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Abstract  
  
British responses to the French Revolution are characterised by humorous 
expression in the literature of the 1790s. Yet political humour is often not readily 
harnessed to an immediate political agenda. ‘Political humour’ as an idea appears 
to be a contradiction and elicits a contradictory set of epithets, which falls into 
two distinct categories: ideological commitment and disinterested amusement. 
This thesis argues that it is this tension that contributes to the redrawing of the 
ambit of politics. This thesis continues the recent scholarly approach to the 
British response to the Revolution less as a formal ‘debate’ than as a 
‘controversy’, which involves a diversity of cultural practices and 
experimentation of expression and social organisation. I argue that the 
employment of humour in the political literature of the 1790s provides extended 
or alternative means of political engagement. The political humour goes beyond 
topical political agendas and alludes to the eighteenth-century comic theory, 
which instructs ethical questions about social relation or ways of life.  
I demonstrate that the claim to autotelic innocence of humour in the comic 
discourse of the eighteenth century was predicated on contradictory social 
tendencies: laughing either reinforces individual boundary or facilitates 
transmissive and collective conviviality. ‘Common life’, which denotes a social 
relation in settlement, is the existential horizon that enacts this contradiction. 
With ‘common life’ in crisis or contestation in the 1790s, and with social 
organisation under political controversy, humour as political disclaimer is 
thereby reworked into a particular political language. I read the comic discourses 
of Burke and the popular radicals, the satire of Peter Pindar, and the comic 
rhetoric of the anti-Jacobin novels to explore this political language. In doing so, 
this thesis seeks to suggest ways of reading the literary culture of the 1790s in 
terms of the circumscription or expansion of the scope of political life, so as to 
examine how humour contributed and responded to changes in political culture. 
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Introduction 
 
The Problem of the Political Nature of Humour  
 
Commenting on the graphic satire of James Gillray, the nineteenth-century 
historian Thomas Wright writes that wit is something above politics and history: 
‘Party politics are transient, but wit survives, when the circumstance in which it 
originated is forgotten, or sunk into insignificance’.1 But is it possible for 
Gillray’s viewer to enjoy his wit without the knowledge or a degree of empathy 
into the political events to which his wit was responding? What, then, does 
Wright suggest of the relationship between comic entertainment and politics? 
This study concentrates on the political humour, or the literature of comic 
expression, that prevailed in Britain in response to the controversies generated by 
the impact of the French Revolution in the 1790s. It analyses the formal features 
of humorous literature in relation to its political content, but not before first 
reconsidering critical methodology. I use ‘humour’ as an umbrella term, a 
convenient synecdoche of a set of key term of the comic modes of expression in 
the comic genres, ranging from modes of language of ‘wit’, ‘humour’, and ‘joke’, 
to genres of comedy, farce, satire, and parody.2 I do so because the objective of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Thomas Wright and R. H. Evans, Historical and Descriptive Account of the Caricatures of 
James Gillray (London, 1851), 174.   
2 The scope of ‘comic’ expression, as critics such as Harry Levin recognise, is indefinite. 
Nonetheless, Levin provides a methodological sleight-of-hand that may help us out of this critical 
impasse: ‘We might find a word of encouragement in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s dictum on games (a 
genus of which comedies are a species, as we shall be recognising). We should look, he tells us, 
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this study is not an analytical inquiry into the rhetorical systems of the comic 
modes of expression, but a political inquiry into, as this study will unfold, the 
social and pragmatic implications in the discourse and practice of any of these 
various modes. Also, I want to highlight the political tensions among these comic 
modes so that the 1790s can be properly represented as an age of controversy 
(for example, as I will show in the chapters, there are political contradictions in 
‘comedy’ and ‘laughter’, or ‘comedy’ and ‘farce’). The range of these terms 
reflects the range of ethical and epistemological concerns in eighteenth-century 
discourse, which I shall address in questions raised in this thesis.  
Wright’s suggestion that a value of innocent amusement can be extracted 
from a humorous expression, even if it is produced in a specific political and 
historical context, may well be put to doubt in our critical climate, in which 
hardly anything can escape the dimension of the political. However, his 
judgment indicates some of our critical problems. At any rate, he is articulate in 
his assertion that ‘wit’ is regarded as something timeless and can be singled out 
and appreciated in its own right, while ‘politics’ is hopelessly bound up with its 
context. But, from the fact that some aesthetic value can be politically 
contextualised, it does not follow that this value in humour can be reduced to yet 
another political variable. A question thus surfaces about the very scope of both 
‘politics’ and ‘humour’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in Philosophical Investigations, not for a single formula but for a network of similarities, 
relationships, and family resemblances (Familienähnlichkeiten)’. See Harry Levin, Playboys and 
Killjoys: An Essay on the Theory and Practice of Comedy (New York: Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 4.  
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By ‘aesthetic’, I mean a particular dimension in the modern sense of the 
word, in which the value of something is determined in its own right rather than 
by its utilitarian function, a value of immediate pleasure that is invested in the 
particular, autonomously self-defining in spite of its context, and can be singled 
out from its political or moral concerns.3 I take the ‘autotelic’ attitude to the 
‘particular’, inter alia, to be an ideological element shared by the 
eighteenth-century discourse of ‘humour’.4 If autotelic disinterestedness is one 
defining character of the aesthetic, as well as ‘innocent’ amusement, then it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The modern idea of the aesthetic certainly involves reference to the Kantian notion of 
uniqueness in particular, though the dimension of autonomy in the idea of the aesthetic continues 
to be shared by modern critics and philosophers across the political spectrum. Although it is 
widely acknowledged that autonomy is by no means the sole nature or sufficiently defining 
characteristic of the aesthetic, and that it is subject to contestations about its range of moral and 
political meanings, critics from Left to Right still take the autonomous dimension as an 
indispensable point of departure. For modern ethical or political reflections on the aesthetic in 
this light, see Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind (London: 
Methuen, 1974); Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), esp. ch. 
1; Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. Gabriel 
Rockhill (London; New York: Continuum, 2004), and Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, 
trans. Steven Corcoran (London; New York: Continuum, 2010), esp. ch. 9.  
4  This understanding finds echoes in modern criticism on comedy and aesthetic. Some 
twentieth-century philosophical reflections associate the aesthetic with the comic in this 
metaphysical premise. See, for example, Steven Connor’s reading of Terry Eagleton’s Ideology 
of the Aesthetic as informed by the metaphysical reflection on the comic. Connor, ‘Art, Criticism 
and Laughter: Terry Eagleton on Aesthetics’, Lecture at ‘Aesthetics, Gender, Nation’, University 
of Oxford, March 1998, <http://stevenconnor.com/artlaugh.html>. However, in his essay 
‘Comedy and Finitude’, Simon Critchley argues that modern European aesthetics establishes a 
‘tragic-heroic’ paradigm that systematically represses the alternative ‘comic’ paradigm. Yet 
Critchley’s concentration on the Continental tradition may not fit the eighteenth-century British 
context snugly, which precisely substantiates its aesthetic discourse with reflections on the comic. 
See Critchley, ‘Comedy and Finitude: Displacing the Tragic-Heroic Paradigm in Philosophy and 
Psychoanalysis’, in Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary 
French Thought (London: Verso, 1999), 217-38. 
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immediately poses a paradoxical problem for humour as a political expression. 
Of course, it may be argued that it was with historical distance that Wright could 
write with an aesthetic distance from the Revolutionary context, yet what is 
intriguing is that the contemporary uses of political humour in the 1790s, even 
those which involve salient agendas, emphasise its aesthetic neutrality.  
Instances of this kind abound, not least in the famous caricature, Richard 
Newton’s ‘Treason!!!’ (1798; see Illustration, p.7). Newton’s caricature was 
produced in the wake of the government’s broadened definition of treason in 
answer to the subversive threats, which, as John Barrell argues, evolved from 
‘aristocratic crime’ as ‘direct or indirect attempts on the life of the king’ to effect 
aristocratic regime change, to a diversity of cultural practice that jeopardised ‘the 
whole constitution’.5 Mocking the government’s paranoid fear of subversion, 
Newton’s caricature has John Bull farting at a picture of the King. Newton’s 
wager clearly lies in the argument that jokes and laughter are innocent enough to 
disclaim political purpose. However, the point is that Newton’s depoliticising 
statement is precisely his political argument. He obviously disputes with the 
government’s style of rule that, according to Newton’s interpretation, 
over-politicises an innocent, disinterested and innocuous practice of humour. 
However, Newton’s rhetorical economy, which vividly presents a political case 
in apolitical language, shall not obscure the ambiguities compressed in the very 
economy of his satire. Although the King and the government (represented by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  John Barrell, Imagining the King’s Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide, 
1793-1796 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 129.  
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William Pitt’s head probing in from outside) are the subjects of the satire, it is 
John Bull who takes the centre stage. The ‘king’, on the other hand, is a print 
version on public display who suffers John Bull’s asphyxiation vicariously. If we 
imagine that John Bull is a private reader making fun of the public print image of 
George, Pitt looks like a government intruder into private space. It is the space of 
the plebian joke that is at the centre, while the government, represented by Pitt, 
functions like a censorious voiceover. Here Pitt becomes an amusing killjoy in 
comedy, a gadfly of the plebian carnival. The near absence of the king and the 
government from the public stage may imply that political power can remain 
intact behind the curtain. Society is ambiguously both under and out of control.6  
 Such rhetorical sleight-of-hand that plays with the ambiguity between 
political agenda and apolitical laughter is also a far cry from the Hobbes’s 
understanding of laughter, which conceived laughter as a political utility. Hobbes 
in the seventeenth century defined the passion of laughter as ‘a sudden glory 
arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Vic Gatrell provides an interesting speculation on why Newton escaped government 
prosecution: ‘Had Treason!!! been prosecuted, the court would have been obliged to debate 
whether Newton himself had the seditiously “wicked purpose of ridiculing the king and royal 
family”, or whether he was merely warning against that wickedness, as his defence would have 
claimed. He would also have been protected by the need to read out in court an indictment in 
pompous legalese that would have to describe a farting figure. This would have so punctured the 
law’s solemnity that prosecution would have been counterproductive.’ Vic Gatrell, City of 
Laughter: Sex and Satire in Eighteenth-Century London (London: Atlantic, 2006), 485. Gatrell’s 
suggestion implies that prosecution of a work of this nature will render the ambit of treason law 
in particular and government control in general alarmingly unstable and self-subversive. This 
teases out the problem of the ambit of politics itself in the 1790s which will be a main theme in 
this study.     
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with the infirmities of others’.7 If a sense of triumph is the key to the nature of 
laughter, then the ontological attribute of laughter would seem to be politically 
functional. Laughter is understood in terms of political warfare, in which it is 
effective in gaining superiority over others. But Newton’s message to his 
government censors — that he is just laughing — shifts the terrain of the 
question from the use of laughter to the act of laughing itself. Or, the terrain 
shifts from the political purpose under a particular practice of humour to the 
nature of humour as such. Certainly, Newton’s rhetoric may still involve a sense 
of superiority (over the caricatured Pitt, for instance). The radical satirists in the 
1790s surely still welcomed forms of triumph such as laughter in the warfare 
with their political enemies. Yet the significance of Newton’s piece is the way in 
which its satirical edge is delivered through a treacherous emptying of immediate 
semantics. The semantic void opens up pragmatic possibilities. Newton raises the 
question of whether or not laughter should be regarded as a political expression 
at all. The question of laughter, in short, concerns a shift of focus from what 
laughing does to what laughter is.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	   Elements	  of	  Law	  Natural	  and	  Politic,	  ed.	   J.	  C.	  A.	  Gaskin	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  I.IX.13-­‐14,	  54-­‐55.	  




Illustration 1, Richard Newton, ‘Treason!!!”, (1798)  
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The very idea of ‘political humour’ may strike one as an oxymoron, as the 
two words may evoke contradictory sets of epithets: humour is often understood 
as disarming, disinterested, diverting, affectively detached, anti-heroic, comic, 
innocent, autotelic, aesthetical, and innocuously ‘private’; while politics concerns 
power, interest, identity, propaganda, confrontation, tragic struggle, commitment 
and ‘public’ spirit. The matter, I contend, lies both in the politics of humour and 
the political character of humour, the latter raising the question of whether 
humour is to be regarded as a political expression at all.  
With this in mind, I wish to intervene the scholarship on political humour in 
this period. Humour may serve to consolidate received wisdoms or entrench 
reactionary stereotypes, as well as to estrange or undermine them. It can be 
radical or reactionary, lending itself both to 'resistance' and 'control'.8 For all the 
adequate acknowledgements of the radical diversity of humour, however, these 
studies often constrain analyses on the phenomenological level. When cracking a 
joke in a politically sensitive context, for example, and when the joking 
individual defends himself with statements like ‘it’s only a joke’ or ‘have a sense 
of humour!’, it is less a comment on the content than on the contextual condition. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I can only provide a very selective list here. Nevertheless, all the studies in the following list 
addresses the methodological issues I have been discussing: Villy Tsakona and Diana Elena Popa 
(eds.), Studies in Political Humour: In between Political Critique and Public Entertainment 
(Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2011); Alison Dagnes, A Conservative Walks into a 
Bar: The Politics of Political Humor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Marjolein 't Hart 
and Dennis Bos (eds.), Humour and Social Protest (Cambridge; New York: Press Syndicate of 
the University of Cambridge, 2007); Sharon Lockyer and Michael Pickering (eds.), Beyond a 
Joke: The Limits of Humour (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); 
Chris Powell, George E.C. Paton (eds.), Humour in Society: Resistance and Control (New York: 
St. Martin's, 1988).  
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Either it accuses the listeners of making what in philosophy is called a ‘category 
mistake’, of judging a performative, aesthetic practice with analytical and moral 
criteria, or it displaces political content in the comic frame of reference to 
disclaim responsibility. On the other hand, retorts to this disclaimer such as ‘it’s 
not funny!’ serve either to banish humour from the realm of serious political 
topics, or to reintroduce political responsibility to the practice of humour. In 
either case, this raises questions about what humour and politics consist of and 
where their boundaries lie. Questions of this kind must not be overlooked in 
favour of questions of their historicity. In a political context, the statement ‘It’s 
only a joke’ not only depoliticises the joke but also at the same times defines the 
boundary between humour and politics. Political humour concerns the question 
of how to approach the relationship between politics and humour, not only in 
terms of how humour expresses and mediates political arguments, but also in the 
sense that humour may shift the terrain of engagement or sometimes even 
threaten or undo its political cases altogether, teasing out questions as to what 
constitutes a political question at all. 
To ask what it means to say ‘it is only a joke’ in political contexts enables 
us to approach a much-neglected question. Humour as a political expression in 
the Revolutionary era has attracted scholarly attention, and there are numerous 
criticisms undertaking to analyse humorous expression in political contexts. 
Many of them, however, are more often conducted ad hoc than systematically 
(for instance, mockery as a practical strategy to dismiss or discredit particular 
targets). Certainly, some criticisms undertake to analyse the nature and the 
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political attributes of humour, yet they often too neatly situate their analysis in 
certain unequivocal political interests. A popular approach is to see political 
humour as a satiric strategy that challenges received values and orthodoxy, such 
as the focus on ‘subversive’ laughter in the literature by the politically 
disenfranchised — the lower orders, woman, etc. — to assess humour as a 
democratic or feminist intervention into power and hegemony.9 Sometimes 
critics tend to make hasty ontological statements. In reading radical humour of 
the romantic period, Marcus Wood makes a generalising assertion that ‘parody’ 
is essentially subversive.10 But Newton’s parody of government witch-hunting, I 
have noted, may involve ambiguous use of humour as an end in itself that may or 
may not fully comply with his radicalism. And it will be dubious to apply 
Wood’s judgment to anti-Jacobin parody of radicalism. Many feminist readings 
on the humour of women writers seem to conclude that women’s humour is ipso 
facto radical because it involves blasting patriarchal authority and its monopoly 
of humour.11 Yet it is uncertain, for instance, whether the comic caricature of the 
extravagance of sensibility in the women novelists is radical or conservative. 
Among other things, this kind of approach may subscribe to the received critical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Scholars on popular radicalism tend to present its humorous expression as a subversive carnival 
against oppression or strict discipline. See Joseph Butwin, ‘Seditious Laughter’, Radical History 
Review, 18 (1978), 17-34; James Epstein, Radical Expression (Oxford, 1994); Marcus Wood, 
Radical Satire and Print Culture, 1790-1822 (Oxford, 1994); Michael Scrivener, Seditious 
Allegories: John Thelwall and Jacobin Writing (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2001), esp. ch. 5.  
10 Wood, Radical Satire and Print Culture, 13. 11	   See e.g. Audrey Bilger, Laughing Feminism (Detroit, 1998); Jill Heydt-Stevenson, Austen's 
Unbecoming Conjunctions: Subversive Laughter, Embodied History (Basingstoke, 2005).	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wisdom that comedy represents a world upside down, and thus is naturally 
subversive. But reactionary humour in the literature of the 1790s was as 
flourishing.  
It is for this reason that this study will undertake to read political humour on 
both sides of the political spectrum. As a matter of fact, languages of wit and 
humour characterise a good deal of the British responses to the impact of the 
French Revolution, from both sides of the political spectrum. Political humour 
pervades the republic of letters on political questions in the 1790s: for instance, 
Thomas Paine’s comic ridicule of the political establishment in Rights of Man; 
the comic political satire of John Thelwall, Thomas Spence and William Cobbett; 
the comic plays of ‘Jacobin’ novelists such as Thomas Holcroft and Elizabeth 
Inchbald; the ‘subversive’ laughter in the political parodies of Daniel Eaton, 
Charles Pigott, Richard ‘Citizen’ Lee and numerous anonymous popular authors; 
the caricatures of James Gillray, Thomas Rowlandson, Isaac and George 
Cruikshank; the mock-epical attack on the British political regime by the 
extremely popular political satirist, John Wolcot (‘Peter Pindar’); the 
conservative satire of William Gifford and the ‘anti-Jacobins’; the 
counter-revolutionary humour in the conservative, or ‘anti-Jacobin’, novels by 
Isaac D’Israeli, Elizabeth Hamilton and many others; let alone the numerous, 
mostly anonymous pamphlets and ephemeral prints ridiculing the politics and the 
fashions of the time. To clarify, this study does not seek to exhaust this vast 
literature in a comprehensive survey. Its objective is to reconsider the critical 
approaches that appear to me to require a more systematic and ideological 
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inquiry. In fact, works of political humour are often tonally nuanced, politically 
and ethically tricky. They problematise perceived reality, and entertain 
subversive visions without espousing radical or oppositional commitment. To 
name only one of the numerous examples, the satire of John Wolcot, as I will 
show in Chapter 3, produces jokes that alarm the loyalists, while being distant 
from radical ideologies in some respects. More problematic still is the existence 
of loyalist political humour, which, sometimes powerfully, reveals the 
ideological contradictions or wistfulness of the radicals, and in this sense 
subverts the ideology of the oppositions while vindicating and consolidating the 
ruling orthodoxy in crisis. Above all, the problem of humour for its own sake in 
political rhetoric is often why its political message can be read ambivalently and 
equivocally. It implies that humour can be to a certain extent an independent 
category that merits inquiry into its nature, scope and ideological system. 
Because of the problematic apolitical rhetoric, it is important not to rely on 
pre-judgement of the political tendency of humour. I contend that the political 
nature and character of humour should be rethought systematically before we 
attempt to decipher the significations in a political humour. 
 
Joke as a Political Expression and the Political Community  
 
By accentuating the slippery character of humour, this study reconsiders the 
theoretical issues surrounding comic expression in the political controversy of 
the Revolution. Comic expression, by virtue of its ambivalent character between 
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satiric allegory and autotelic amusement, posed immediate semantic difficulty 
for the contemporary audience. An illustrative example is the humorous attacks 
on the British state by popular radicals, which sit ambiguously between a hidden 
seditious or revolutionary project and innocuous entertainment. Take, for 
instance, John Thelwall’s animal fable ‘King Chaunticlere’, which resulted in 
Daniel Isaac Eaton’s trial for high treason for publishing it. The fable allegedly 
compares the King to a gamecock, which is decapitated because of its tyrannical 
behaviours among fellow cocks. The plot was read as a seditious allegory for 
regicide.12 John Barrell discusses how the ambiguities of the humorous language 
posed difficulties of interpretation and probably played a role in the 
government’s failure to pin down the fable’s meaning and convict the radicals:  
The humour of these [radical] imaginings may certainly sometimes have 
been strategic: it seems quite likely for example that Thelwall believed that 
his fable could teach that the only good king was a dead king, but that by 
passing it off as a simple jeu d’esprit he could ridicule the notion that he 
was also in earnest in recommending the king’s execution. But humour may 
also have allowed radicals to avoid asking themselves exactly what these 
regicidal imaginings were about and whether they were in earnest or not. It 
may also have been, for many of them, an essential condition of their being 
able to imagine the king’s death at all. They had passed their whole lives in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Daniel Isaac Eaton (ed.), Politics for the People; or a Salmagundy for Swine, 8 (16 Nov. 
1793), 102-07. For a modern edition of the text, see Nicholas Mason (ed.), British Satire, 
1785-1840, vol. 1 (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2003), 44-46. For a useful discussion, see 
Michael Scrivener, Seditious Allegories: John Thelwall and Jacobin Writing (University Park, 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 112-18.  
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the aura and shadow of the quasi-mystical authority of the Crown, and there 
must have been a huge psychological barrier in the way of conceiving its 
extinction, a barrier which, if it could not easily be shifted, could be got 
round, so to speak, by humour.13  
Barrell’s reflection addresses the many nuances of political meaning in 
Thelwall’s humour. As Barrell suggests, it is ambiguous whether humour assists 
political expression and interpretation or frustrates it. If humour can pass itself 
off ‘as a simple jeu d’esprit’, then the semantic correspondence between words 
the real meanings can be bracketed, and the whole verbal act displaced to 
autotelic performativity. Secondly, if, by assuming a poetic license in which 
moral and political transgression can be symbolically allowed, humour helps to 
lift the ‘psychological barrier’ caused by the supposed indestructibility of 
political power or illegitimacy of subversive action, then it also suggests that this 
method of self-protection shifts the terrain of argument to a place where the 
government will find it difficult to impose its power to prosecute. In other words, 
this escape into the vicarious enjoyment of subversion, where the scope of 
government policing fails to reach, could become a paradoxical empowerment 
for radicals. Barrell effectively points out that, in addition to strategic concerns, 
humour may also be employed as a byway of political engagement in addition to 
direct and literal confrontation. Humour may frustrate the attempt to determine 
its political tendency because of its facetious and playful tonality, or because of 
its bearing on the old ethical dilemma between jest and earnestness, but it does at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 John Barrell, Imagining the King’s Death, 122.  
	   15	  
times function as an indirect form of political expression that can either provide 
shelter from political responsibility or for illegitimate opinions that are otherwise 
banished from political orthodoxy.  
In a sense, humour can be regarded as a byway of political expression that 
can complicate and reinvent, if not problematise, political questions. Mark Philp 
has regarded ‘King Chaunticlere’ as a demonstration of radical experimentation 
and exploration for alternative political languages to ‘high theory’.14 For Jon 
Mee, ‘King Chaunticlere’ exemplifies the radical literature of the 1790s as a 
‘bricolage’ rather than a prescribed, well-executed formal language of 
Enlightenment rationality, for it shows that the popular radicals often did not 
share orthodox political platforms but rather had to explore alternative styles of 
political participation.15 Mee has raised this historical and methodological issue 
in many other cases of popular radicalism, and has thereby repeatedly contended 
that these popular radicals evidence a shared central theme that the political 
dispute of the 1790s was less of a ‘debate’ than a ‘controversy’. The idea of 
‘debate’, Mee argues, ‘suggests some kind of exchange between stable, 
well-defined subject positions’ which cannot adequately describe the more 
protean form of radical expression and radical readership that characterised the 
dispute.16 It is important to note that the evolution from ‘debate’ to ‘controversy’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Mark Philp, ‘The Fragmented Ideology of Reform’, in Mark Philp (ed.), The French 
Revolution and British Popular Politics ((Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 70-72.  
15 Jon Mee, ‘“Examples of Safe Printing”, Censorship and Popular Radical Literature in the 
1790s’, in Nigel Smith (ed.), Literature and Censorship (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1993), 81-95. 
16 Mee, ‘The Political Showman at Home: Reflections on Popular Radicalism and Print Culture 
in the 1790s’, in Michael T. Davis, 42. For his case studies on such popular radicals as Richard 
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and the diversity of political expression was certainly a shared reality across the 
political spectrum. 17 Because the political horizon was unstable under the 
conditions of the Revolution, in which the formerly politically disenfranchised 
(both of radicalism and conservatism) were demanding wider participation 
politically as well as culturally, a formal, highly-regulated ‘debate’ was unable to 
accommodate a diversity of political demands.18   
The indefiniteness of the political horizon reminds us of Barrell’s thesis of 
the limitless politicisation of various aspects of social life in the 1790s in his 
more recent work. Barrell expounds on this theme and sheds light on a variety of 
cultural and social practices that gained a political character in the politically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lee and Charles Pigott, see ‘The Strange Case of Richard “Citizen” Lee: Poetry, Popular 
Radicalism, and enthusiasm in the 1790s’, in Timothy Morton and Nigel Smith (ed.), Radicalism 
in British Literary Culture, 1650-1830: From Revolution to Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 151-66; ‘Libertines and Radicals in the 1790s: The Strange Case of 
Charles Pigott I’, in Peter Cryle and Lisa O’Donnell (eds.), Libertine Enlightenment: Sex, Liberty 
and Licence in the Eighteenth Century (London: Palgrave, 2003), 185–203; ‘“A Bold and 
Freespoken Man”: The Strange Career of Charles Pigott II’, in David Womersley (ed.), ‘Cultures 
of Whiggism’: New Essays on English Literature and Culture in the Long Eighteenth Century 
(Newark, New Jersey: University of Delaware Press, 2005), 330–50.  
17 I will elaborate on this theme particularly in my discussion of conservative humour in Chapter 
4.  
18 Mark Philp points out that the development of conservatism in the 1790s was also not 
restricted to the elite but was seeking extension into a popular base. See his ‘Vulgar 
Conservatism, 1792-3’, English Historical Review, 110 (1995), 42-69. For elaboration on such 
development, see Kevin Gilmartin, Writing against Revolution: Literary Conservatism in Britain, 
1790-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), particularly chapter 2 on Hannah 
More and her Cheap Repository Tracts.  
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charged 1790s.19 This study adopts an approach that is in broad agreement with 
Barrell’s thesis, which rightly recognises that, among other things, humour opens 
up an alternative horizon of political engagement. Yet I believe a more 
systematic inquiry into political humour beyond Barrell’s passing remark is 
needed, and it does not seem very clear how far Barrell has considered that the 
idea of universal politicisation is not fully commensurable to the received 
wisdom that all critical questions are by nature political. This thesis of 
‘politicisation’ implies that the scope of politics was in flux; a diversity of modes 
of expression, then, is not only a symptom of a politically indefinite era, but also 
a necessary means of addressing issues that were only newly politicised and 
therefore had to rely on innovative or unorthodox modes of address. Although 
the aestheticism of humour can certainly be approached in terms of particular 
political frameworks, it is not to be reduced to another political variable. 
‘Politicisation’ as a verb implies that the ubiquity of politics was still developing 
in the 1790s, rather than that the political character of cultural and practical 
issues was permanent. The scope of politics was malleable to the extent that 
politicisation and depoliticisation could be at work simultaneously. Humour, in 
my view, reflects a historical process regarding how a political life is imagined 
or lived in the 1790s.  
 It is important to stress that humour contributes to determining a way of 
political life because it instructs or implies of the ways in which political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See, in particular, John Barrell, ‘“An Entire Change of Performance?” The Politicisation of 
Theatre and the Theatricalisation of Politics in the mid 1790s’, Lumen, 17 (1998): 11-50, and The 
Spirit of Despotism: Invasions of Privacy in the 1790s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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community is recognised and organised. By recognising alternative political 
expressions at work in the 1790s, Mee and Barrell rightly suggest, though 
sometimes only covertly, that the broadened controversy inspired by the use of 
other modes of expression goes beyond the level of argument to the level of 
identity and the political life as such. The language of depoliticisation in humour, 
in this sense, can be viewed as a departure from the consensual ‘political’ forum 
of the linguistically and behaviorally regulated ‘debate’ to create new social 
spaces where ideological contents are extended to the question of how political 
community is constructed in which to live a political life. As Michael Scrivener 
writes of ‘English Jacobinism’ in the case of Thelwall, it involves the reshaping 
of the public sphere and the very style of life in radicalism.20 According to Cecil 
Thelwall’s Life of John Thelwall, Thelwall’s Chaunticlere joke ‘was told with 
such an irresistible spirit of humour, that it at once put an end to argument, and 
was received with shouts of laughter and applause’.21 The significance of joke 
lies not as much in the validity of argument as in the tightening of radical 
community through the ritual of solidarity in laughter.  
 
Humour as a Way of Life and Byway to Knowledge  
 
The critical commentaries of Mee, Scrivener and others on radical humour 
suggest that the humour should be understood not simply as practical political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	   Scrivener, Seditious Allegories, passim.	  
21 [Cecil] Thelwall, The Life of John Thelwall (London: John Macrone, 1837), 110. See also 
Scrivener, Seditious Allegories, 118.  
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weapons but also as particular ways of constructing and organising the culture 
and social relations of radicalism. Such is the meaning of radical rituals, print 
culture, symbolism, and the byways of political ‘controversy’, to which I shall 
return in Chapter 2. Indeed, Richard Newton’s disavowal of political tendency 
likewise delivers a message that laughter is an expression of a lifestyle which 
takes pleasure in laughing, regardless of its content. This dimension of social life 
as a broad ideological content of humour is what I want to foreground in this 
study. Although I have so far used the examples of radical humour as my 
opening gambit, I want to stress that humour as a way of life is the common 
ground across the political spectrum in the 1790s. This study wants to sideline 
the utilitarian, topic-centered approach to humour in the political context and to 
inquire into the political nature of humour because, by constructing political 
communities and defining ways of life, ‘humour’ contains intrinsic value system 
that merits a political inquiry in its own right, with or without reference to topical 
political agendas.  
Influential theories of comedy in the twentieth century such as Freud, 
Bergson and Bakhtin point out that humour must be understood in terms of its 
sociality and its philosophy of life. Freud recognises that joke is a social process 
with which one defines relations with others; Bergson and Bakhtin conceive 
laughter and humour as a celebration of life in company.22 Although the details 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Sigmund Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, trans. James Strachey, ed. 
Strachey and Angela Richards (London: Penguin, 1976); Henri Bergson, ‘Laughter’, in Wylie 
Sypher (ed.), Comedy: ‘An Essay on Comedy’ by George Meredith and ‘Laughter’ by Henri 
Bergson (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1956), 61-190; Mikhail I. Bakhtin, 
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of eighteenth-century humour do not always fit snugly into these theoretical 
models, its ethical outlook does corroborate the general validity of these modern 
theories. Comedy in the eighteenth century was not simply to be utilised but to 
be lived. ‘Humour’ has broadened its semantic scope from political or moral 
utility of ridicule to an attitude towards human life, not least in the famous 
example of Laurence Sterne’s pronouncement of laughter as a philosophy of life 
‘against the spleen’.23 This development corresponds to the burgeoning of 
popular comic print in the eighteenth century. The jest-book, for example, does 
not hesitate to stress that joke is an integral part of the physical and mental 
economy of everyday life: ‘The chearfulness or mirth, as a relaxation from the 
cares and business of the world, is as necessary for proper existence of man 
through life, almost as food to satisfy cravings for hunger, or sleep to rest the 
weary limbs, and fit the body for the renewal of the toil and fatigues of the day, 
will not admit of the smallest dubity’.24 The uses of humour in the 1790s very 
often allude to and negotiate with the eighteenth-century theory and philosophy 
of humour, wit, and comedy. Because much of the literature I investigate is 
conscious of its practices being problematic of political expression, this study 
will pay special attention to the eighteenth-century comic theory and criticism.  
The chief category with which the eighteenth-century comic literature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rabelais and His World, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 
1984).  
23 Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman, ed. Ian Campbell 
Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 239.  
24 The Wit's Magazine; or, New Convivial Jester (Sunderland, 1782), [iii].  
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explicates or expresses their take on humour as a way of life is that of ‘common 
life’. In fact, ‘common life’ was established as the province of comedy in 
eighteenth-century criticism. Authors subscribing to this critical paradigm 
include Addison, Arthur Murphy, James Beattie, George Campbell, Hugh Blair, 
John and Anna Letitia Aikin (Barbauld), and many others.25 ‘Common life’ is a 
notion that delimits the language of comedy as that of the mundane and 
commonplace. An article in Henry McKenzie’s periodical The Mirror maintains 
that the language of ‘humour’ has to ‘descend to common and ludicrous pictures 
of life; if, in short, he is to deal in humorous composition, his language must be, 
as nearly as possible, that of the common life, that of the bulk of the people’.26 
As Beattie puts it: ‘The language of Comedy is that of common life improved in 
point of correctness, but not much elevated; — both because the speakers are of 
middle and lower ranks of mankind, and also because the affairs they are 
engaged in give little scope to those emotions that exalt the mind, and rouse the 
imagination.’27 In Hugh Blair’s words: ‘the action of Comedy being more 
familiar to us than that of Tragedy, more like what we are accustomed to see[ing] 
in common life, we judged easily of what is probable, and are more hurt by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Murphy will be discussed in Chapter 2. See below for discussion of Beattie, Campbell, Blair, 
and the Aikins. See also John Adams, Elements of Useful Knowledge (London, 1793), 226: 
‘Comedy is an agreeable imitation of the actions, humours, and customs of common life’; and 
Vicesimus Knox, ‘On Ridicule, as a Test of Truth in Common Life’, Essays Moral and Literary, 
2nd edn, 2 vols. (London: Edward and Charles Dilly, 1779), 1: 241-53.  
26 The Mirror, 83 (22 Feb. 1780), 80. See also Conclusion.  
27 Beattie, Essays on Laughter, and Ludicrous Composition, 3rd edn. (London; Edinburgh, 1779), 
210-11. 
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want of it.’28 For Blair, the subject of comedy should be kept apart from the 
transcendent majesty of tragedy and wayward fancy and exoticism, and 
concentrate on the immediate life world: ‘In the managements of Characters, one 
of the most common faults of Comic Writers, is the carrying of them too far 
beyond life’. He adds: ‘Certain degrees of exaggeration are allowed to the 
Comedian; but there are limits set to it by nature and good taste.’29 John and 
Anna Aikin contrast comedy with its generic opposite, tragedy: they assert that 
modern tragedy ‘removed too far from the rank of common life’.30 In general, 
the eighteenth-century comic critics employ the idea of ‘common life’ as 
concrete experience of the mundane in contrast to the elevated or the 
transcendent.  
As for ‘humour’, it is conceived as a productive force in human life and a 
byway to knowledge in the eighteenth-century intellectual and cultural tradition. 
It is concomitant with the discourse on British national character as a humorous 
cast of mind, and a comic outlook that partly characterises the British 
Enlightenment.31 In a century customarily construed as an age of reason, ‘comic’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, (London: W. Strahan, 1983), 3: 364-65.  
29 Ibid, 368.  
30 John Aikin and Anna Laetitia Aikin, ‘On the Province of Comedy’, in Miscellaneous Pieces, 
in Prose (London: J. Johnson, 1773), 21. 
31 See the classic account in Stuart Tave, The Amiable Humorist: A Study in the Comic Theory 
and Criticism of the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1960), ch. 5. For wit and humour as a component of ‘Englishness’, see Paul Langford, 
Englishness Identified: Manners and Character, 1650-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 286-90.  
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or ‘ludicrous’ language was also regarded as a productive practice.32  The 
recognition of the significance of humorous expression in relation to the question 
of meaningful knowledge includes the familiar controversy over ridicule as a test 
of truth, which originates from a religious context.33 The recognition of the 
productivity of wit and humour was concomitant with the development of 
‘incongruity’ theory, which was set to replace Hobbes theory of superiority.34 
Generally, ‘incongruity’ works by mismatching codes or texts. It is that which 
disrupts the imaginary harmony in the perception of reality. As James Beattie 
puts it, ‘a ludicrous object must be made up of several parts; that the parts 
whereof it is made up must be in some degree inconsistent, unsuitable, or 
incongruous; and that they must be considered as united in one assemblage, or as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For a study that addresses forms of quixotism as an alternative mode of ‘reason’ to 
Enlightenment rationality, see Wendy Motooka, The Age of Reasons: Quixotism, Sentimentalism, 
and Political Economy in Eighteenth-Century Britain (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). 
Curiously, however, Motooka reads Addison as an absolutist of reason, which, though sensible in 
some cases, overstates her case and overlooks Addison’s emphasis on human faculties other than 
reason. The platitude of ‘Enlightenment’ as a shorthand of reason has provoked some other 
revisionist accounts, not least in Roy Porter’s re-evaluation of the British version of 
Enlightenment culture. See Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern 
World (London: Penguin, 2000).  
33  For a useful survey of the controversy, see Thomas B. Gilmore, The Eighteenth-Century 
Controversy over Ridicule as a Test of Truth: A Reconsideration (Atlanta: Georgia State 
University, 1970).  
34 See a classic account in Stuart Tave, The Amiable Humorist: A Study in the Comic Theory and 
Criticism of the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1960). See also Chapter 1 below. For other useful accounts of incongruity theory, though 
not always historically accurate concerning its origins, See John Morreall, Taking Laughter 
Seriously (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), and Morreall (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Laughter and Humour (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987); Simon 
Critchley, On Humour (London: Routledge, 2002), 3. 
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acquiring a sort of mutual connection from the peculiar manner in which the 
mind takes notice of them.’35 This incongruity theory of humour broadens the 
Enlightenment pursuit of knowledge, because it perceives productivity in 
seemingly unproductive discord and absurdity. Addison at the beginning of the 
century revises Locke’s seventeenth-century distinction between ‘wit’ and 
‘judgment’ and argues that it is possible for wit to go by a different route to 
attain judgment and knowledge than that of rational language.36 Later, Joseph 
Priestley adds that the perception of comic incongruity is capable of producing 
knowledge from an otherwise unrecognised source, as the surprise comes along 
with ‘quick succession of thought’ and ‘enlargement of idea’.37 
The comic mode of expression thus went beyond its negative function of 
ridicule and was introduced by eighteenth-century thinkers and literati into the 
production process of knowledge and pleasure. The semantic development of 
‘wit’ and ‘humour’ in the eighteenth-century criticism reflects that the comic 
mode of expression was conceived not merely as a rhetorical device. ‘Wit’ as 
verbal and intellectual ingenuity and ‘humour’ as psycho-physiological condition 
have widened their semantic and ethical ambits to denote the disposition to 
engage in the mirth of social life. Shaftesbury’s rejection of Hobbes’ thesis of 
egotism, one can recall, involves the ‘freedom of wit and humour’ that affirms 
and expresses human sociability and the art of pleasing in the company of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 James Beattie, Elements of Moral Science (Edinburgh, 1790), 1: 162.  
36 See Joseph Addison, ‘No. 62’, The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1965), 1: 263-70. See also Sitter, Arguments of Augustan Wit, 62-64.   
37 Joseph Priestley, A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (London: J. Johnson, 1777), 
197-98.  
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polite. Albeit in ways that are distinct from those of reason, wit and humour are 
also conducive to communication and the pursuit of knowledge in a particular 
communicative and imaginative economy.38 Addison claims that the Spectator 
endeavours to ‘enliven Morality with Wit and to temper Wit with Morality’ as a 
means of bringing moral and aesthetic categories together in reciprocity as part 
of his Enlightenment project.39 Samuel Johnson’s operative definition of wit as 
‘discordia concors; a combination of dissimilar images or discovery of occult 
resemblances in things apparently unlike’, reflects an eighteenth-century 
understanding of the inventiveness of language in wit capable of making sense 
out of apparent nonsense. 40  Mark Akenside states in The Pleasures of 
Imagination that ‘some stubborn dissonance of things’ is productive of comic 
incongruity that ‘strikes on the quick observer’. The wit necessary for this 
perception will ‘aid the tardy steps of Reason’.41 ‘Humour’, on the other hand, 
moves from physiological pathology in the seventeenth century to a mark of 
original ‘character’ that can offer the vitality of a sociable milieu to 
eighteenth-century secular philosophy. In the seventeenth century, Samuel Butler 
pronounced that ‘Humour is but a Crookedness of the Mind, a disproportioned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 John Sitter provides a revisionist account of the eighteenth-century arguments and uses of wit, 
not as mere verbal cleverness dismissed by Locke in the seventeenth century, but as imaginative 
pursuit of alternative ‘truth’ that bequeaths a legacy to the Romantics. See John Sitter, Arguments 
of Augustan Wit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
39 Addison, ‘No. 10’, The Spectator, 1: 44.  
40 Samuel Johnson, ‘Cowley’, in John H. Middendorf (ed.), Lives of the Poets, The Yale Edition 
of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010), 26. Cf. 
Rambler 167: ‘Concordia discors, that suitable disagreement [of mind] which is always 
necessary to intellectual harmony’ See Yale Edition, 5: 123-24.  
41 Mark Akenside, The Pleasures of Imagination (Dublin: George Faulkner, 1744), 83, 87.  
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Swelling of the Brain, that draws the Nourishment from the other Parts, to stuff 
an ugly and deformed Crup-Shoulder’.42 In the eighteenth century, ‘humour’ 
was affirmed by a host of intellectuals as an evidence of the British diversity of 
characters and a reason for their self-congratulation of an ‘English liberty’ that 
prided itself not only on its toleration for eccentricity, but also on its fostering of 
amiability and benevolence in amusement. 43  In general, the etymological 
changes in ‘wit’ and ‘humour’, corresponding to the incongruity theory, show the 
growing (Enlightenment) relish for the irreducible plethora of worldly experience 
that infinitely enlarges the scope of knowledge and pleasure. It reflects the 
growing relish for the particular — hence, in a sense, the aesthetic character.  
These discursive developments, particularly ‘common life’ as a general 
practical horizon, appear to be apolitical, but I shall demonstrate that their 
distinct political character is precisely inherent in the depoliticising language. 
Chapter 1 will investigate the eighteenth-century comic theory to explicate and to 
identify the ideological strains that are still present in the political controversy of 
the 1790s. The discursive paradigm I discuss is the hegemonic culture of 
politeness, which proposes a theory of wit and humour that are set within the 
ethos of civil society in commercial Britain that encourages diversity of 
individuality. It is in this cultural milieu that the theory of ‘incongruity’, often 
produced in the perception of the variety of individual oddity, was established to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Samuel Butler, Characters and Passages from Note-Books, ed. A. R. Waller (Cambridge, 
1908), 138-39.   
43 See Paul Langford, Englishness Identified: Manners and Character, 1650-1850 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 289-91. For humour and English ‘liberty’, see also Chapter 1 
below.  
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define a comic way of social life. It is also in this discursive milieu that the idea 
of ‘common life’, whose semantic scope dwells ambiguously inside and outside 
the political, was established as the legitimate content of comedy. I argue that the 
generally depoliticising discourse of the comedy of ‘common life’ harbours its 
own implicit political contradiction in the form of the crowd, which signifies the 
potential overturn of that the version of ‘common life’ in civil society. This latent 
(or repressed) political contradiction in the comic theory (re-)surfaced in the 
wake of Revolutionary events when fear of crowd (‘mob’) politics mounted and 
when the flood of political writings responded to these events.  
The subsequent chapters investigate three different cases in the 1790s and 
address the problem of humour in the politicised milieu in terms of the social 
dimension of the comic theory expounded in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 reads Burke’s 
Reflections, which goes far beyond technical constitutional issue to raise 
questions concerning the political community substantiated by the comic ways of 
life. It is now widely recognised that Burke’s polemic concerns far more that the 
clash of two political systems. It concerns two ways of social being, one dictated 
by abstract ‘metaphysic’ and the other by ‘custom’, experience and the dense 
fabric of ‘common life’. This fundamental approach concerning how social life is 
organised is also true of his popular radical critics. I will explain how the 
political disagreements between Burke and the popular radicals can be 
understood as the controversy between two kinds of comic social orders: the one 
in informed by the manners of civil society and the other generated by 
spontaneous, diffusive laughter of the popular congregation. Chapter 3 turns to 
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the case of the satiric humour of Peter Pindar to explore the political significance 
of the controversies around his ‘inoffensive sport’. I discuss Wolcot’s take on 
‘humour’ not only as mere purposeless joking but also as a vital element in the 
maintenance of cultural, literary, and, through a medical metaphoric of the body 
politic, national, health. Chapter 4 reads the comic performance of the 
‘anti-Jacobin’ novels at the end of the decade and analyses the ways in which 
depoliticising comedy serves as an elaborate method of social and literary 
regulation. I discuss comedy as a method for reducing the scale of social 
intercourse to a much more manageable size than that of the crowd, namely the 
size of the small community fit for the regulated realm of the ‘common life’ in 






The Comedy of ‘Common Life’ and the Social Theories in the 
Eighteenth-Century Comic Discourse 
 
This chapter explains the relevance of the eighteenth-century comic theory 
to the comic literature of the 1790s. Scholars have paid much attention to the 
social aspect of the eighteenth-century comic theory and practice. The comic 
theory generally falls into the paradigm identified by Stuart Tave’s classic 
account of ‘amiable’ humour, which relies on sociability and sympathy rather 
than Hobbesian egoism and hierarchy.1 Recently, Simon Dickie’s rediscovery of 
the mid-century comic literature demonstrates the discrepancy between this 
theory and the practice. The vulgar, Hobbesian kind of ‘cruel’ jokes of the 
socially inferior, which contradicts its own principle, was popular even among 
the polite cultural elite.2 Dickie’s counterexamples show that social and political 
prejudices persist and that the marriage between comedy and middle-class virtue 
remains a theoretical ideal. But his point is that the practice contradicts the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   Stuart Tave, The Amiable Humorist: A Study in the Comic Theory and Criticism of the 
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). 	  
2 Simon Dickie, Cruelty and Laughter: Forgotten Comic Literature and the Unsentimental 
Eighteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). Cultural historians have also 
shown that a wealth of comic literature was ostensibly at odds with the culture of ‘politeness’. 
See Ronald Paulson, ‘The Joke and Joe Miller’s Jests’, in Popular and Polite Art in the Age of 
Hogarth and Fielding (Notre Dame; London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 64-84; Vic 
Gatrell, City of Laughter: Sex and Satire in Eighteenth-Century London (London: Atlantic, 
2006).  
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theory. I want to explain in this chapter that the political anxiety exists within the 
theory itself, and often precisely in its sociable and depoliticising language, 
which in my view contains contradictory tendencies that can be formulated as a 
political antagonism explained below.  
This chapter will situate the discourse of comedy of ‘common life’ in a 
more concrete theoretical and social context and point out that the depoliticising 
philosophy of a comic life actually involves specific social theories that merit 
political inquiry. I will explain that the eighteenth-century comic theory was 
constructed in response to the plurality of society in the commercial milieu in 
which moral questions were reformulated in terms of sociability, civility, and a 
worldly, empiricist outlook. I shall also demonstrate how the depoliticising 
discourse of comic disinterestedness is constructed and how that can be viewed 
as a particular formulation of the political antagonism that played out in the 
political controversy of the 1790s. I argue that the discourse of comedy of 
‘common life’ involves contradictory conceptions of social relation, which 
provide materials for political controversy later. I argue that ‘common life’ as 
horizon of the innocent and disinterested amusement may yield a figurative 
political antagonism because of the contradictory social theories: on the one hand, 
the hegemonic (and polite) theory and ‘comedy of character’, by depoliticising 
political conflict into aesthetic particularism, consolidates individual boundary 
and obscures systematic political inquiry. On the other, this critical hegemony 
yields its figurative obverse: the homogeneous collectivity in the form of the 
crowd, whose indiscriminate laughter threatens diversity that the polite theory 
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wants to privilege and preserve. 
 
1.1 The ‘Decline’ of Satire and the Emergence of Modern Comedy 
 
The transition from Hobbes’ theory of laughter to the that in the 
‘incongruity’ theory, as Tave has accounted, hinges on the change in ethical 
attitude from mean triumphalism to one that is dedicated to more tonally 
softened or neutralised, ethically sociable and sympathetic mode of 
communication. A correspondent development is a gradual shift in the generic 
paradigm in the eighteenth-century literature and criticism of humour. Satire was 
thought by some twentieth-century scholars to have gone into decline with the 
rise of the novel, the rise of Romanticism, the development of aesthetics and the 
culture of ‘sentiment’, and so on.3 Recent studies, on the other hand, have 
provided revisionist accounts of the persistence of satire well into the 
Revolutionary as well as the Romantic period, if not beyond.4 Nevertheless, 
whatever position one would take concerning the decline or survival of satire, a 
crucial aspect of this scholarly debate lies in satire’s ambivalence that can be 
couched, for the sake of analytical convenience, in terms of the contrast between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A more recent and sophisticated account, though still subscribing to the narrative of the decline 
of satire, is Claude Rawson, Satire and Sentiment, 1660-1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994).  
4 See Gary Dyer, British Satire and the Politics of Style, 1789–1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997); Steven E. Jones, Satire and Romanticism (New York: Macmillan, 2000). 
For all its rediscovery of the vitality of satire in the Revolutionary period, however, Dyer’s 
historical narrative only relocates the transition to a later period in the nineteenth century.  
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‘satire’ and ‘comedy’. Despite the different approaches by Stuart Tave, Thomas 
Lockwood, Vincent Carretta, David Nokes, Ronald Paulson, Gary Dyer, Frank 
Palmeri, and Richard Terry, an implicit consensus is satire contains its 
playfulness and, for all the fluctuations of its historical development, became in 
many ways less tendentious or partisan, and more performative, self-reflexive or 
benevolent. 5  Often, stylistic performance outweighs the underlying moral 
message it conveys. Lockwood goes so far as to conceive of it as a transition 
from the ‘satiric’ to the ‘comic’. Humour, once a rhetorical instrument for the 
public morality of satire, turns into private enjoyment. As ethical questions are 
displaced, these studies suggest, political ones are thereby bracketed. Of course, 
the exact moment of occurrence of this transition, or indeed its existence at all, is 
subject to contestation. Some scholarly accounts suggest that the double 
character of the satiric and the comic in satire exists even in its heyday in Pope.6 
‘Satire’ itself, recent studies continue to emphasise, has been a problematic term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Lockwood, Post-Augustan Satire (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979); Tave, The 
Amiable Humorist; Carretta, The Snarling Muse (Philadelphia, 1983), ch. 8;. Carretta, George III 
and the Satirists from Hogarth to Byron (Athens, 1990); Nokes, Raillery and Rage: A Study of 
Eighteenth-Century Satire (Brighton: Harvester, 1987); Paulson, Don Quixote in England 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), discussed below; Dyer, British 
Satire 1789-1832 (Cambridge, 1997); Palmeri, Satire, History, Novel: Narrative Forms, 
1665-1815 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003), esp. 126-42; Terry, Mock-Heroic from 
Butler to Cowper (Aldershot, England, 2005), esp. ch. 8. 
6 Howard Weinbrot reads Pope as a synthesiser of the ‘Juvenalian’ and ‘Horatian’ tradition, 
capable of balancing, in my convenient terms, the satiric and comic approaches. See Weinbrot, 
Alexander Pope and the Traditions of Formal Verse Satire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1982). See below, p.33.  
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that serves as a convenient signifier for a diversity of literary practices.7 Yet it is 
also true that the ‘aestheticisation’ of satire broadens its scope rather than 
contributes to its demise. The rhetorical shift, in addition, corresponds to the 
ethical adjustment. As studies have shown, satire was often attacked for its 
aggressiveness and partisanship that increasingly baulk at what Stuart Tave calls 
the principle of ‘amiability’ against (satiric) ‘spleen’, which lies at the heart of 
the emergent ethical hegemony of sociability and sentimentality of the 
commercial society.8  
Concomitant with this development was the eighteenth-century reception of 
the Roman satirical paradigms, such as the opposition between ‘Horatian’ and 
the ‘Juvenalian’ modes. While ‘Horace’ for the eighteenth-century critics refers 
to comic and conciliatory humour, ‘Juneval’ is regarded as a voice of moralistic, 
confrontational rage. Furthermore, ‘Juvenalian’ satire was considered more 
pointed, personal and tendentious on specific political issues, in contrast to the 
‘Horatian’ tradition, which placed emphasis on the general, impersonal 
revelation of human faults and foibles. Scholars report that ‘Horace’ was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See a recent comprehensive survey in Ashley Marshall, The Practice of Satire in England, 
1658-1770 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).  
8  Tave, The Amiable Humorist. David Nokes reads the subtlety of eighteenth-century satirical 
performances and emphasises the complication of satire’s ‘rage’ by more playful, ‘comic’ take on 
human faults, idealism and propagandist use of language: Nokes, Raillery and Rage. Frank 
Palmeri discusses Hume’s criticism of satire as an expression of partisanship and his effort to 
moderate and contain political antagonism and fanaticism: Palmeri, Satire, History, Novel, 
126-42.  
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favoured by more critics of the in the eighteenth-century.9 At the end of the 
century, however, this became another source of political controversy over the 
work of John Wolcot, to which I will return in Chapter 3.  
I do not seek to enforce the demarcation between ‘satire’ and ‘comedy’. I 
use this generic critical phenomenon to foreground the contradiction between 
aggression and conciliation that exists within the ambivalence of humour itself. 
Certainly comic aesthetics and its implied disinterestedness cannot fully play 
down partisanship, as it constitutes an integral part of the political rhetoric I have 
emphasised. But a crucial question is how such comic disinterestedness can be 
politically contextualised, and who in the eighteenth century were able to speak 
of disinterestedness within certain political framework. A case in point is the 
Whigs, who developed the political theory of disinterestedness and the aesthetic. 
Ronald Paulson’s Don Quixote in England: The Aesthetics of Laughter expounds 
illustratively how modern comic theory establishes comedy as a genre in its own 
right by parting with satiric and political functions. Paulson identifies a changing 
epistemology that most of the aforementioned scholars gloss over, as well as its 
ethics in the transition from the satiric to the comic. His argument echoes the 
critical wager of literary historians such as Michael McKeon, who approaches 
the comic novels of Fielding and Smollett, in which the satiric dimension is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For a survey of this eighteenth-century critical reception, see Howard D. Weinbrot, Alexander 
Pope and the Traditions of Formal Verse Satire, ch. 1 and 4. See also W. B. Cronochan, ‘Satire, 
Sublimity, and Sentiment: Theory and Practice in Post-Augustan Satire’, PMLA, 85 (1970), 
60-67.   
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somehow transformed or neutralised by the presence of ‘aesthetic pleasure’.10 
Paulson argues that ‘satire’ was ‘depoliticised’ into ‘comedy’ through the 
development of a specific line of aesthetics. Don Quixote in England is in part 
built on Paulson’s previous book The Beautiful, Novel and Strange, which argues 
that the birth of aesthetics in the eighteenth century concerns the shift of attention 
from religious morality and Platonic abstraction to the particular, ‘novel’ and 
‘strange’. For Paulson, aesthetics is a secular product that defines itself against 
religious or Platonic disinterestedness. Rejecting John Barrell’s history of the 
discourse of disinterestedness in civic humanism, which, Paulson argues, 
monolithically plays down differences within Whiggism, Paulson proposes two 
Whiggisms: the one with Shaftesbury as its paradigm which values landed, 
aristocratic control against private interest, and the other starting with Addison, 
which is more bourgeois, landless, explorative and open-ended. A new kind of 
‘disinterestedness’, formulated from Addison to Hogarth, appreciates the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Paulson’s acknowledgement of his debt to McKeon, Don Quixote in England, xiii. On 
Fielding, in relation to the moral enterprise of Richardson, McKeon writes: ‘Fielding meets 
Richardson at the nexus where moral and social pedagogy hesitate on the edge of their 
transformation into something else entirely, aesthetic pleasure’. See Michael McKeon, The 
Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 408. 
McKeon continues this approach in his reading of Smollett’s Humphry Clinker, whose 
‘aestheticisation’ of narrative form problematises conventional reading of the novel as a satire on 
luxury as a contemporary vice. See McKeon, ‘Aestheticising the Critique of Luxury: Smollett's 
Humphry Clinker’, in Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger (eds.), Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: 
Debates, Desires and Delectable Goods (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2003), 
57-67. 
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contingent, the flawed and the unusual in the empirical world as its own end.11 It 
is this new Whig ethos, continues Paulson in Don Quixote in England, with 
which Addison severs ‘beauty’ from ‘norm’ in the paradigm of Shaftesbury and 
Swift, who take laughter to be a moral corrective to or critique of deformity. 
Shaftesbury, Paulson observes, conceives disinterested laughter as corrective 
from a moral high ground of public spirit, which seeks to ratify excess of 
unsociable self-indulgence. Whereas in Addison, individual flaws and oddities 
can turn from objects of satire or ridicule into a disinterested, aestheticised 
amusement in its own right. Since Addison, an eighteenth-century tradition 
emerged, in which satire was ‘depoliticised’ in the form of comedy: the ideal is 
suspended and the actual is accepted, and Sancho Panza’s empiricism 
aestheticises, neutralises and laughs at Quixote’s idealism. Paulson calls it ‘the 
aesthetics of laughter’, which is derived from an Addisonian ‘pleasures of the 
imagination’. 12  The valorisation of ‘pleasures’ expands the ambit of 
Enlightenment pursuits by appreciating unidentified values of the residue of 
experience through the ‘aesthetic’ byway of reason, such as wit and humour.  
Paulson’s reading provides a useful note to the narrative of the gradual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Paulson, The Beautiful, Novel and Strange: Aesthetics and Heterodoxy (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996). Hogarth, argues Paulson, synthesised the two traditions, 
creating a ‘middle area’ between the Beautiful (Platonic abstraction) and the Sublime (the body 
as a site of desire, the uncommon, novel and strange). For Barrell’s account of civic humanism, 
see The Political Theory of Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt: ‘The Body of the Public’ (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986). Barrell argues that civic humanism is an 
aristocratic political theory that public affairs should be left to a learned elite whose freedom 
from labour guarantees their disinterestedness.  
12 Paulson, Don Quixote in England, 20-31.   
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separation between satire and comedy in the course of the eighteenth century 
(also discussed in his early book Satire and the Novel). The ancient (Aristotelian) 
notion of comedy as a representation of the low and ugly was one reason for its 
inseparability from satire, in that both were a representation of reality held up to 
a moral norm. Once ‘comedy’ developed the aesthetic dimension that weaned off 
the moral weight of satire, it became a genre in its own right.13  
The present study acknowledges a debt to Paulson’s theoretical 
formulations. However, his critical interest seems to lie chiefly in the formation 
of a cultural genealogy from Addison to Hogarth, more than how this tradition of 
aesthetic ‘disinterestedness’ was maintained or troubled throughout the century. 
Nor is Paulson significantly attentive to his authors’ political anxieties that are 
conspicuous in their construction of comic theory. Moreover, as I will discuss in 
the next three chapters, this language of depoliticising humour was repackaged 
as political expression in the political controversy of the 1790s. Paulson’s 
reading in general concerns chiefly a change of attitude and epistemology, and is 
less elaborate on the political and ideological conditions needed to situate ethical 
questions in more material dimensions. 14  His thesis that the Aristotelian 
hierarchy is replaced by an appreciative acknowledgement of novelty and 
strangeness in ordinary life leaves a largely unaddressed question of whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Paulson, Satire and the Novel in Eighteenth-Century England (New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press, 1967), esp. ‘Augustan Satire — and Comedy’, 52-72.  
14 Nevertheless, Paulson does offer a helpful note on the concrete political backgrounds for the 
two kinds of Whiggism, although in my critical framework it may or may not be an essential 
information: while Shaftesbury was of the landed aristocratism, Addison represents the ‘landless’, 
more bourgeois, liberalism. See The Beautiful, Novel and Strange, 74.  
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social hierarchy is bracketed or simply disappears.15 At any rate, Addison’s 
comic aesthetics, or more particularly his Sir Roger de Coverley, which is 
Paulson’s paradigmatic model of the eighteenth-century comic character, can 
indeed be more specifically contextualised. The introduction of polite manner to 
replace political enmity, as Marvin Becker argues, contributes to the 
maintenance of ‘civil society’. Becker adds that Addison’s language of polite 
toleration towards a Tory gentleman represents the historical development where 
‘the esthetic jostled the rudely political’.16 Sir Roger de Coverley becomes a 
harmless and depoliticised character as he is situated in a particular social setting 
in Addison’s literary representation. Addison imagines a transformation of 
political conflict into aesthetic pleasure through the gentlemanly associative life 
in which men and manners in social intercourses displace partisanship.  
Thus the paradigmatic change of the satiric genre corresponds to a change 
in political thinking in the eighteenth-century theory. Don Quixote, who could be 
read as a manifestation of a political conflict between ethical codes of the past 
and the present, serves as another illustrative case in point of the 
re-contextualisation of political conflict in the everyday social setting. As Corbyn 
Morris put it in 1744, although Quixote’s ‘[a]dventures in general [are] too gross 
and disastrous . . . you yourself, if [Quixote] existed in real Life, would be fond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Paulson, Don Quixote in England, esp. 76.  16	   Marvin B. Becker, The Emergence of Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century: A Privileged 
Moment in the History of England, Scotland, and France (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994), 68.	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of his Company at your own Table’.17 Because the eighteenth-century literary 
reception of Don Quixote decontextualises this character from its political and 
historical matrix of chivalry to the dining table, the mode of the engagement with 
the political enemy is transformed. The new ethics of sociability the 
eighteenth-century comic theory involves a new form of (a-)political engagement 
concerning living with one’s political enemy on a shared existential horizon. 
Thus we can now turn to the discourse of this practical category of ‘common 
life’.  
 
1.2 ‘Common Life’ and the Comedy of Character  
  
Notwithstanding Paulson’s reading of Shaftesbury as a custodian of norm 
against anomaly, particularity and diversity are not always unequivocally 
discredited in Shaftesbury’s work. Shaftesbury’s celebration of ‘the freedom of 
wit and humour’ is based on his chauvinist panegyric of the British ‘liberty’, 
supposedly realised in its cultural diversity and the variety of wit, and 
exclusively possessed by ‘miscellanarian race’ such as ‘we islanders’. 18 
Shaftesbury was confident that the variety of ‘wit and humour’ the British enjoys 
was founded on this condition. His claim clearly echoes the emerging hegemonic 
discourse of the early eighteenth century of the diversity of ‘character’ as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Corbyn Morris, An Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour, Raillery, Satire, 
and Ridicule (London, 1744), 38-40. The italics at the end of the quote are mine.  
18 Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Lawrence E. Klein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 379.  
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testimony of British ‘liberty’.19 This development was coterminous with the rise 
of the ethical discourse related to the dictates of sociability in response to the rise 
of commerce.20 Indeed, both Shaftesbury’s and Addison’s rewriting of Hobbes’ 
comic theory can be understood as an attempt to establish the polite discourse of 
sociability. A concomitant development is the privileging of ‘comedy of 
character’ over the ‘comedy of intrigue [i.e. plot and action]’.21  
 In addition to the espousal of aesthetic disinterestedness and the soft virtues 
of civility and ‘politeness’, I will add here that the comic theory in question can 
be understood as a response to the plurality in the civil society in commercial 
Britain. It is reflected in the rising discourse of the proliferation of ‘character’ in 
the British environment. The apparent imperial chauvinism in this discourse 
aside, I hope to demonstrate that incongruity theory of comedy is constructed to 
protect the cultural identity of the civil society of politeness in commercial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 On this point, see Stuart Tave’s account in The Amiable Humorist, 91-105.  
20 On the reinvention of moral language in response to modern commercial Britain, see, among 
others, the case study of the Scottish intellectual modernisers in John Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse: 
Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh: Donald, 1987), and 
‘The Imperative of Sociability: Moral Culture in the Late Scottish Enlightenment’, British 
Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 13 (1990): 169-84.  
21 Adam Smith suggestively argues that unlike tragedy, in which the environment dominates the 
individual, comedy must centre on the individual. ‘Ridicule must consist in the character 
represented: Ridicule that is founded only on the Ridiculousness of the circumstances into which 
the Persons are brought without regarding themselves is the lowest species of wit and such is 
hardly tolerable in the common Story’. See Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle Lettres, 
ed. by J. C. Bryce, in A. S. Skinner (gen. ed.), The Glasgow Edition of the Works and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. 4 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 121-24. See also 
Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle Lettres, (1783), eds. by Linda Ferreira-Buckley and S. 
Michael Halloran (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005), 544. 
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Britain against the categorical otherness of the popular ‘vulgar’.  
 Comedy of ‘character’, which relishes individual particularity and 
contributes to the aestheticisation of comedy in the eighteenth century, is 
theoretically situated in the social horizon of ‘common life’. But what exactly is 
the semantic range of ‘common life’? Epistemologically as the empirically 
mundane, the conception of ‘common life’ surely resonates with David Hume’s 
work. With a practical and secular approach to knowledge and pleasure, Hume 
frequently employs ‘common life’ as a keyword to refer to empirically based, 
practically lived experience in contrast to abstract ‘reason’. 22  Hume’s 
characterisation of ‘common life’ epitomises the British empiricist tradition, 
which privileges the richness of lived experience against the poverty of 
‘theory’.23 In this vein, Burke in the 1790s defends the inviolable organicism of 
‘common life’ against the onslaught of Revolutionary theory.24 On the other 
hand, the emphasis on ‘common life’ as a crucial interest in the British 
Enlightenment may be traced at least back to Addison of the Spectator, who, as 
Hume also does later, shifts engagement from the religious context to the 
pleasures of ‘imagination’ and sociability of the gentlemen in the secular daily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See, for example, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 122, 124.   
23 For a history of British hostility to theory, see David Simpson, Romanticism, Nationalism, and 
the Revolt against Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). See Chapter 4, Sec. 1 
for more discussion. 
24 The agreements between Hume and Burke with regard to ‘common life’ also include their 
shared view that it is structured by customs and prejudices available in a given society. See 
Chapter 2 for Burke. See also Donald W. Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
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setting. Hume’s ‘common life’ is often mentioned in connection with 
‘conversation’, ‘pleasure’ or ‘commerce’, and this displays his thinking of the 
concrete lived experience as a basis for his secular ethics of sociability.25 If 
‘common life’ denotes such a sociable setting, one can therefore find an 
explanation of Paulson’s formulation of satire’s transmutation into comedy in 
Addison as the suspension of political conflict in favour of the ‘flow’ of 
conversation.26 I shall argue that ‘common life’ harbours its own kind of 
political contradiction or conflict which, though probably not as directly partisan 
as that of satire, still bequeaths to the 1790s some ways of imagining political 
life.  
The thrust of Hume’s (re-)introduction of ‘common life’ into philosophical 
inquiry is not epistemological but social-ethical. It is a realm into which 
philosophical energy must be invested in order not to lapse into the 
self-indulgence of abstract speculation. As Hume famously declares, 
‘philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, 
methodized and corrected.’ 27  It requires active engagement in sociable 
conversation with which the (polite and commercial) civil society is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Hume, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1985), 535. 
26 For Addison’s ‘narcissistic’ mode of conversation, which privileges a conflict-free ‘flow’ over 
free contestation, see Jon Mee, Conversable Worlds: Literature, Contention, and Community 
1762 to 1830 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 38-58.  
27 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000), 121. 
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maintained.28 James Beattie, Hume’s fellow Scotsman and a major theorist of 
humour, also suggests such association between ‘common life’ and social 
ethics.29 Indeed, ‘life’ may be a rather vague signifier of worldly experience, but 
‘common’ connotes shared, communal, in addition to ordinary. 
It is in the existential, social horizon of ‘common life’, according to the 
comic theory, that the comedy of ‘character’ is situated. The association of 
‘common life’ and sociability patently contributes to the cultural hegemony of 
commercial society. However, in this liberal, depoliticising milieu political 
concerns regarding the accommodation of individual ‘characters’ abides. A first 
political problem concerns individuals who prove incongruous to the society of 
‘common life’. This individual is the ‘humourist’, characterised by a degree of 
impracticality or unsociability that runs at odds with the demands of sociability 
of ‘common life’. The idea of ‘humour’, from which the ‘humourist’ derives, 
comprises two semantic levels. It is, on the one hand, an acknowledgement of 
human diversity, and, on the other, a theory of a certain disposition to sociable 
action (e.g. ‘good-natured’ humour). Its etymological antecedent in the 
seventeenth century, namely the conception based on the physiological 
determinism of the four bodily fluids on temperament and mental disposition still 
presided in the eighteenth-century, but it had gained a new dimension of meaning, 
as a penchant for social amusement and personal traits conducive to the 
production of comic effects. ‘Humour’ often overlaps individual ‘character’, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See, again, Livingston’s Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, esp. ch. 1.  29	   On this point, see Jon Mee, Conversable Worlds, 207.	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traits and temperaments odd and eccentric enough to gain distinctiveness. Morris 
writes that ‘the chief Subjects of Humour are Persons in real life, who are 
Characters’.30 George Campbell also asserts that ‘The subject of humour is 
always character’.31 In the eighteenth century, the semantics of ‘humour’ and 
‘character’ continued to overlap to a certain extent. This development was 
reflected in the popularity and predilection for individuals with distinctive traits 
that become understood as ‘humourists’; that is, a person, a ‘character’, who 
possesses or is possessed by his or her particular ‘humour’. In the seventeenth 
century, ‘humour’, as a condition of physiological balance, indicated the familiar 
social taxonomy of pre-established ‘types’ of character. Samuel Butler’s 
taxonomy of ‘characters’ as general individual types include ‘humourist’ as a key 
category.32 In the eighteenth century, as a discourse of toleration for eccentricity 
and diversity emerged, human subjects, as ‘characters’, were increasingly 
conceived as singular aesthetic objects. Addison speaks of Sir Roger de 
Coverley’s ‘singularities’ as ‘Contradictions to the Manners of the World’ (my 
italics).33 Likewise, The Aikins understand the ‘humourist’ as ‘a character 
distinguished by certain ludicrous singularities from the rest of mankind’ (my 
italic).34 Conspicuously, the opposition between the individual character and the 
vague universal referents such as ‘the world’ and ‘the rest of mankind’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Morris, True Standards, 12.  
31 George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (London: W. Strahan; and T. Cadell; Edinburgh: 
W. Creech, 1776), 59.  
32 Butler, Characters and Passages from Note-Books, ed. A. R. Waller (Cambridge, 1908).  
33 Addison, ‘No. 2’, in Daniel F. Bond (ed.), The Spectator (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), 1: 7. 
34 Aikin and Aikin, ‘On the Province of Comedy’, 15.  
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contributes to obscuration of any concrete political analysis of the social 
incongruity.  
Deidre Lynch has argued that literary ‘character’ evolved from an outward 
excess of a single material feature in the eighteenth century to an inward-turning 
‘round’ personality in Romantic literature.35 This private ‘character’ marks, 
Lynch notes, the move from the Theophrastan conception of the exemplary 
toward the exceptional.36 In my view, however, such fascinating yet forceful 
account of the historical transition might not apply when it comes to the 
character of the comic genre. I would like to point out that in the comic character, 
outward material excess and solitary introversion coexist as two integral features. 
Certainly, ‘character’ and ‘humourist’ are not synonymous, but the idea of a 
single distinctive feature or behavioural pattern, often to the degree of oddity or 
eccentricity, is what these two concepts have in common. If eccentricity defines 
the ‘humourist’, a question emerges as to how such characters can tend towards 
productive sociability. Stuart Tave’s survey of the ‘humourist’ concerns its 
transition from satiric disposition to softened and ‘amiable’ sociability, but he 
does not properly address the potential confusion or conflation of, as well as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Deidra Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business 
of Inner Meaning (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998).  
36  Lynch, and Dror Wahrman later, have illustrated the historical peculiarity of the 
eighteenth-century concept of the self as an industry of malleable yet identifiable character types 
in the marketplace, which gave way to the late-century reinvention of irreducible and unique 
individuality with inner depth. Lynch, The Economy of Character); Dror Wahrman, The Making 
of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-Century England (New Haven; London: 
Yale University Press, 2004).  
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efforts to distinguish between, the humourist as a subject and as an object.37 
Corbyn Morris distinguishes the ‘humourist’ from the ‘man of humour’: a ‘man 
of humour is one, who can happily exhibit a weak and ridiculous Character in 
real Life, either by assuming it himself, or representing another in it, so naturally, 
that the whimsical oddities, and Foibles, of that Character, shall be palpably 
expos’d. Whereas an [sic] Humourist is a Person in real Life, obstinately 
attached to sensible peculiar Oddities of his own genuine Growth, which appear 
in his Temper and Conduct’.38 Eighteenth-century reflections on ‘humour’ are 
fraught with this kind of dilemma between the seventeenth-century conceptual 
legacy of personal oddity and the eighteenth-century notion of ‘humour’ as a 
form of communicative sociability. According to the early discourse of the 
gentleman in Shaftesbury and Addison, one trait that distinguishes the gentleman 
is his ‘good-humour’, or open-mindedness in resistance of the misanthropic ‘ill 
humour’. Shaftesbury’s notion of ‘character’, in particular, is often a polite, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 ‘Humourist’ was synonymous with ‘satirist’ in the Elizabethan period. For useful accounts, 
see Charles R. Baskervill, English Elements in Jonson’s Early Comedy (Austin, 1911), ch. 3; 
Tave, Amiable Humourist, 92. Indeed, in the eighteenth century, many uses of the ‘humourist’ 
still retain the idea of the satirist or the learned wit. ‘Humourist’ was the title of some essay 
collections in the eighteenth century that offer opinions on presumably unlimited subjects as a 
‘satirist’, but sometimes also as a conversational essayist, a communicator, a philosophical wit. 
See, for example, Thomas Gordon, The Humourist: Being Essays upon Several Subjects (London, 
1720); Anonymous, The Humourist: Being Essays on Several Subjects; Treating of The Author, 
A Rake, Love, Gaming, Gallantry, Drinking, Adultery, Dancing, Matrimony, A Birth Day, 
Cuckoldom, Merit, Good and Bad Wives, Physick, Virtue, A Birth Day, Virtue, Rich and Poor 
Clergy, Taste, Gods of the Heathen, Masquerade, Transmigration, Visiting Days, Ingratitude, &c. 
&c. (London: J. Coote, 1763; H. Serjeant, 1764).  
38 Morris, True Standards, 15.  
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sociable gentleman who can regulate his ‘humour’.39 ‘Humour’ in Shaftesbury 
and Addison is often short for ‘good-humour’, or open-mindedness in resistance 
to ‘ill humour’. Addison sometimes uses ‘humourist’ to describe a person of a 
more self-isolated lifestyle who ‘gives up all the Compliments which People of 
his own Condition could make to him, for the Pleasures of helping the Afflicted, 
supplying the Needy, and befriending the Neglected. This Humourist keeps to 
himself much more than he wants, and gives a vast Refuse of his Superfluities to 
purchase Heaven, and by freeing others from the Temptations of Worldly Want, 
to carry a Retinue with him thither’.40 Steele adds that ‘The witty Man sinks into 
a Humourist imperceptibly, for want of reflecting that all Things around him are 
in a Flux, and continually changing’.41 Steele’s complaint not only expresses the 
moral outlook of sociability of which Steele was a key contributor to the 
discourse, but also, notably, teases out an idea of the private humourist whose 
reciprocity with society is completely absent.  
The conception of Steele’s humourist grammatically resembles that of Henri 
Bergson’s comic character. For Bergson, comedy occurs when an individual’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 In an early fragment, Shaftesbury writes of ‘character’ as a balanced personality that manages 
to juggle between ‘jest’ and ‘earnestness’, ‘mirth’ and ‘gravity’. The model for this ideal 
character should be a Whig gentleman supposedly capable of improving his ‘character’ towards 
disinterested liberty through cultivation and regulation but not indulgence or moral dictates of 
jest. ‘Character’, in Benjamin Rand (ed.), The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical 
Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury (New York: Macmillan, 1900), 192-206.  
40 Addison, ‘No. 264’, Spectator, 2: 527.   
41 Steele, ‘No. 260’, Spectator, 2: 511.  
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persistently singular mode of action fails to respond to the flux of social life.42 
However, while Bergson regards laughter as a corrective to unsociability, the 
eighteenth-century comic theorists are more ambiguous about their ethical 
attitude towards individual aberration. If the idiosyncrasy of the characters of 
humour baulks at communication with their social surroundings, they will mark 
the end of the productivity of social intercourse. The ‘humour’ of the humourist 
is defined as something at odds with social rhythm, and it is characterised as an 
excess energy. How, then, can that energy itself be still productive of comic 
pleasure which does not hamper but promotes sociable ethics? 
The aesthetics of incongruity theory may serve as a theory of 
communicational economy that transforms potential political conflict into social 
productivity. The seventeenth-century taxonomy of ‘characters’ in Samuel Butler 
categorises types of individual that should be considered as social outcasts. In the 
eighteenth-century comic theory, these outcasts are in certain ways recycled into 
an alternative process that can be productive in communication. One method is 
through the medium of print, which displaces failures of social intercourse. As a 
remark on the characters in Sterne’s Tristram Shandy in the Critical Review 
powerfully explains the age’s predilection for the character as the life of 
amusement:  
Characters are distinguished merely by their opposition to some other 
characters; remove the contrast, and you annihilate the personages, just as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42 	   Henri Bergson, ‘Laughter’, in Wylie Sypher (ed.), Comedy (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday Anchor, 1956), 61-190. 	  
49	  	  
little wits in conversation are reduced to mere inanimate figures, when you 
have taken away the fool who drew forth their talents. How different from 
this is the ridiculous simplicity of Adams, the absurd vehemence of Western, 
the boisterous generosity of Bowling, the native humour of Trunnion, and 
the laughable solemnity of uncle Toby! Each character singly is complete; 
without relation to any other object they excite mirth. . . . Every sentence, 
and every action, diverts by its peculiarity; and hence it is that the novels in 
which those characters are to be found, will furnish perpetual amusement, 
while others, which entertain merely from the nature of the incidents, and 
the conduct of the fable, are for ever laid aside after single perusal: an 
engaging story will bear relating but once; a humourous character will bear 
viewing repeatedly.43  
A ‘character’ is sublimated into an aesthetic object of ‘perpetual amusement’, 
which ‘singly is complete’. The otherwise socially inept characters such as 
Parson Adams, Squire Western and Uncle Toby are translated into sources of 
vitality in fictional narrative in a similar manner to that described by Paulson in 
his analysis of the ‘Don Quixote’ in eighteenth-century English society. Indeed, 
Sterne’s literary aesthetic encourages tolerance of eccentricity and Quixotism in 
the scenes of common life. It seems that those humorous characters can be 
aestheticized by the Critical Review because of the medium of print, which 
displaces the failure of social intercourse onto the page, so that a failed 
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sociability in ‘real life’ can be transformed into comic impetus as an alternative 
sociality between the author and the reader. 44  As a result of the 
eighteenth-century re-conception, the humourist was transformed from the 
pathological notion of deviation from the human norm to the very notion of the 
human norm itself. The early Edmund Burke writes on Sterne’s Walter Shandy 
as a ‘humourist . . . not uncommon in the world’.45 In his reflections on Sterne, 
Coleridge concludes that one of Sterne’s achievements is the recognition of the 
universality of eccentricity: ‘In short, to seize happily on those points in which 
every man is more or less a humourist’.46  
The key to understanding the transition of the meaning of the ‘humourist’ 
from the satiric to the comic, in a word, is that the pathological is now regarded 
as useful. So eccentrics are not to be ousted or cured but tolerated, kept and 
utilised for comic production. But, as the humourist is appreciated as an aesthetic 
subject, eighteenth-century comic aestheticians are also concerned with the 
social and moral framework in which such aesthetic value can be safely 
appreciated without the onset of political conflict. Celebrated ‘humourists’ of 	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eighteenth-century literature, such as Sir Roger, Parson Adams, Uncle Toby, and 
Don Quixote, can be liberally allowed to perform their eccentricities because of 
at least two literary pre-arrangements of their social being. First, they are situated 
in the innocuous scenes of ‘common life’; second, they are morally 
irreproachable, so that their eccentricities can be passed off as marks of harmless 
personality. This aesthetic manipulation of political conflict finds expression in 
Addison’s Sir Roger, a ‘humourist’, because the political difference constituted 
by his Toryism is displaced to the retired scene of everyday social intercourse in 
the coterie of Mr. Spectator. As Addison puts it:  
my Friend Sir Roger, amidst all his good Qualities, is something of an 
Humourist; and that his Virtues, as well as Imperfections, are as it were 
tinged by a certain Extravagance, which makes them particularly his, and 
distinguishes them from those of other Men. This Cast of Mind, as it is 
generally very innocent in it self, so it renders his Conversation highly 
agreeable, and more delightful than the same Degree of Sense and Virtue 
would appear in their common and ordinary Colours.47  
Because Sir Roger’s ‘good quality’ and ‘virtues’ temper his otherwise 
disagreeable ‘extravagance’ of a humourist, and because the extravagance is 
manageably ‘tinged’ to his cast of mind, it turns out to afford delight to the 
‘conversation’ as the imagination adds pleasure to common life. As a ‘humourist’ 
in country common life, rather than a Tory partisan at court or parliament, Sir 
Roger is the example with which Paulson verifies his argument about the 	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aestheticisation and depoliticisation of Addison’s humour. The horizon of 
‘common life’ is therefore already a regulatory and prescriptive, rather than a 
descriptive, category. Since the affirmation of ‘common life’ is often bound up 
with the polite ethics of sociability and conversation, ‘common life’ is often 
restricted to private domestic setting of small company, in which the partisanship 
of the satire is absent. This ethics that hinges on ‘common life’ can be associated 
with the effort to do away with what Hume calls the ‘party-rage’ and ‘selfishness’ 
of satire as a political genre and transmutes it into a progressive, commercial, 
‘conversable’ world.48 In this kind of social setting for comedy, politics is of a 
more moderated kind, but does not disappear altogether.  
 ‘Common life’ in Addison and Hume concerns social intercourse, but 
another key dimension that cannot be played down is community. ‘Common life’ 
is certainly a ubiquitous buzzword, casually or rigorously used, in all kinds of 
literature of the eighteenth-century, but should its reference be as wide as its 
appearances in all contexts to refer to the plethora of lived experience? The scope 
of its social application is indefinite. In other words, ‘common life’ is 
presumably class-inclusive, if not class-blind. In the context of comedy, John and 
Anna Letitia Aikin note that ‘genuine Comedy knows no distinction of rank, but 
can as heartily enjoy a humourous picture in the common walks of life’.49 But 
the connotation of either ‘universal’ or ‘ordinary’ in the ‘common’ in ‘common 
life’ may come to contradict each other in certain semantic contexts. Samuel 
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Johnson, for example, conceives ‘common life’ as the life of the common people, 
not that of the elite:  
The true state of every nation is the state of common life. The manners of a 
people are not to be found in the schools of learning, or the palaces of 
greatness, where the national character is obscured or obliterated by travel 
or instruction, by philosophy or vanity; nor is public happiness to be 
estimated by the assemblies of the gay, or the banquets of the rich. The 
great mass of nations is neither rich nor gay: they whose aggregate 
constitutes the people, are found in the streets, and the villages, in the shops 
and farms; and from them collectively considered, must the measure of 
general prosperity be taken.50 
Johnson’s idea of ‘common life’ does not particularly encompass the entirety of 
lived experience, but concentrates on the ‘manners’ and ‘character’ found in the 
life of common people and unavailable in ‘the schools of learning’ and the 
‘palaces of greatness’. Therefore, Johnson concurs with the tendency to situate 
this concept in a demotic context while excluding the elite. As an article on the 
Mirror puts it, ‘common life’ refers to the experience of ‘the bulk of the people’, 
and sometimes more specifically the ‘low life’ in which ‘ludicrous representation’ 
can be best invested.51  
Johnson’s conception of common life, in another sense, recalls the 
antagonism inherent in the terminology of ‘civil society’ as local community in 	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opposition to the political elite or the state. The political character of ‘common 
life’ becomes manifest at the end of the century, as it turns from a language of 
universal social ethics to that of identity politics. The ‘common life’ in Burke’s 
Reflections denotes a totality of lived experience under a civil society. Burke also 
describes the characteristics of ‘common life’ as the diversity of cultural form 
‘according to the temper and circumstances of every community’. 52  The 
keyword here is certainly ‘community’, which unites all ranks as an organic 
whole in order for the creative diversity to prosper. But it also suggests that the 
ambit of ‘common life’ must be circumscribed into a definite territory rather than 
expand indefinitely in the Humean manner whose ‘common life’ seems to 
encourage infinite extension of sociability in the ever-growing marketplace. 
From Chapter 2 to Chapter 4 and the Conclusion, I will identify some strands in 
the identity politics of ‘common life’: there is the ‘common life’ of civil society, 
the ‘common life’ of popular crowd, the ‘common life’ of the lower orders, the 
‘common life’ of the elite, the ‘common life’ of rural England, and the ‘common 
life’ regional specificity (e.g. Ireland). The politics of humour depends largely on 
the kind of ‘common life’ different practitioners subscribe to. 
 
1.3 The Contradictions of Comic Sociability 
 
 This section wants to point out that the discourse of (apolitical) 	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disinterestedness, or humour for its own sake, in the eighteenth-century comic 
theory, is predicated on the conflicting formulations of social relation. The idea 
of innocent, disinterested or autotelic laughter rests on contradictory social 
imaginations. On the one hand, a pattern of social intercourse (in commercial 
society) reinforces individual boundary; on the other, humour as a diffusive 
conviviality breaks down that boundary into some sort of Bakhtinian collectivity 
in popular laughter.53   
 The depoliticising move to aestheticize political antagonism into the ethos 
of sociability, I argue, effectively produces an alternative form of political 
conflict within the very discourse of comic sociability itself. I want here to 
unpack this tension by taking a look at the discourses of Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson. Although both are categorised as offering a paradigm of the 
sociability of wit and humour, their reflections involve potentially incompatible 
social implications. Shaftesbury proposes ‘freedom of wit and humour’ to 
modernise social intercourse and urge unsociable egotist to communicate, but he 
is at the same time concerned that excessive freedom of laughter may degenerate 
into tyrannical selfhood. It should be pointed out at the outset that, revolting 
against Hobbesianism, as his philosophy can be seen to be, Shaftesbury’s 
conception of laughter has not completely gone beyond the ‘superiority’ model 
of laughing-at and fully attained the amiable communality of laughing-with. He 
does not discard altogether the sense of triumph in laughter: ‘I have taken liberty, 	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you see, to laugh upon some occasions and, if I have either laughed wrong or 
been impertinently serious, I can be content to be laughed at in my turn. If 
contrariwise I am railed at, I can laugh still, as before, and with fresh advantage 
to my cause.’54 Shaftesbury characterises the freedom of wit and humour as ‘a 
sort of amicable collision’ by which the company ‘polish one another and rub off 
our corners and rough sides’.55 If the freedom to collide is not to attack but to 
‘polish one another rub off our corners and rough sides’, then the function of wit 
and humour must be to determine and delimit proper individual boundaries. The 
dictate of liberty demands all subjects involved are free to attack in a proper 
manner: ‘A free conference is a close fight’.56 The ‘fight’ here is a metaphor of 
civilised conflict materialised in the forms of ‘raillery, ‘ridicule’, ‘wit and 
humour’. Regulated in the framework of the select company of polite gentleman, 
the ‘fight’ of laughter progressively refines manners. This aggressive freedom of 
raillery, in other words, is paradoxically a method of regulation, operating on the 
dynamic balance of power, that is, the mutual openness to attack in the social 
circle in order to restrain each other’s selfhood.  
Francis Hutcheson, usually identified as the philosophical successor to 
Shaftesbury, puts forwards his version of comic sociability, which, ironically, 
includes a social vision incompatible with Shaftesbury’s. In his three letters on 
laughter in 1725, later published together as Reflections upon Laughter (1750), 
Hutcheson begins in a quite faithfully Shaftesburyan manner by refuting 	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Hobbesian superiority as an obstacle to sociable amiability. But while 
Shaftesbury stops at intersubjective raillery, Hutcheson goes one step further by 
pointing out that wit and humour do not even need a human object.57 Richard 
Terry describes it as ‘victimless’ humour.58 In this gesture away from personal 
satire, a contrary social vision is thus derived:  
  Laughter, like other affections, is very contagious; our whole frame is so 
sociable, that one merry countenance may diffuse cheerfulness to many; 
nor are they all fools who are apt to laugh before they know the jest, 
however curiosity in wise men may restrain it, that their attention may be 
kept awake. We are disposed by laughter to a good opinion of the person 
who raises it, if neither ourselves nor our friends are made the butt. 
Laughter is none of the smallest bonds of common friendships, tho’ it be 
of less consequence in great heroic friendships.59  
Both the Shaftesbury’s intersubjective public spirit and Hutcheson’s victimless 
benevolence can be regarded as discourse of disinterestedness, but it is in this 
common ground a fundamental tension is revealed. Hutcheson here presents a 
striking contradiction to the Shaftesbury’s model, in which liberal 
intersubjectivity reinforces individual boundaries. Perhaps less disposed than 
Shaftesbury to the doctrine of politeness, Hutcheson, in this respect at least, goes 
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in the opposite direction while developing Shaftesbury’s philosophy of 
anti-egoism. Unlike most eighteenth-century theorists, Hutcheson’s idea of 
laughter is more fully committed to his benevolism and to communal ethics of 
laughing-with, one that could break down individual boundary by the ‘diffus[ion]’ 
of laughter. Laughter becomes an ambivalent category in the polite discourse of 
wit and humour because it can materialise the tension within the discourse of 
sociability, which either relies on the Shaftesbury’s dovetailing of individual 
space by checking egotism with wit and humour, or imagines the dissolution of 
individuality into the boundless, indefinite energy of laughter.  
 The contrary comic visions indicate the different social theories — the civil 
society of polite individuals and the ‘contagious’ collectivity — within the comic 
discourse. However, Hutcheson’s comic aesthetic of contagion was not very 
typical. The eighteenth-century comic theory predominantly conforms to the 
regulatory public sphere suggested in the polite model in which the individual 
must know his bound. It is in this social model that the potentially socially 
disruptive ‘humourist’ and oddball ‘characters’ can be safely contained. This 
social configuration needed for the flourishing of ‘humour’ still finds a 
hyperbolic expression in the nineteenth century in William Hazlitt’s paean for ‘a 
nation of hobbyhorse’ in his Lecture on the English Comic Writers. The notion 
of ‘hobbyhorse’, derived from Sterne’s popularisation and reinvention, in 
Tristram Shandy, of George Cheyne’s recommendation of private recreation as 
conducive to individual health in English Malady, rests on the idea of an 
idiosyncratic attachment to private, incommunicable activities. For Hazlitt, the 
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Georgian enclosure of land was the political condition for the nourishment of 
individual characters that enriches English comedy. Reciting the familiar Whig 
cant, Hazlitt writes that the ideal of freeborn Englishman was finally realised in 
the reign of George III. It was the private ownership of land, whereby the ‘whole 
surface of society appeared cut out into square enclosures and sharp angles, 
which extended to the dresses of the time, their gravel-walks, and clipped hedges. 
Each individual had a certain ground-plot of his own to cultivate his particular 
humours in, and let them shoot out at pleasure’. It guaranteed free private 
pursuits of their ‘hobbyhorses’, and ‘made the English character more truly 
English than perhaps at any other period’.60 His overstatement that the reign of 
George III is ‘the age of hobbyhorses’ envisages an imaginary polity comprising 
an archipelago of private individuals, with the unpropertied multitude being 
excluded.61 Hazlitt’s comic imagination conspicuously rules out Hutcheson’s 
social aesthetics of contagion. I will suggest that this aesthetics of contagion is 	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roughly the ideological unconscious in the eighteenth-century comic theory in 
the sense that it can be in dangerous proximity to the social anarchy of the unruly 
crowd. This ideological tension was only implicit here, but would become 
manifest in the 1790s, particularly in the controversy between Burke and the 
popular radicals to which I will elaborate in the next chapter.  
The contradictory social imaginations enable us to read the political anxiety 
in the polite theory of humour in the eighteenth century. The demotic referent of 
common life provided by writers such as Johnson can raise ethical issues when 
used as materials of comedy. The class valence is also identified in Hume’s 
frequent assimilation of ‘common’ to ‘vulgar’ and ‘popular’ and ‘common life’ 
with ‘vulgar’ experience.62 Eighteenth-century criticism maintains that humour 
is most productive in representing ‘low life’, which hints at a return to a certain 
extent to the Aristotelian theory of comic subjects, which is bound up with 
hierarchy. But to what extent can the ‘vulgar’ content of ‘common life’ be 
introduced into the polite discourse of comedy? In general, unsurprisingly, 
eighteenth-century discourse is eager to delimit the scope of ‘common life’ in a 
manner that does not unequivocally democratise comedy, but rather gentrifies it. 
This tendency is reflected in the concern for the decorum of comic language. 
Hugh Blair holds that the ‘Style of Comedy ought to be pure, elegant, and lively, 
very seldom rising higher than the ordinary tone of polite conversation; and upon 
no occasion, descending into vulgar, mean, and gross expressions’.63 Blair’s 
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criteria for comedy are certainly associated with the moralist tradition of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, civic humanism, and the ethics of sociability.64 The 
deviation from this comic norm is known as farce. For Beattie, comedy should 
not go beyond ‘life’, but farce can go further: ‘As to the style of farce, which is 
frequently blended with comedy; — it is purposely degraded below that of 
common life; or rather, it is the ridiculous language of common life made more 
ridiculous’.65 For Campbell, ‘farce deserves not a place in the subdivision [of 
comedy], being at most but a kind of dramatic apologue, whereof the characters 
of monstrous, the intrigues unnatural, the incidents often impossible, and which, 
instead of humour, has adopted a spurious bantling called fun’.66 ‘Fun’, as an 
idea of autotelic pleasure (in the ‘monstrous’), may recall Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
characterisation of the popular carnival ‘for laughter’s sake’, ‘for amusement’s 
sake’ or ‘for its own sake’ in celebration of the grotesque. 67  Patently, 
Campbell’s concern for comic propriety reflects the eighteenth century’s polite 
effort to eliminate these elements of popular festival and to sublimate popular 
jest culture into the controlled cultural institution of the polite.68 For Campbell 
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Dwyer’s Virtuous Discourse.  
65 Beattie, Ludicrous Composition, 211.  
66 Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric, 71.  
67 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 5, 173, 183, 192, 208.  
68 See, in particular, Paulson’s argument that the eighteenth-century jest-book constitutes the 
institutionalisation of popular oral jest culture. Paulson, Popular and Polite Art, 70. One may 
also recall Peter Stallybrass and Allon White’s argument that the establishment of the gentle 
culture of the bourgeoisie involves its dissociation from popular culture. Stallybrass and White, 
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and Beattie, farce represents a pointless energy, breaking its link with practical 
reality and indulging in mindless, idle practice. Campbell’s contempt for the idea 
of ‘fun’ indicates the polite cultural elite’s reservations about comedy’s 
self-elevation into pleasure for its own sake.  
Therefore, comedy for autotelic pleasure can dwell either in the polite and 
the popular context, but in the polite theory it is only permissible under a highly 
regulated and circumscribed horizon of social experience. As a signifier of the 
experience of the ‘bulk of the people’, ‘common life’ as the province of comedy 
also serves as a regulatory horizon in case the autotelic element of comedy, the 
‘fun’ of it, should dangerously indulge vulgar pleasures that know no bounds. 
Carefree pleasure can be more politically dangerous than politically committed 
activity. I shall return to this theme in Chapter 2 on the aesthetic of transmission 
in radical laughter that extends beyond the ambit of the polite version of 
‘common life’, and again in Chapter 3, on the controversy over Wolcot’s 
vindication of free laughter.  
 This distinction between comedy and farce also reflects the concern of the 
cultural elite about the presence of low comedy in various scenes of life in 
Georgian Britain. Vic Gatrell accounts for late-century graphic satire, 
characterised by the ethically neutral celebration of urban dynamics and vitality, 
the pleasurable chaos in urban traffic, tumult, boisterous social gathering and the 
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unruly crowd.69 These acts of libidinal laughter clash with the artificial polishing 
of ‘wit’ and the ‘humour’ of polite virtue. A paradox, if not an irony, in the polite 
theory of comedy is that ‘common life’ is not as much a practical fact as a moral 
value to be protected against the onslaught of unproductive vulgarisation such as 
farce. 
To redeem the idea of common life from its vulgar generic variation, 
‘comedy’, in dramatic discourse, was conceived in a sense to winnow out its 
chaotic, low, farcical abuses and impurities. Moralist thinkers were particularly 
eager to circumscribe the scope and purify the language of comedy. To identify 
‘comedy’ with the representation of ‘common life’ reflects the mimetic as well 
as moral orthodoxy of eighteenth-century criticism. ‘Common life’, being a 
sphere of social mixing and mingling, should be carried out by the innocuous 
comic tone in ‘conversation’. This existential sphere is where potential social 
conflict can be sublimated into comic productivity by turning otherwise 
unsociable oddities into humourism. Beattie writes that ‘The laughable 
peculiarities that distinguish Don Quixote, Parson Adams, Sir Roger de Coverley, 
Squire Western, and many other heroes of the Comic Romance, are such as men 
could not be supposed to acquire, if they did not live secluded in some degree 
from the general intercourse of society.’70 The partial seclusion of the humourist, 
one can argue, provides a certain aesthetic distance that prevents direct conflict 
with society in order to create a dynamic for comic production. By concentrating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Gatrell, City of Laughter (London: Atlantic, 2006). 
70 Beattie, Ludicrous Composition, 431.  
64	  	  
on the ‘manners of individuals’ (rather than their values and belief systems and 
their way of life), Beattie effectively neutralises political contradictions.71 Yet 
such neutralizing manoeuvre generates its own political and social contradiction 
within the discourse of ‘common life’. The mix and mingling of individuals in 
everyday social scene is ambivalent between distinction and chaos: ‘common life’ 
delimits a concrete existential horizon of practical community in which socially 
cultivated, temperamentally distinct personalities can be discerned and secured. 
But the flipside of such social form, the social mixture that may eventually 
amount to the effacement or indiscernibility of individuality and becomes 
chaotically homogenously, can sometimes threaten the civil framework of 
‘common life’ itself.  
 For the ‘polite’ intellectuals, in order to regulate comic practice, it is 
necessary to polish the individual faculty of perception and judgement of humour 
to balance pleasure and rationality. The danger of comedy includes not only the 
potential anarchy encouraged by autotelic indulgence in mirth and laughter 
without moral restraint, but also its indiscretion, which can imply the obscuration 
of difference, and the obliteration of character. ‘Wit’ and ‘humour’ were much 
appreciated because they reflect the variety and inventiveness of language and 
the diversity of culture; they were feared for their apparent flipside, the confusion 
and relativisation of value. Shaftesbury raised an early ‘polite’ concern about the 
indiscriminate indulgence of wit and humour: ‘The vulgar, indeed, may swallow 
any sordid jest, any mere drollery or buffoonery, but it must be a finer and truer 	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wit which takes with the men of sense and breeding’. It is this ‘sense and 
breeding’ that distinguishes men from the collective vulgar as possessing true 
character.72  
Generally, following Addison’s insistence on the inseparability of wit and 
judgement, eighteenth-century polite discourse raised concern over the decorum 
of humour. ‘Taste’ is the term to establish a meritocratic criterion of comic 
judgement. As Alexander Gerard, fellow philosopher of Beattie and George 
Campbell at the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, and early expounder of the 
incongruity theory, puts it, ‘[i]n our enumeration of the simple powers which 
constitute taste, we must not omit that sense, which perceives, and is gratified by 
the odd, the ridiculous, the humourous, the witty . . . It has a province’. For 
Gerard, the special faculty of perceiving and producing delightful incongruity is 
as distinct as other ‘tastes’ and ‘senses’ and requires a separate account. 73 Mark 
Akenside notes that comic incongruity ‘aid[s] the tardy steps of Reason’.74 
Much of Henry Fielding’s Covent-Garden Journal is dedicated to rectifying taste 
against the pollution from the vulgar print culture; in this vein, he has likened the 
discretion and appreciation of wit and humour to the tasting of wine.75 Kames, 
upon reflecting on ridicule as a test of truth, concedes that such a test requires a 
distinct mental faculty outside reason: ‘Reasoning, as observed, cannot be 	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applied. And therefore the only means is to judge by taste. The test of ridicule 
which separates from its artificial connections, exposes it naked with all its 
improprieties. . . . We have better leave nature to her own operation.’ For Kames, 
‘ridicule’ falls into the similar aesthetic category as the sublime and the 
beautiful.76 The early Thomas Holcroft writes in his Wit’s Magazine (1784) that 
‘Wit, like ghosts of old, is only visible to a few individuals: it is a meteor that 
gleams over the heaven of the imagination with a thousand variegated and 
astonishing rays; and which, if not caught by the mind’s eye, instantly disperses 
into darkness’.77 Holcroft’s words register two points: first, the sensibility of 
‘wit’ serves to capture the diversity of imaginative activities (‘a thousand 
variegated and astonishing rays’). Second, to capture this diversity, a special 
faculty is needed, which is only available to the few. This implies that the comic 
sensibility is perhaps restricted to the capable elite, for, in Campbell’s words, 
‘the witty and the humourous’ is perceived and produced by ‘taste’, for ‘they are 
of so subtle a nature, that they will hardly endure to be touched, much less to 
undergo a strict analysis and scrutiny. They are like those volatile essences, 	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which, being too delicate to bear the open air, evaporate almost as soon as they 
are exposed to it.’78 If wit and humour defy ‘strict analysis and scrutiny’, they 
probably cannot be acquired but are simply possessed as an intrinsic ability by 
few.  
This meritocratic attitude serves to preserve polite morality against vulgar 
autotelic farce. As we have seen, conceptions of comic amusement are caught 
between regulative and productive sociability and its potential crumbling into 
unsociable individuality or civil disorder. If the ‘aesthetic’ attitude of comedy, so 
to speak, encourages a dangerous collapse of political control, it is another 
aesthetic category such as ‘taste’ that brings comedy back under control. 
Campbell and Beattie, in establishing the polite discourse on humour, believe 
that a good humourist should develop a particular sense or taste in order to 
produce true humour.79 Hugh Blair, in line with the culture of politeness, holds 
that the comedian must be regulated by ‘nature and good taste’ to avoid 
extravagance.80 Surely, ‘true humour’ in the polite conception is attained by 
discernment, a faculty capable of telling difference and perceiving the 
incongruous rather than indulging in the chaos of indiscriminate conviviality. 
Therefore, the objective is to draw a boundary between polite individuality and 
pervasive, indiscreet laughter that dangerously denies individual boundaries. 
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I shall sum up the points in this chapter with a detailed reading of Beattie’s 
comic theory in Essay on Ludicrous Composition (first edition in 1776). In this 
ambitious book, Beattie sets out to provide a comprehensive theory that 
encompasses the diversity of comic incongruities. He affirms Hutcheson’s effort 
to do away with Hobbes’s legacy and his pioneering speculation on incongruity 
theory. He is nonetheless dissatisfied with Hutcheson’s relatively simple 
formulation of the grammar of humour as the incongruity produced by the 
juxtaposition of grandeur and meanness, and he produces a long list of various 
types of incongruity and their rigorous definitions and differentiations, including 
pun, paronomasia, mock-epic, parody, burlesque and many other modes of 
‘ludicrous composition’.  
Beattie is dedicated to dispensing with Aristotle and Hobbes to broaden the 
critical inquiry into humour. But in order to address the richness of incongruity, 
Beattie somewhat ironically makes many rigorous qualifications to circumscribe 
the scope of his inquiry. He attempts to theorise the sources of ‘innocent’ 
amusement distinct from satirical genres and the topics that partake of moral 
solemnity. He discards the ancient Aristotelian theory of comedy as an imitation 
of ‘vices and meanness’, which partake of the ridiculous that provokes moral 
contempt rather than innocent amusement. According to Beattie, the ‘ludicrous’ 
differs from the ‘ridiculous’ in the sense that the latter is contaminated with the 
morally reprobate while the former induces ‘pure laughter’.81 For Beattie, the 
aesthetic character of comedy is only approvable insofar as it is productive to 	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polite learning. The vice of the person laughed at could be dangerously and 
unjustly written off if it is made the ‘subject of mere pleasantry and amusement’. 
A satirical contempt, then, has to be at work in such moral circumstance. 
‘Downright wickedness’, for instance, ought not to be the subject of comedy.82 
Beattie’s words reveal misgivings about comedy’s indefinite scope in practice. 
He expresses elsewhere his scepticism about the comedy of Sterne and Smollett, 
which in his judgment often tends towards laughter for laughter’s sake.83 
Symptomatically, Beattie stresses the need to enforce the generic demarcation 
between ‘satire’ and ‘comedy’. He subcategorises satire into the ‘comic’ and the 
‘serious’, respectively ridiculing ‘human foibles’ and ‘vices and crimes’. He 
considers ‘comic satire’ an oxymoron and regrets its popularity.84 Beattie’s 
friend Campbell adds that ‘the edge of ridicule [cannot] strike with equal force 
every species of misconduct: it is not the criminal part which it attacks, but that 
which we denominate silly or foolish.’85 For Beattie and Campbell, ‘vice’ is the 
subject of satire, while ‘folly’ is that of comedy.86  
Beattie argues effectively that diversity is only good when it promotes 
distinction and judgement rather than confusion. In other words, the ludicrous is 
diverse, but one has to learn not to laugh at anything. For Beattie, only the 
persons cultivated with the perceptive faculty of true ludicrous incongruity can 	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grasp its diversity. A cultivated sensibility for wit and humour is the same thing 
as aesthetic education:  
The more we are accustomed to any set of objects, the greater delicacy of 
discernment we acquire in comparing them together, and estimating their 
degree of excellence. By studying many pictures one may become a judge 
of painting; by attending to the ornaments and proportions of many 
buildings, one acquires a taste in architecture. . . . In like manner, by being 
conversant in works of wit and humour, and by joining in polite 
conversation, we refine our taste in ridicule, and come to undervalue those 
homelier jokes that entertain the vulgar.’87  
The ‘taste’ for wit and humour becomes the new criterion for hierarchy, which is 
predicated now on the distinction between ‘polite’ and ‘vulgar’, rather than on 
the ‘superiority’ of Hobbesian laughter. For Beattie, the cultivation of ‘taste’ of 
humour, of which only a learned gentleman is capable, aims for a comprehensive 
grasp of the diversity of practice. Effectively, Beattie’s incongruity theory 
amounts to a case for cultural meritocracy. On the other hand, the conversation 
of the ‘common people’ for Beattie does not show the ability to distinguish 
differences in experience, which is essential for cultivating the taste for truly 
ludicrous incongruities. The commoners 
speak and look what they think, bluster and threaten when they are angry, 
affect no sympathies which they do not feel, and when offended are at no 
pains to conceal their dissatisfaction. They laugh when they perceive 	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anything ludicrous, without much deference to the sentiments of their 
company; and, having little relish for delicate humour, because they have 
been so little used to it, they amuse themselves with such pleasantry as in 
the higher ranks of life would offend by its homeliness’.88  
For Beattie, their ‘pleasantry’ is pleasantry for its own sake, lacking moral 
scrupulousness, which results from indiscriminate laughter. Although cast in 
terms of class, Beattie’s reflections effectively suggest two kinds of social 
imaginaries based on the two laughing cultures — the society of difference and 
that of sameness and indiscrimination. These critical manoeuvres betray anxiety 
about the crowd, often envisaged as the identical collective, in contrast to an 
individualised society in which individual characters are discernable.89	  
Beattie’s critical misgiving reveals the ambivalence of the function of 
humour that encourages conviviality and spices up communal life, but can at the 
same time be dangerously anarchic for the conservative-minded. His anxiety lies 
in the tension of two kinds of pleasure: the pleasure that is securely lodged in a 
regulated community and transforms political conflict into aesthetic amusement 
on the one hand, and the pleasure of bereft of meaning, the ‘vulgar’ pleasure of 
‘fun’. Beattie distinguishes between two kinds of laughter: ‘animal’ and 	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‘sentimental’ laughter. ‘Animal’ laughter is that physiological act of laughing, 
driven by ‘animal impulse’. Therefore it is prone to excess and uncontrollability, 
displaying indecency and coarseness. Hutcheson’s confidence in natural laughter 
as a spontaneous expression of benevolence is here absent in Beattie. On the 
other hand, ‘sentimental’ laughter manages to correspond with a mental state of 
pleasing emotion. It should be ‘the effect of good humour, complacency, tender 
affection’. 90  For Beattie, ‘sentimental laughter’ represents the authentic 
expression of inner gaiety, in contrast to the forced expression of mirth. It is a 
fusion of outward sign and inward reality, an unaffected expression in exact 
proportion to the actual mirth. Beattie seeks to regulate laughter as an organic 
flow from a well-orchestrated comic atmosphere, prepared by a cultivated taste 
for the incongruous. Otherwise, it would degenerate into a noisy material surplus 
of ‘animal laughter’ that does not correspond to comic taste and therefore risks 
evolving into an act for no identifiable purpose.  
Beattie’s comic criticism is predicated on the conflict between diversity and 
sameness, and that between civilisation and chaos, revealing his anxiety about 
the contradiction within the comic social theory that could simultaneously 
promote polite regulation and popular contagion. It is important to note that 
Beattie enthuses about the superiority of ‘modern’ humour over the ‘ancient’ one. 
This is because, he asserts, the modern epoch is blessed with the accumulation 
and sophistication of political institution and social custom, which supply 
copious materials that are ever increasingly productive of comic incongruities. It 	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is this sophisticated (and, through Beattie does not spell out, commercial) 
civilisation of developed customs and manners that produces the rich array of 
comic literary characters such as Quixote, Squire Western, Uncle Toby, Parson 
Adams and Sir Roger de Coverley, along with real-life characters including the 
‘conjurer, the politician, the man of humour, the critic; the seriousness of the 
moralist, and the mock dignities of the astrologer; the vivacities and the 
infirmities peculiar to old age’.91 These types of individuals ‘are all so blended 
and contrasted in the censor of Great Britain, as to form a character equally 
complex and natural, equally laughable and respectable’.92 The sumptuous 
present is superior to the meagre past. It attests the achievement of civilisation, 
according to Beattie, which is occasionally threatened by the chaos and anarchy 
of animal laughter. Monarchy is preferable to the republic because, as Beattie 
here anticipates Hazlitt, it secures ‘private business and private amusement’.93 
The ‘savage’, more liable to violent activities and emotions, cannot enjoy ‘[w]it, 
humour and those nicer improvements’ available only in a peaceful political 
system such as that of modern Britain.94 Also, Beattie’s dissertation shows how 
far the polite theory of humour is distant from the culture of the jest-book. Most 
of Beattie’s textual examples are from canonical poetry, with almost none from 
the jest-book. His conspicuous wish to wean off the popular sources of ludicrous 
composition shows in his effort to sublimate the comic raw materials into polite 	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93 Ibid, 445.  
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learning acquired by ‘taste’, and perhaps to stave off demotic anarchy that could 
wipe out the diversity in ‘common life’.  
 Beattie’s understanding, that ‘comedy’ needs a developed social and civil 
foundation, is at the heart of the political controversy over the practice of humour 
in the 1790s. The comedy of ‘common life’ as an allegory of British civil society 
plunged into crisis in the wake of the Revolutionary events, especially that of the 
conduct of the crowd. I argue that comic modes of expression in the 1790s 
became not only a rhetorical device but also a locus of political controversy 
because its existential horizon of ‘common life’ ceased to be the ready, 
inexhaustible source of comic incongruity and became a contested category as 
well as an endangered realm of social experience. Edmund Burke asserts that the 
French threat was precisely the encroachment of ‘common life’. The next three 
chapters will discuss how ‘common life’ contributes to shape political 
controversies. I argue in Chapter 2 that, for Burke, the eclipse of ‘common life’ 
that marks the triumph of mob politics can be read as the degeneration of the 
comic genre from the regulatory aesthetics within civil framework into the 
anarchic laughter of the crowd. The popular radical counter-vision of laughter, 
on the other hand, is less reflective of the available ‘common life’ than 
constitutive of a common life on a new collective and co-operative basis of social 
relation. Chapter 3 discusses John Wolcot’s portrayal of George III as a comic 
character in common life, which provoked controversy among his loyalist critics 
over its subversive potential of ‘leveling’. Chapter 4 reads the comic anti-Jacobin 
novels to explicate ‘common life’ as a powerful ideological component of 
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counter-revolutionary polemics against the radical theory of perfectibility and the 








The Contestation over ‘Common Life’ from Burke’s Critique of Comedy to the 
Humour of Popular Radicalism 
 
Burke’s Reflection on the Revolution in France, a seminal text in defence of 
the civil society against the rising radical discourse of natural rights of men in the 
wake of the October Days, is particularly acute about what was at stake on both 
sides of the Channel that was deeper than simply a change in regime or political 
system. Castigating not only Price’s dubious interpretation of the political 
principle of 1688 but also the facile subversion of the social fabric by the French 
Revolution and, Burke emphatically situates ‘common life’ in the civil society 
based on a balance between a holistic political framework and local customs and 
communities. As Burke articulates in the famous dictum on the revolutionary 
theory in Reflections: ‘These metaphysic rights entering into common life, like 
rays of light which pierce into a dense medium, are, by the laws of nature, 
refracted from their straight line.’1 Burke holds that the political questions of the 
1790s encompass far more than the regime change: it involves a revolution in 
manner and approach to ‘common life’. Burke insists that the political 
framework and the entirety of lived experience are inseparable. In doing so, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. L.G. Mitchell and William B. 
Todd, in Paul Langford (gen. ed.), The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, 9 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1981-2015), 8: 112. All references to Burke, unless otherwise specified, are to this 
edition, given in the main text with volume and page numbers.  
77	  	  
Burke differs markedly from the opposition between civil society and the state as 
‘necessary evil’ in the Paine of Common Sense in 1776 and the French 
Déclaration of 1789. 2  Reflections argues that ‘common life’ depends on 
government as the institution of provision of needs rather than restraint of 
freedom. Without it, society will be overturned and there will be no ‘common 
life’ to speak of. For Burke, the theory of the universal rights of men threatened 
to undermine the social structure that produces the complexity of lived 
experience. In the broadest sense, particularly in Burke’s description of a 
comprehensive ‘dense medium’ of all aspects of civil social being, ‘common life’ 
appears to mean the sum of quotidian lived experience. In the very least, Burke’s 
caution in Reflection against the assault on ‘common life’ by revolutionary 
‘abstract’ theory reiterates the British empiricism and utilitarian practicality.3 At 
most, as I will explain, this move reveals Burke’s profound distrust of popular 
politics in which the crowd’s anarchic approach would threaten to dismantle the 
sophisticated system of social relation that constitutes the fabric of ‘common 
life’.  
Edmund Burke’s notorious phrase ‘swinish multitude’, which describes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For contrast between Burke and Common Sense on government, see e.g. David Bromwich, The 
Intellectual Life of Edmund Burke: From the Sublime and Beautiful to American Independence 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 268-73; for 
the contrast between Burke and the French Déclaration, see F. P. Lock, Edmund Burke (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 2006), 2: 317-19.  
3 For the tradition of the British disposition to privilege practicality over ‘theory’, in which 
Burke plays a vital part, see David Simpson, Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt against 
Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). See also Chapter 4, Sec. 1.  
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unruly behaviour of the crowd in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, 
expresses the conservative rejection of its political subjectivity of the crowd. But 
where political subjectivity is denied by the conservatives, there, ironically, an 
ideal locus is offered to the radicals to reinvent it. This is precisely the case when 
the sometimes alarmist, more than derisive, tone of the conservatives displays 
anxiety that the politically disenfranchised are making their way towards an 
illegitimate enfranchisement. The radicals promptly turn this insult into a 
compliment with numerous witty and humorous rejoinders and satires, the shared 
themes of which are a main topic of this chapter.4  
The critical interest in popular radical literature, in the works of Iain 
McCalman, David Worrall, Jon Mee, James Epstein, Gillian Russell, Kevin 
Gilmartin, John Barrell, Michael Scrivener, and Ian Haywood, among others, has 
emphasised the protean, innovative and sometimes illegitimate mix of 
communicative mediums and modes of expression in order to create new zones 
of political engagement beyond the political establishment. I have mentioned that 
this critical paradigm is established in the conviction articulated by Jon Mee and 
John Barrell about the inadequacy of the idea of formal ‘debate’ to characterise 
Revolution controversy and the experimental languages and ideology that sought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a survey of the popularity of the phrase ‘swinish multitude’, see Don Herzog, Poisoning 
the Minds of the Lower Orders (Princeton, 1998), ch. 12. Radicals who accept it as a compliment 
include Daniel Isaac Eaton, Thomas Spence, James Parkinson, John Thelwall, and a number of 
unsigned pamphlets, e.g. [Sharpe, J.], A Rhapsody, to E[dmund] B[urke], Esq. . . . Ornamented 
with a Humorous Print, of ‘The Swinish Multitude’ (Sheffield: J. Crome, 1792); [Anon.], A 
Tribute to the Swinish Multitude: Being a Choice Collection of Patriotic Songs. Collected by the 
Celebrated R. Thomson (London; New York: reprinted by Samuel Loudon and Son, 1795).  
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to redefine political life.5 This critical approach has extensively tackled the 
radical expressions, which employ the diversity of polemical strategies from 
formal arguments to the figurative and performative pragmatics of rituals, 
symbolism, theatre, popular print culture, and humour. These modes of 
expression, essential to the politicisation of otherwise disenfranchised or 
illegitimate spheres of cultural practice, were also essential to the broadening of 
the scope of struggle and production of alternative public spheres in response to 
the new political condition.6  
This chapter revisits the dispute between Burke and his popular radical 
lampooners to situate popular radical humour in its ideological framework. I 
argue that the dispute between Burke and the popular radicals in the first half of 
the 1790s can be viewed as a crisis — if not the collapse — of the 
eighteenth-century discursive paradigm of the social theory of comedy. Burke’s 
early reflections on comedy, and his choice to dwell on tragedy when he 
observes that the social condition for comedy is jeopardised, provide an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Introduction.  
6 McCalman, Iain, Radical Underworld: Prophets, Revolutionaries, and Pornographers in 
London, 1795-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); David Worrall, Radical 
Culture: Discourse, Resistance and Surveillance, 1790-1820 (New York: Harvester, 1992); 
James Epstein, Radical Expression: Political Language, Ritual, and Symbol in England, 
1790-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Kevin Gilmartin, Print Politics: The Press 
and Radical Opposition in Early Nineteenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); John Barrell, ‘“An Entire Change of Performance?” The Politicisation of 
Theatre and the Theatricalisation of Politics in the Mid 1790s’, Lumen, 17 (1998), 11-50; 
Michael Scrivener, Seditious Allegories: John Thelwall and Jacobin Writing (University Park, 
Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Ian Haywood, The Revolution in Popular 
Literature: Print, Politics, and the People, 1790-1860 (Cambridge, England; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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ideological framework for Paine and the popular radicals to develop their 
alternative vision of transmission, solidarity and popular subjectivity. By 
revisiting Burke and radical counter-polemics, I want to modify some customary 
approaches in which Burke and the radicals are contrasted. First, Burke’s 
powerful political aesthetics of tragic theatre seems to have obscured his views 
on the comic genre — an aspect that has been commonly neglected in 
scholarship. I will dedicate a few pages to explaining Burke’s idea of decorum of 
comedy, which, according to him, was vulgarised, along with tragedy, in the 
events of the Revolution. Secondly, the contrast between Burke and Paine tends 
to be formulated as one between tragic theatre based on collective sympathy and 
comic theatre based on emotionally detached, rational spell-breaking and comic 
deflation. The pages that follow will reconsider this dichotomy by reading the 
way in which feeling is affirmed, rather than discredited, by Paine’s alternative 
imagination of feeling through the aesthetics of bathos and laughter. Thirdly, 
Burke’s ‘theatre’ as mass education and political control is generally understood 
as an allegory for social hierarchy, while its radical counter-theatre is concerned 
with the inversion of hierarchy that turns the world upside down.7 This vertical 
social metaphor, although otherwise sensible, appears to me to obscure some 
other dimensions in the figure of theatre in Burkean and radical discourses. In 
fact, as I will explain in detail, the radical counter-theatre, and Thomas Paine’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Frans de Bruyn, The Literary Genres of Edmund Burke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 
185-88. Burke regards revolutionary comedy as baleful because, as de Bruyn puts it, ‘the 
traditional reconciliation of opposing forces with which comedy concludes is shattered by a 
revolutionary conception of comedy which promises to make permanent the inversions of 
hierarchy that traditional comedy provisionally enacts’ (187-88).   
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famous metaphor of ‘the open theatre of the world’ in particular, entertains 
horizontal, expansive and diffusive political aesthetics. 
 
2.1 Burke’s Political Ethics of Theatre and Comedy 
 
In addressing Burke’s views on comedy, the following account seeks to 
caution against the misleading implication that Burke’s recourse to the tragic 
muse in his construction of an allegory of political order unsubtly rejects its 
comic counterpart, which is alleged to bespeak of disorder, or that his figure of 
tragic theatre leaves no space for comedy. Albeit in a distinctive manner, comedy, 
as well as tragedy, provides allegories of manner, moral education, community 
and social order. The degeneration of the comic genre embodied in the 
Revolutionary turbulence, I will suggest in this section, informs Burke’s 
defensive retreat into the tragic genre. As I will unpack in the following pages, 
Burke’s view on comedy does not allow chaos as a source of pleasure. Thus he 
railed against the revolutionary chaos, which he compared to the adulteration of 
the dramatic genre in ‘tragicomedy’.8  
Though his views on comedy cannot be found in his writings of the 1790s, 
and have to be traced far back to his early years of literary journals, Burke did 
provide theses and articulate reflections with regard to the decorum of comedy. 
For instance, a series of articles in The Reformer (1748), a weekly journal edited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See some useful discussions in Paul Hindson and Tim Gray, Burke’s Dramatic Theory 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1988), 131-42; Frans de Bruyn, Literary Genres, 185-88; David Duff, 
Romanticism and the Uses of Genre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 187-91.  
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by the young Burke, criticised the degradation, the ‘dulness’ of Dublin’s Theatre 
Royal. Although the author may or may not have been Burke himself, its themes 
and concerns certainly anticipated Burke’s reflections in the 1790s.9 The author 
assails the moral degradation of contemporary comedy by making laughter a 
self-legitimating hedonism. He laments the decline of contemporary Dublin’s 
cultural life, epitomised in the chaos of theatre: the taste is vulgarised, the moral 
function of plays ignored, the decorum of authentic comedy eroded by the vogue 
of sentimental comedy, and the theatre etiquette debased. He claims that the ‘true 
End of Comedy was, by ridiculing the Follies, and Vices of Men, to make them 
ashamed of them’, and ‘by observing the growing Follies of the Age they live 
in . . . [to] nip them in the Bud’ (1: 113). In his Hints for an Essay on the Drama 
(1761) Burke reiterates comedy’s moral function by defining it as a ‘satirical 
poem’, and claims to follow Aristotle’s idea of comedy which, according to 
Burke’s understanding, ‘represent[s] an action carried on by dialogue, to excite 
laughter by describing ludicrous characters’ (1: 559). But modern comedy has 
turned its back on its moral duty, making comic plays ‘abound with Characters 
insipidly imperfect, where Virtue is painted in an unnatural, and consequently an 
unamiable manner’ (ibid). Burke’s complaint suggests that in contemporary 
comedy virtues were held in suspense, laughter became its own moral, and 
characters rejoiced in the grotesque and ‘unnatural’.  
Burke’s sense of the decorum of drama appears to fall into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For a bibliographical headnote regarding its editorship and authorship, see Writings, vol. 1. 
65-66. The author of these particular pieces could be Burke or his collaborator Beaumont Brenan, 
a playwright.  
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eighteenth-century paradigm. Some of his views on drama show the influence 
from his friend and fellow Irishman, the playwright Arthur Murphy, whose 
reflections on the comic genre and the nature of wit and humour, in particular, 
are also much in line with the polite discourse of Addison, Fielding, Corbyn 
Morris, George Campbell and Beattie. For Murphy, the value of both comedy 
and tragedy lies in its imagination and development of character in this province: 
‘The Comic Writer, as well as the Tragedian, must derive his Force from the true 
primary Sources of Composition, that is to say, he must learn to seize our 
Imaginations, with striking Pictures of common Life; he must instruct our 
Reason by inserting sensible Observations on human Contingencies, and he must 
frequently apply himself to those Passions which it is the Merit of his Art to 
awaken.’10 Likewise, Burke believes that comedy’s subject matter resides in the 
‘manners’ and ‘sentiments’ of ‘common affairs and common life’ (1: 560). For 
Burke, drama is a mimetic art that recreates the characters, manners and passions; 
and comedy, as Burke remains faithfully within the contemporary critical 
paradigm, finds its subjects in the ludicrous circumstances of common life.  
According to Murphy, both tragedy and comedy aim to excite ‘passions’: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 [Charles Ranger] (Arthur Murphy), Gray’s Inn Journal (London: W. Faden and J. Bouquet, 
[1754?]), 291. Cf. a minor change of phrasing in the 1756 edition: ‘The Comic, as well as the 
Tragic Writer, must derive his Force from the true primary Sources of Composition; that is to fay, 
he must learn to seize our Imaginations, with striking Pictures of human Life; he must instruct 
our Reason by inserting sensible Observations on worldly Contingencies, and he must also 
frequently apply himself to those Passions which it is the Merit of his Art to awaken.’ Gray’s Inn 
Journal, 2 vols. (Dublin: William Sleater, 1756), 2: 250.   
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the former terror and pity, the latter ‘gay contempt’.11 Burke echoes this in his 
Hints for an Essay on the Drama, by defining ridicule of the ludicrous character 
as the principal subject matter and tonality of comedy. As a ‘satirical poem’, 
comedy serves as a negative moral lesson by offering counterexamples of ‘virtue 
and politeness’ (1: 559). Its subject dwells in a different province: the ordinary 
yet humorous ‘character’ of empirical life. The implicit hierarchy is further 
suggested, in an Aristotelian vein, that kings are ‘exempt through decency’ as 
comic subjects (ibid) and ‘virtue and politeness not proper for Comedy’ (1: 560). 
Burke’s understanding of the classical decorum of drama, it appears, subscribes 
to its class allegory: when it comes to the subject matters of dramatic genres, 
tragedy features the great, comedy the rest. Burke regards ‘nature’ as a chaotic 
plethora of existence, an irreducible mixture of ‘the great and the little, the 
serious and the ludicrous, things the most disproportionate the one to the other, 
are frequently huddled together in much confusion’ (1: 561). In confrontation of, 
so to speak, the mixture of the tragic and the comic, it falls to the lot of the poet 
and ‘art’ to find his or her way through that chaos, to select material to purify 
experience and to produce aesthetic effects in accordance with ‘propriety’. 
Realism is indecorous for the artistic portrayal of heroes: ‘An hero eats, drinks 
and sleeps like other men, but to introduce such scenes on the stage, because they 
are natural, would be ridiculous’ (Ibid). Burke’s disgust at the gleeful irreverence 
in the iconoclastic rituals against the political establishment in Reflections — 
particularly in revealing the French Queen as ‘but a woman . . . and an animal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Gray’s Inn Journal [1754?], 290.  
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not of the highest order’ (8: 128) — therefore, both reiterates his disapproval of 
the misplacement of a larger-than-life character in iconoclastic ridicule, and 
expresses his discontent of a culture that lapses from the aesthetic ordering of 
experience into enjoyment in the very chaos of experience.  
Comedy in Burke materialises an aspect of cultural value founded on such 
social, moral and political framework that must be defended but was in danger of 
being eclipsed by the events of the Revolution. The Parisian crowd, in a sense, 
realises Burke’s constant nightmare of the disregard of hierarchy, which comedy 
should not dispense with but rather preserve. Burke’s ideal of the comic genre 
resides in his faith in the moral function of satire and in the human knowledge 
derived from its ridicule on the comically flawed character. In this sense, he is 
closer to the Shaftesburyan ideal that the practice of wit and humour is to 
produce self-regulated gentleman, not unrestrained self-indulgence. It has to do, 
among other things, with an understanding of human character. Both Burke and 
Murphy conform to the eighteenth-century critical paradigm and hold that the 
value of drama lies not so much in action as in character.12 This principle 
conforms to the eighteenth-century predilection for ‘comedy of character’ and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For Murphy’s emphasis on character, see, for example, Arthur Murphy, Gray's Inn Journal, 
94 (3 August 1754), 267: ‘Aristotle was certainly mistaken when he called the Fable the Life and 
Soul of Tragedy; the Art of constructing the dramatic Story should always be subservient to the 
Exhibition of Character.’ T. O. McLoughlin and James T. Boulton believe the emphasis on 
character a rare argument in the dramatic theory the eighteenth century. See their headnote to 
Hints for an Essay on the Drama, ed. McLoughlin and Boulton, 1: 554.  
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applies to comedy in Burke.13 But what kind of character conforms to the 
comedic decorum? For Burke, ‘A character which has nothing extravagant, 
wrong, or singular in it, can affect but very little’ (1: 561). Burke’s emphasis on 
the singularity of character recalls the paradigmatic theory of the ‘humourist’. In 
his review of Sterne’s Tristram Shandy in the Annual Register (1760), Burke 
speaks of Walter Shandy precisely as a ‘humourist’: ‘The principal figure, old 
Shandy, is a humourist; full of good nature; full of whims; full of learning, which 
for want of being balanced by good sense, runs him into an innumerable 
multitude of absurdities, in all affairs of life, and disquisitions of science. A 
character well imagined; and not uncommon in the world’.14 This remark clearly 
concurs with the eighteenth-century relish for the ‘humourist’, which, though 
recalcitrant to social integration, is such a pleasurable and innocuous oddity that 
its incommunicability becomes something enjoyable.  
It also shows that Burke’s view of humour and comedy in general agrees 
with the eighteenth-century critical tradition: the source of amusement is the 
singularity of character of the humourist, produced by the diversity in common 
life, yet at the same time at odds with its social rhythm. Burke’s comedy agrees 
with the mainstream of eighteenth-century polite discourse: predicated on 
existential assumptions of ‘common life’ constituted by sophisticated social 
relations, featuring a ‘humorist’ that illustrate the ubiquitous peculiarity of 
human nature, and as morally edifying and instructive as tragedy ought to be. Yet, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For the preference of the ‘comedy of character’ to the ‘comedy of intrigue’, see Chapter 1, p. 
40.  
14 [Edmund Burke], Annual Register, iii (1760), 247. See also Chapter 1.  
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as Burke argues in Reflections, the very horizon of ‘common life’ is jeopardised, 
its ‘dense medium’ of custom and institution being assault by revolutionary 
‘metaphysics’. In this condition, the humour and laughter of the Revolutionary 
crowd cannot be qualified as components of a true comedy. Burke’s moral 
outrage should not be understood as a no-confidence vote on comedy as such, 
nor as a judgment of the irredeemable unruliness of the very nature of this genre, 
but as an act of mourning for its historic loss of generic propriety. Burke had 
disapproved of the invention of sentimental comedy (the ‘Weeping Comedy’), 
the mixture of laughter and tears, comic joy and tragic distress, as a ‘great fault 
of comedy’ (1: 112-13). This disgust reappears in his description of the 
‘tragicomic scene[s]’ of the Revolution that ‘alternate contempt and indignation; 
alternate laughter and tears; alternate scorn and horror’ (1: 60; my italics). In 
other words, the eighteenth-century comedy, in which incongruous comic 
individual clashes with a practically regulative environment of ‘common life’ 
was, in the conservative eyes of the 1790s, being alarmingly eroded by the 
popular laughter as, in Bakhtinian terms, a carnivalesque activity.15   
Burke had experienced this carnivalisation of the theatre in his early years. 
He complained in the Reformer that the audience’s clapping and hissing 
interrupted performance, threatening to undermine a polite civil society in 
miniature. ‘Every Person who goes to a Play, should endeavour to persuade 
himself, he sees some real Action, this one Consideration would put a Stop to 
impertinent Clapping, at least, to the End of the Scene. A thinking Audience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His World. 
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gives, and a judicious Actor receives, a profound Silence as the best Applause’ (1: 
81-82). In such silent communication, it is meaning that prevails. No outward 
sign needs to be performed, and the empty clamour of clapping and hissing are 
purged from that public sphere. It would be rather odd if Burke effectively 
recommended silence as the proper response to any kind of play, even including 
holding laughter when watching a comedy. At any rate, certainly, Burke does not 
want the flood of laughter to drown the theatre. Burke’s instruction of the 
manner of the audience involves a moral division of labour in which the 
audience’s task is passive reception. The profound silence in theatre functions to 
make communal feelings cohere by producing social ties. This reflection on 
theatre etiquette could be read as an allegory of a kind that is still at work 
decades later in the ideal civil society Burke defends in Reflections. The moral 
code of respect performed in this manner, moreover, which maintains the social 
distinction, leads to a paradox that respect for distinctions and boundaries in civil 
society can tie civil subjects together.  
For Burke, the civic disorder reflected in forms of public performance in the 
Revolution indicates the collapse of such a moral code. Reflections describes the 
activities of the National Assembly that recall Burke’s aversion to the unruly 
crowd and his early castigation of public disorder in arenas from the theatre to 
the coffeehouse and debating club. The French Revolutionaries act like ‘the 
comedians of a fair before a riotous audience; they act amidst the tumultuous 
cries of a mixed mob of ferocious men, and of women lost to shame, who, 
according to their insolent fancies, direct, control, applaud, explode them . . .’ (8: 
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119). While public piety and moderation are maintained in the ‘profound silence’ 
of private reflections, the cacophony of Revolutionary theatre renders the public 
a mess, and privacy eradicated. Burke’s epithets, with which he excoriates the 
Revolutionary turbulence and the measures of the National Assembly, include 
words related to comedy, rather than simply ‘comedy’. The Revolutionary events 
are dubbed a ‘farce’ (8: 119; 191), a ‘monstrous tragicomic scene’ (8: 60), their 
practitioners ‘comedians in a fair before a riotous audience’ (8: 119). Burke’s 
apprehension about French scenes became a reality in the mid-1790s in the 
English radical counter-theatre, which was abundant with pantomime, burlesque, 
public mock-political show, comic ephemera and all kinds of illegitimate cultural 
forms that pose as alternatives to the established theatre. Critics regard these 
cultural practices as ‘low comedy’, which Burke’s high tragedy allegedly 
rejects.16 As critically useful a term as this is, it may have some difficulty 
describing factually the polite and classical critical paradigm in the eighteenth 
century concerning what ‘comedy’ is. It implies that ‘comedy’ blankets a 
diversity of cultural practices of humour and laughter, which can obscure that, 
for Burke, ‘low comedy’ may be a contradiction in terms. It seems in Burke that 
‘low’ comedy does not qualify as ‘comedy’ since true ‘comedy’ has to conform 
to a set of prescribed rules and ethics.  
The only exception where Burke actually uses the word ‘comedy’ is when 
he sarcastically describes the policy of assignats, the bonds issued by the 
National Assembly of France and backed by the incomes of the confiscated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Jon Mee, ‘The Political Showman at Home’, 45, 52. 
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church lands by the Assembly, as the panacea for all financial issues in the wake 
of the Revolution (8: 281). After mockingly repeating the word assignat twelve 
times, Burke attempts at humorous dog Latin to describes this farcical event in 
some mock-classical term:  
Mais si maladia, opiniatria, non vult se garire, quid illi facere? assignare — 
postea assignare; ensuita assignare [‘But if the disease in opinion does not 
wish to cure itself, what's to be done? Issue assignats — and then more 
assignats; and yet more assignats.’] The word is a trifle altered. The Latin 
of your present doctors may be better than that of your old comedy; their 
wisdom, and the variety of their resources, are the same. (8: 281) 
The repetitions of the phrase ‘issue assignats’ that describes the National 
Assembly’s uniform response to a long list of economic issues registers Burke’s 
derision of the Assembly’s inability to deal with the complexity of the national 
economy as an endangered fabric of the common life, which had been 
convincingly incarnated in the landed community of the Church. In a sense, the 
robotic repetition of ‘issue assignat’, which appears fifteen times in the passage, 
reads like the Bergsonian formula of comedy as ‘something mechanic encrusted 
upon the living’, as the homogenous language of the paper economy violently 
denies the complex concerns of national life. Burke is here giving an example of 
the ‘metaphysic . . . light’ of abstract solution aiming to penetrate into the ‘dense 
medium of common life’, which is doomed to fail (8: 112). Since ‘common life’, 
comedy’s natural province, is under revolutionary assault, the ‘comedy’ of 
assignat becomes its own vulgar parody. In a sense, this passage displays 
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conservative uncertainty, shared by counter-revolutionary novelists in my final 
chapter, about the role ‘comedy’ should take. The term ‘old comedy’ Burke uses 
to compare with the farce of assignat seems to confirm that Burke still abides by 
his early definition of ‘comedy’ as a trenchant satire. Yet the other paradigm of 
eighteen-century comedy — the ‘amiable humourist’ in which moral and 
political pressure is suspended for autotelic pleasure — with which Burke 
appreciated Tristram Shandy, comes into conflict with this satiric variation, and 
is absent from Burke’s polemic. For Burke, as for the anti-Jacobin novelists, 
comedy as satire and comedy as entertainment appear to be in unresolvable 
tension with each other.  
 
2.2 Social Totality, Pathetic Tragedy, and Radical Comedy  
 
I have described Burke’s interpretation of Revolutionary politics as the 
disappearance, or corruption, of authentic comedy, as ‘common life’ is placed 
under siege by the crowd politics of the ‘swinish multitude’. Burke’s recourse to 
tragedy, I will argue, can be viewed as part of his project to repair the damaged 
horizon of ‘common life’. Only by fixing that social order can comedy be put 
into practice again. One of the methods is the reconstruction of social cohesion 
that relies on fellow feeling promoted in certain kind of tragic theatre. 
Christopher Reid identifies Burke’s inheritance of eighteenth-century 
sentimentalism, and shows that Burke privileges feminine pity over masculine 
awe and fear, or the beautiful over the sublime, as the central theme of his tragic 
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muse, which performs the much-needed function of social cohesion in a time of 
crisis.17 Otherwise brilliant, Reid’s essay curiously makes a judgment apparently 
at odds with fact: the passage in which Burke recourses to tragic theatre as a 
moral instrument is preceded by a paragraph on the ‘terror and pity’ induced 
‘when kings are hurl'd from their thrones by the Supreme Director of this great 
drama’ (8: 132). Certainly, tragic theatre is not confined to the feminine symbol 
of the French Queen. The tragic emotions of terror and pity, as respective 
representations of the sublime and the beautiful, are for Burke both essential in 
cementing the nation. Such emotions in response to momentous political events 
are exercises of ‘natural feeling’, Burke claims, ‘because we are so made as to be 
affected at such spectacles’, in which ‘our passions instruct our reason’ (8: 131). 
The metaphysics that informs Burke’s political aesthetics of tragic theatre, which 
relies on feeling as a method of mass submission to power, is best expressed in 
this passage in Reflections:  
[W]e have consecrated the state, that no man should approach to look into 
its defects or corruptions but with due caution; that he should never dream 
of beginning its reformation by its subversion; that he should approach to 
the faults of the state as to the wounds of a father, with pious awe and 
trembling solicitude. (8: 146)  
This personification of the state, for one thing, symbolises a now widely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Reid identifies the theatrical persona of Sarah Siddons as the ‘victim’ of ‘pathetic and 
domestic tragedy’ on which Burke’s portrayal of Marie Antoinette was modelled. See 
Christopher Reid, ‘Edmund Burke’s Tragic Muse: Sarah Siddons and the “Feminization” of the 
Reflections’, in Steven Blakemore (ed.), Burke and the French Revolution: Bicentennial Essays 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press 1992), 1-27. 
93	  	  
recognised ideological strain in Burke that a particular group of persons is 
synecdochic to the collective. Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord (1796), written in 
defence of his state pension against the indictment from the Duke of Bedford, 
illustrates his belief in the binding between personal and national fate. Bedford 
shares Paine’s political views and is dedicated to French Revolutionary 
principles. Burke believes his pension is fully justified, not least because of his 
service relating to Indian Colonial justice during that time, but also because of its 
adherence to laws and traditions of the British Nation against the Revolutionary 
disrespect of private property in the name of democratic universalism. He 
charges Bedford of the fatal confusion of private and public causes in 
prosecuting a poor old man (Burke) in the name of the public good. He contends 
that Bedford’s own personal interest is provided by the British state, and, by 
capitulating to the French principles, Bedford decontextualises and uproots the 
British ‘oak’ (9: 171).18 In the letter, Burke plays a dejected old man under the 
cruel attack of a rich young magnate seduced by French principles. Since he 
insists his personal fate is synecdochic to that of the British Nation, an assault on 
him would mean surrender to the universalist doctrine of the French that would 
destroy all: ‘We shall all of us, perish and be overwhelmed in a common ruin. If 
a great storm blow[s] on our coast, it will cast the whales on the strand as well as 
the periwinkles. [The Duke of Bedford] will not survive the poor grantee he 
despises, no not for a twelvemonth’ (9: 173). This smooth transition from 
individual to collective matters leads Frans de Bruyn to conclude that the ‘line 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This metaphor of social organicity is found first in Reflections, 8: 136.  
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between public and private, which the “letter to a noble lord” so ambivalently 
straddles, is all but erased’.19 Insisting that his private tranquillity must be 
guaranteed with the pension, Burke contends effectively that it was the 
universalist doctrine of the Revolution that encouraged the tyranny of the public 
at the expense of the private. Burke’s fear of this doctrine lies in its tendency to 
homogenise, ironically turning concrete individuals into the faceless ‘swinish’ 
multitude.  
Burke’s insistence on the inseparability of person and polity is in stark 
contrast to Paine’s conception of society as a congregation of freestanding 
individuals, as is demonstrated by his emphasis on the institutional nature of 
humanity: ‘Every sort of moral, every sort of civil, every sort of politic 
institution, aiding the rational and natural ties that connect the human 
understanding and affections to the divine, are not more than necessary, in order 
to build up that wonderful structure, Man’ (8: 143). Burke observes that ‘Man’ as 
a product of civil society needs to be understood through a structural approach. 
His very existence is an intricate nexus of institutions; it demands affective 
engagement rather than detachment because the immeasurable involvement of 
interpersonal interests incarnated in such an existence is difficult to dismiss as 
being external to the individual interest. As Burke argues, civil institutions are 
incarnated in the form of the government, which performs the irreplaceable task 
of providing human wants and curbing unrestrained individual passions (8: 110). 
Civil laws not only guarantee liberty and organise public life, but also define 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 De Bruyn, Literary Genres, 53.  
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individual boundaries: ‘Whatever each man can separately do, without 
trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself’ (8: 110). Burke’s 
individual ‘man’ is more than individual, as it often entails a totality of social 
interests, which he cannot easily disengage from. Burke claims that ‘We are 
afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; 
because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals 
would be better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, 
and of ages’ (8: 138). The ‘private stock of reason’ can be read as a refutation of 
the natural right theory, which for Burke places ‘man’ into a self-sufficient 
individualism. Burke believes that the confiscation of the property of the 
Gallican Church by the National Assembly in late 1789 was a political crime in 
that it disrupted both the symbolic and substantial social ties, since the function 
of the Church is not only religious but also socioeconomic, as its property 
entitles them to perform their social duty through the provision for the multitude 
(8: 150-154). In place of this social tie founded on concrete landed property was 
the introduction of the paper circulation of assignats that, Burke argues, set 
social relation afloat in the abstract arithmetic of business relation, which can 
only ‘cement’ atomised and homogenised individuals (8: 236). In a sense, 
therefore, Burke’s sympathy is not a Smithian act of empathy, which relies on 
the projection of the sentiment and interest of one’s self onto others. It is because 
the social totality that constitutes the social being of the individual leads to an 
idea that one’s own interest is bound up with that of others. To sympathise with 
others, as Burke argues, is an expression of ‘natural’, ‘untaught’ feeling, because 
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there is an I, or part of my interest, in others. Luke Gibbons has traced Burke’s 
Irish cultural context and shows that Burke’s idea of sympathy demands 
unmediated confrontation with the sufferer as an exercise of solidarity.20 In this 
sense, pathos for Burke is an ethical imperative when engagement is needed in a 
time of collective crisis, and the sense of disengagement expressed in irreverent 
bathos is dangerous because it assumes the position of a neutral observer from 
the outside, which for Burke is only a denial of one’s share in the social totality.  
For Burke, it is also the case that individuals may not develop such 
consciousness as they are engrossed in private engagements. As Burke defends 
the religious establishment as ‘the consecration of the state’, it is necessary to 
‘operate with an wholesome awe upon free citizens’. It is ‘even more necessary 
than in such societies, where the people by the terms of their subjection are 
confined to private sentiments, and the management of their own family 
concerns’ (8: 143).21 Burke’s recourse in Reflections to religious symbolism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Reading Burke’s discourse on sympathy from Sublime and Beautiful onward, Luke Gibbons 
argues convincingly that ‘sympathy’ in Burke has its origin in the witness of pain and suffering 
that induces terror as a trigger of a sublime process: a process that demands the mental labour of 
sympathetic fellow-feeling and a social commitment to relieving the plight of the sufferer to 
produce sublime ‘delight’. Thus the socially cohesive, ‘beautiful’ category of feeling already 
partakes of a sublime character. Luke Gibbons, Edmund Burke and Ireland (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 2 and 3. 
21 The last sentence is to some extent reminiscent of a moribund civic humanist theory by the 
end of the century, which holds that the knowledge of public interest is unlikely to be available to 
the common people since they are engaged in private concerns, rather than privileged by a high 
social position to a more panoramic view of society and its collective interest. See again John 
Barrell, The Political Theory of Painting, esp. ch. 1. These arguments implicitly recall Burke’s 
political theory of natural law in custom and tradition that constitutes the social being of the 
individual. 
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exemplifies his attempt to cohere a nation by redirecting the ‘private sentiments’ 
with ‘an wholesome awe’. Religious symbolism thus ties citizens together. It is 
therefore more accurate to say that the ‘natural feeling’ somehow has to be 
imposed, as the ‘decent drapery’ of civilisation is ‘superadded’, or the whole 
social system will crumble into ‘naked, shivering’ individual animality (8: 
128).22 Yet the church may not be the most efficient in instructing this civil 
virtue, since ‘theatre is a better school of moral sentiments than churches’ (8: 
132). Scholars have done a lot to explore the figure of theatre in Burke as a 
cornerstone of his allegory of political order.23 Theatre can represent spectacles 
of horror that affect the audience ‘without any elaborate process of reasoning’ 
(ibid), and Burke is effectively recommending tragic theatre as the byway of 
reason in the time of communal crisis. 
Tragic feeling for Burke serves to curb individualism and to raise social ties 
to a symbolic and affective consciousness. Scholars have frequently commented 
on the relationship between theatre and reality in Burke, but these comments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 As critics recognise, ‘natural’ feeling in Burke is also already acquired through civil process, 
as Burke’s idea of ‘second nature’ shows. See James Chandler, Wordsworth's Second Nature: A 
Study of the Poetry and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 69-74. Claude 
Rawson suggests that the phrase ‘inbred sentiments’, while denoting natural and innate, carries 
overtones of ‘bred into’, which suggests the sentiments are ‘absorbed by a deep process of 
breeding’ and ‘can partly be described as one of acquiring habits’. Claude Rawson, Satire and 
Sentiment, 1660-1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 176.  
23 See, among others, Peter Melvin, ‘Burke on Theatricality and Revolution’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas 36 (1975), 447-68; Paul Hindson and Tim Gray, Burke's Dramatic Theory of 
Politics; Geraldine Friedman, ‘History in the Background of Wordsworth’s “Blind Beggar”’, 
ELH 56 (1989), 131-34; Christopher Reid, ‘Edmund Burke’s Tragic Muse’; Julie Carlson, In the 
Theatre of Romanticism: Coleridge, Nationalism, Women (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 10-11, 136-43; Frans de Bruyn, The Literary Genres of Edmund Burke, ch. 4.  
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combine an unresolved tension. Some point out that, for Burke, theatre is 
inseparable from real life, yet this judgment is not easy to square with another 
popular issue that Burke opposes, namely the over-theatricalisation of social life, 
and his concomitant desire to shore up the boundary for theatre.24 Burke’s 
principle for the relationship between theatre and reality, I argue, hinges, again, 
on his social metaphysics concerning the personal’s inevitable involvement in 
the interpersonal. In the famous reflection on the ‘effect of tragedy’ in Burke’s 
The Sublime and Beautiful, for example, Burke imagines that the popularity of 
even the most intense tragic performance on stage cannot compete with the 
sensation caused by an actual public execution. Burke explains that it is because 
the enjoyment of a tragedy depends on whether an aesthetic distance can be 
maintained. It requires the fact that the spectator himself is removed from 
imminent danger. In other words, with his own interest detached from the 
sufferer’s, it is possible for him to enjoy. His comparison in Reflections of the 
pathetic emotion towards the tragic theatre with that of real-life political turmoil 
should therefore be read in this light: ‘Some tears might be drawn from me, if 
such a spectacle were exhibited on the stage. I should be truly ashamed of 
finding in myself that superficial, theatric sense of painted distress, whilst I could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For the former point, see Paul Hindson and Tim Gary, Burke’s Dramatic Theory, passim, and 
Tom Furniss, Burke’s Aesthetic Ideology, 162: ‘For Burke, there is, or ought to be, no difference 
between our response to theatre and to reality’. For the latter point, see Geraldine Friedman, 
‘History in the Background of Wordsworth’s “Blind Beggar”’, ELH 56 (1989): 125-48 (131-34). 
Friedman puts her points in national terms: in Burke the ‘English theatre’, in its authentic form, is 
contrasted to ‘French theatricality.’ While the former is restricted to its proper place, the actual 
theatre, the latter tends to generalise and insinuate its airy concept into ‘real life.’ The contrast is 
analogous to that of the solid economy of England and abstract paper circulation of France. 
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exult over it in real life. With such a perverted mind, I could never venture to 
shew my face at a tragedy. People would think the tears that Garrick formerly, or 
that Siddons not long since, have extorted from me, were the tears of hypocrisy; I 
should know them to be the tears of folly’ (8: 132). Burke therefore demands 
tragic feeling to be applied to real-life tragedy of revolution because it is the only 
way to constrain the tragedy of ‘actual crime’ and the inappropriate ‘exultation’ 
from the audience (ibid.) In the absence of theatrical feeling, the monstrosity of 
human nature will be released into real life where public interests are intricate. 
The terrain of public life will fall to ‘insatiable appetites’ of private individuals, 
who uses ‘public benefits’ as their ‘pretext’ (8: 133).  
This metaphysics of the social totality in the intricate network of lived 
experience and collective interest is clearly in contrast to Paine’s social vision of 
‘national men’ who are universally connected by commercial relation alone. 
Their respective expression in tragedy and comedy bespeaks the centrality of 
pathos and bathos in advancing political belief. For Burke, tragic feeling for an 
individual, or an object, provides the cohesion a civil society desperately needs 
when the customs and institutions that constitute common life are crumbling into 
crowd politics. It binds the personal with the political. Figuratively speaking, he 
retreats from comedy as he does not believe it could be situated in the vacuum of 
civil life, which he finds the radicals are creating.  
 
2.3 Popular Radical Humour and the Quixotism of Burke  
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Burke’s impassioned castigation of the revolution and vindication of the 
ancien regime struck many of his contemporary readers as a hyperbolic 
overreaction, and rendered himself vulnerable to comic deflation to his dramatic 
pathos. As an unrepentant polemicist, Burke unsurprisingly lent himself to 
relentless caricatures. But there were readers, however, with a political 
persuasion opposite to Burke’s, who felt encouraged or even congratulated by 
Burke’s scorn of their values. John Thelwall gives Burke rather than Tom Paine 
the credit for motivating his radicalism: ‘You see, the aristocrats themselves are 
compelled to furnish us with these [revolutionary] arguments. In short, if you 
wish to be a true democrat, read every aristocratic book that is published. Begin 
with Burke’s Reflections, for I declare to you, that it was not Tom Paine but 
Edmund Burke that made me so zealous a reformer’.25 In his Vindiciae Gallicae, 
the early James Mackintosh comments on Burke’s tone: ‘He affects to despise 
those whom he appears to dread. His anger exalts those whom his ridicule would 
vilify; and on those whom at one moment he derides as too contemptible for 
resentment, he at another confers a criminal eminence, as too audacious for 
contempt’.26 For Mackintosh, Burke’s rage serves to hide his fear, and his 
language is so bitter as to sacrifice some humour.  
The radicals in the 1790s consult various sources of loyalist discourse 
against which they construct their political subjectivity. But Burke in particular 
offers the radicals a comic grammar to do so. His marginal status in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 John Thelwall, The Tribune (London, 1795-96), 3: 194-95.  
26 James Mackintosh, Vindiciae Gallicae, 3rd. edn (London, 1791), reprinted in Gregory Claeys 
(ed.) Political Writings of the 1790s (London: Pickering, 1995), 1: 359.  
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contemporary politics and his self-portrayal as a Quixote is particularly 
conducive to radical self-congratulation. Indeed, caricaturists who exploit 
Burke’s self-image as Quixote are not limited to his radical opponents but 
include satirists with undetermined political leanings.27 Burke’s use of the figure 
of Quixote rests on this divided semantics. In Reflections, Burke’s ridicule of the 
revolutionaries as ‘metaphysical’ dreamers whose emancipatory ‘light’ of reason 
must meet ‘refraction’ in ‘the dense medium of common life’ provides a 
Quixotic theme for the conservatives such as the counter-revolutionary novelists 
to work on, which I shall discuss in Chapter 4. On the other hand, Burke’s 
self-representation as custodian of an endangered ancien regime is 
self-consciously Quixotic, leaving the radicals a convenient material of 
caricature. Scholars have done a lot to demonstrate that Burke’s figurative 
requiem for ‘the age of chivalry’ is a coded defence of the virtues, manners, and 
religion necessary for modern commercial society to maintain itself. Quixotism 
is therefore not anachronistic, but a forgotten communal ethos that has to be 
reinvented in the present to reform a society of business relations dominated by 
‘sophisters, oeconomists, and calculators’ of the Revolutionary republicanism.28  
 In this sense, Burke’s use of the Quixote leans towards the tradition of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See, for example, Fredrick George Byron’s graphic satires on Burke’s Quixotism, collected in 
Nicholas K. Robinson, Edmund Burke: A Life in Caricature (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1996), 140-44.   
28 See William C. Dowling, ‘Burke and the Age of Chivalry’, Yearbook of English Studies, 12 
(1982), 109-24; Frans de Bruyn, ‘Edmund Burke and the Political Quixote, Romance, Chivalry, 
and the Political Imagination’, Eighteenth-Century Fiction, 16 (2004), 695-734; F. P. Lock, 
Edmund Burke, 2: 300-302. 
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moral allegory rather than that of what Ronald Paulson calls the aesthetics of 
comedy.29  Burke depicts a system of common life in turmoil, and chooses his 
own Quixotic image to dwell on the tragic side of the struggle with the ways 
things are (or are going to be). The comic side of Quixotism becomes open to the 
radicals in their attack on Burke to advance a different social vision to the 
conservative system of common life. Since Burke’s rendition of the Quixote 
renounces its comicality, this most popular comic character in the eighteenth 
century undergoes a change in semantic association. If a popular idea of Quixote 
regards this character as a deluded persona at odds with ‘common life’, Burke’s 
reinterpretation effectively reestablishes Quixote as its moral custodian. Quixote 
becomes the endangered norm, while the rising order adumbrated in the 
Revolutionary events signals the degeneration of ‘common life’. Burke’s reading 
of Quixotism is a far cry from the eighteenth-century comedy of character as he 
resituates the Quixotic character in common life’s ruin. Therefore, a critical 
strain of Quixotism I account for in the previous chapter in eighteenth-century 
comic critical paradigm, particularly in Corbyn Morris’s pleasurable company at 
one’s dinner table, is absent in this political context.30   
If the Quixote symbolises a powerless individual unable to change the state 
of things, then this is the exact pitch of Burke’s self-portrayal. In her elegy on the 
death of Burke in 1797, Jane West represents Burke as an otherworldly sage, his 
death being a timely flight from the fallen world whose wrongful direction he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Chapter 1.  
30 See Chapter 1.  
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could not influence. West asks Burke to ‘Go — join the Host of Britain’s mighty 
dead.’ She imagines him finding a balmy repose with heroes from a glorious past, 
away from the vicious present, about which he could do nothing.31 Perhaps 
exaggerating Burke’s impotence, West nonetheless points out his internal 
self-exile from British politics in the 1790s. Reflections itself concludes with 
Burke’s lamentation of his old age and a sense of his inability to influence the 
course of the things he witnessed (8: 291-93). Burke’s impassioned polemics 
invite radical readings of them as a sign of desperation, which offers the radicals 
a reason for glee. In Rights of Man, Paine refuses to sympathise with Burke’s 
enthusiastic histrionics. He presents Burke as a self-isolated, aged man, seized by 
irrational deliriums, as if he posed no threat: a comic-bathetic counterpart to 
Burke’s self-confessed dejection in old age. Therefore, Burke’s self-portrayal as 
Quixote strikes the plain-minded Paine as nothing other than an unequivocal 
dream vision of the relics of the past that affords amusement without moral or 
political significance: ‘In the rhapsody of his imagination, he has discovered a 
world of wind-mills, and his sorrows are, that there are no Quixotes to attack 
them. But if the age of aristocracy, like that of chivalry, should fall, and they had 
originally some connection, Mr. Burke, the trumpeter of the order, may continue 
his parody to the end, and finish with exclaiming, “Othello's occupation's gone!”’ 
(1: 259). Paine’s treatment of Burke’s personality implies that Burke is obsessed 
with his publicly irrelevant hobbyhorse, as Paine reiterates his intention to leave 
Burke alone with ‘what he pleases’: ‘Here then lies the monster; and Mr. Burke, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Jane West, An Elegy on the Death of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (London, 1797), 3. 
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if he pleases, may write its epitaph’ (1: 288).32 Paine asserts that ‘Ignorance is of 
a very peculiar nature; once dispelled, it is impossible to re-establish it’ (1: 320). 
The issue of Paine’s intellectual accuracy and sophistication aside, the 
significance lies in the political use of this rhetorical pattern as a shared method 
of radicalism in the 1790s for galvanising radical energy.  
The political significance of radical use of the Quixote in response to Burke 
is, so to speak, a renewal of the ‘superiority’ paradigm. The comic Quixote in the 
eighteenth century is a source of pleasure whose political conflict with ‘common 
life’ is neutralised through aestheticisation. In other words, the Quixote, or more 
broadly the ‘humourist’, is an indispensible aesthetic object to be preserved for 
amusement. Radical humour, however, while retaining this comic grammar, 
combines with the political commitment to triumph over and oust that object. 
The radical mockery of Burke’s Quixotism marks a symbolic fulfilment of its 
political orthodoxy, or a symbolic empowerment. Daniel Isaac Eaton’s popular 
radical periodicals Politics for the People features a song titled ‘The Triumph of 
Reason’, over, predictably, the political Quixote such as Burke:  
Like Quixote, that renowned Knight, so fam’d in Spanish tales, 
And full as mad, stepp’d Edmund [Burke] forth, equipt in courtly mail, 
He from the Treasury took a spear, ’twas tipt with gold, and pointed,  
And on his arm he bore a shield, giv’n by the Lord’s anointed, 
Thus arm’d with power he thought divine, he rush’d into the battle, 
And on the staymaker, most furiously did rattle,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See also 1: 272, 414.  
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He threw his darts sublime about, and rav’d of plots and treason, 
But Freedom’s champion stood unhurt, for his was clad in reason.33 
The significations are straightforward and conventional in popular radicalism. 
‘Freedom’s champion’, like Quixote’s windmill, ‘stood unhurt’ and renders 
Burke’s ‘sublime’ crusade quixotically comic. Such a correspondence of Burke 
and radicalism to, respectively, Quixotism and realism, seems to position ‘reason’ 
and ‘freedom’ as something of an unshakable status quo by way of its analogy to 
the Quixotic windmill. Through this triumphant tonality, the radical struggle for 
political power turns into an assertion, as if radicals were already in power.  
Given that Burke’s ‘common life’ is of settlement and stability, the 
employment of such figure of a picaresque rover as the Quixote in his political 
rhetoric is ironic, as if he himself is disconnected from ‘common life’. For all its 
variations, the Quixotic theme in the eighteenth century always preserves the 
denotation of a deluded narcissist or an anachronistic crusader. As Burke’s 
expression of dejection manoeuvred him into the position of the anachronistic, 
his implicit concession from the orthodoxy of political and moral values supplies 
a ready vacancy for the radicals to fill in. Burke’s interpretation of Quixotism 
suggests one way to understand the radical acceptance and appropriation of 
Burke’s ‘swinish multitude’ as an ironic badge of honour. The interesting 
paradox of this phrase lies therefore in its transformation from the reiteration of 
the multitude’s political disenfranchisement to a symbolic empowerment. In a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Politics for the People; or, a Salmagundy for Swine. (London: D. I. Eaton, 1794-95), vol. 1, 
part 2, p. 4.  
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parody on reactionaries, Eaton evokes Quixotism as shorthand for the futile 
reactionary nostalgia. He parodies the loyalist laments for the ‘Golden age’ of the 
‘feudal system’, controlled by strict social stratification: ‘the different orders of 
society were kept in perfectly distinct and separate — there were kings, barons, 
priests, yeomanry, villains and slaves; and they were, I believe, with regard to 
rank and power, in the order in which I have named them’.34 The comic 
rendition of Burke’s moral crusade resembles the Bergsonian comedy that 
represents its object of laughter as an isolated character, who is unable to fit in 
their social surroundings. As Paine writes of Burke’s sentimental ‘rhapsody’, 
‘[Burke] mounted in the air like a balloon, to draw the eyes of the multitude from 
the ground they stand upon’ (1: 282). Paine’s accusation of Burke’s airiness 
(perhaps a retaliation to what Burke did to the radical ‘metaphysicians’ in 
Reflections) effectively contends that it is Burke who is unable to descend to the 
mundane.  
This section does not intend to overstate Burke’s centrality in radical 
humour, but it does want to stress that Burke’s peculiar rendition of the Quixotic 
trope contributes to clear a space for the popular radical wits to reconstruct the 
aesthetics of comedy from a ideological foundation different from that of the 
established civil framework. It helps the restoration of laughter of superiority, 
which combines with the aesthetics of popular conviviality, as I will discuss 
below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 D. I. Eaton, The Pernicious Effects of the Art of Printing upon Society, Exposed: A Short 
Essay Addressed to the Friends of Social Order (London: D. I. Eaton, 1793), 6.  
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2.4 Common Sense and the ‘Open Theatre of the World’ 
 
Paine’s response to Burke in Rights of Man ideologically underpins popular 
radical humour in a number of ways. His relentless and willfully populist 
caricature of monarchy and the existing system of government (the British 
‘mixed’ government) in Rights of Man encouraged and provided some 
ideological basis for a tradition of popular radical humour. This tradition of 
radical humour, which was continued in the early nineteenth century in, inter 
alia, William Hone and the Black Dwarf, has received attention from cultural 
historians, who read it as popular rhetoric of subversion, and as a rhetorical 
feature of an ideological alternative to the cultural hegemony of the ruling 
class.35  
Although Reflections results from a historically specific event, its polemic 
touches on broader and trans-historical controversies, such as the viability of 
popular politics, and the use and distribution of power. ‘Swinish multitude’, 
which describes the unrestrained activity of the revolutionary crowd, signifies 
Burke’s belief, among others, of the need to restore meritocracy. One way to 
achieve this end is through tragic theatre, which, according to Burke, has become 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Joseph M. Butwin, ‘Seditious Laughter’; Richard Hendrix, ‘Popular Humor and “The 
Black Dwarf”’, Journal of British Studies, 16.1 (1976), 108-28. Also, Marcus Wood’s Radical 
Satire and Popular Culture, 1790-1822, in echo to Iain McCalman’s celebrated methodology of 
rediscovery of radical underground culture that resists the cultural hegemony of ‘respectability’, 
concentrates on the innovative forms of publication and unorthodox modes of expression to 
subvert received political consensus.  
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a better candidate than the pulpit as the medium of moral education and social 
control. The revolutionary crisis of royalty is described figuratively as the Fall of 
the Great in tragic theatre, best illustrated in a hyperbolic scenario in ‘which the 
kings are hurl’d from their throne’, serving to inspire fear and sympathy and 
thereby consolidate loyalist sentiments: ‘We are alarmed into reflexion; our 
minds (as it has long been observed) are purified by terror and pity; our weak 
unthinking pride is humbled, under the dispensations of a mysterious wisdom’ (8: 
131-32). Just as his tragic theatre invites Paine’s comic caricature, Burke’s 
literary performance offers what I have emphasised as being the ideological 
horizon — humour as a complement to reason — upon which polemical 
positions can be articulated.  
Pamphlet rejoinders to Burke’s Reflections, including those by 
Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and Mackintosh, oppose Burke’s reliance on 
sentimental language to their own rationalist approaches. But, with the exception 
of Paine, the language of bathos has rarely been combined with rationalist 
argument to counteract Burke’s powerful aesthetic of pathos. In Paine’s Rights of 
Man, reason is partly constituted by a bathetic counterblast to the mystical 
obscurantism of statecraft. Its political metaphor is ‘the open theatre of the 
world’:  
. . . what is called Monarchy always appears to me a silly contemptible 
thing. I compare it to something kept behind a curtain, about which there 
is a great deal of bustle and fuss, and a wonderful air of seeming 
solemnity; but when, by an accident, the curtain happens to be opened, 
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and the company see what it is, they burst into laughter.  
In the representative system of Government, nothing of this can happen. 
Like the nation itself, it possesses a perpetual stamina, as well of body as 
of mind, and presents itself on the open theater [sic] of the world in a fair 
and manly manner. Whatever its excellencies or defects, they are visible 
to all. It exists not by fraud or mystery; it deals not in cant or sophistry; 
but inspire a language that, passing from heart to heart, is felt and 
understood.36  
This section explains the relation between Paine’s ethics of laughter and the 
radical political theory in the first paragraph and the next section explains the 
other. Paine’s metaphoric in the first paragraph is read as a specific response to 
Burke’s theatrical metaphor of the necessity of cultural and political imposition 
on the pre-civil being of humanity, and its crisis in the popular attempt at its 
subversion: ‘All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the 
superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the 
heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of 
our naked, shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are 
to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion’ (8: 128). As I will 
unfold in the next section, although Paine’s ‘open theatre’ can be seen as a 
pointed inversion of Burke’s counter-revolutionary imagery of this passage, its 
political implications are more than this gesture of subversion. As may be readily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Paine, Rights of Man, in Philip S. Foner (ed.), The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, 2 vols. 
(New York: Citadel Press, 1945), 1: 373. Unless otherwise specified, all citations of Paine are 
from this edition, given hereafter in volume and page number in the main text.       
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observed, the passage on the ‘open theatre’ in Paine figures theatrical laughter as 
a feature in the Enlightenment doctrine of transparency. This epistemological 
function by no means exhausts its significance, which, as Gillian Russell argues, 
involves a political transformation in which popular theatrical activities pose an 
alternative to the institutionalised theatre: for Burke, theatre as an institution is an 
indispensable political apparatus for the moral education and social control of the 
civil subjects, insofar as its actors maintain its affective grip on their spectators. 
Paine’s ‘open theatre’, on the other hand, confers the agency of critical 
observation upon the viewing crowd, and thereby grants it a political 
subjectivity.37 As Jon Mee observes, the contrast can be understood as that 
between Aristotelian tragedy and Brechtian theatre.38 However, it is important 
that such judgment does not lapse into a dichotomous formulation of the contrast 
between Burke and Paine as Tragedy versus Comedy, which, though useful for 
grasping the general political implication, obscures some subtlety in both 
pamphleteers. I have argued that Burke had a comic theory. As for Paine, the last 
sentence in which Paine calls for the inspiration of ‘a language that, passing from 
heart to heart, is felt and understood’, is often passed by in critical discussion. I 
want therefore to draw attention to its affective dimension, its dimension of the 
radical imagination of social organisation. Such imagination informs a different 
level of radical politics, which combines feeling and humour.  
Related to the theatrical figuration of politics is the ‘literary’ aspect that lies 	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Clarendon, 1995), 24.  
38 Jon Mee, ‘The Political Showman at Home’, 43. 
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at the heart of the ideological content of the Burke-Paine dispute. It is 
customarily understood that Paine insists on the transparency of language and 
rejects the rhetorical, symbolic, and affective cloaking that get in the way of 
argumentative clarity. This received wisdom concerning Paine clearly derives 
from the structural position that critics customarily assign to Paine, who is posed 
as the both the ideological and the stylistic opposite of Burke. Regarding this 
contrast, David Duff concludes that ‘Paine “rough-mixes” genres, juxtaposing 
rather than synthesizing them, and refusing the impression of organic unity for 
which Burke strives. The reader of Rights of Man is induced into an analytic, 
anti-organic, sceptical frame of mind, as Paine lays bare his sources, breaks up 
his text and buttresses his argument with facts and figures in documentary or 
tabular form.’39 Such a contrast does indeed grasp a good deal of the facts of the 
general antagonism of the Revolution controversy represented by Burke and 
Paine. But to read Paine’s style as a reflection of an ‘analytic, anti-organic, 
sceptical frame of mind’ may obscure the affirmative confidence of his language. 
A number of critics point out that Paine’s ‘plain’ style does not make it 
rhetoric-free, 40  with some regarding his seemingly facile use of ‘rational’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  David Duff, ‘Burke And Paine: Contrasts’, in Pamela Clemit (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to British Literature of the French Revolution in the 1790s (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 68-69.  
40 See, for example, Brain Woodcock, ‘Writing the Revolution: Aspects of Thomas Paine's 
Prose’, Prose Studies, 15.2 (1992), 171-186; Tom Furniss, ‘Rhetoric in Revolution: The Role of 
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language as little better than demagogy, while others suggest that he manipulates 
language to misread and slander Burke for political ends.41 One critic goes so far 
as to read this gap as his practical betrayal of his theory: Paine is as rhetorical as 
Burke, relying heavily on similes and metaphors to convey his ideas; while 
Burke’s figurative speech is flamboyant and dramatic, Paine’s is equally 
figurative, only relying more on formulaic and conventional metaphors.42 For all 
its analytical accuracy, however, this observation obscures the pragmatic 
dimension of rhetoric. Although it does distinguish the different rhetorical 
strategies in Paine with regard to different subject matters, its analysis remains 
largely confined to language as a representation of reality, and downplays the 
equally important question of identity politics, in which the confrontational 
nature of Paine’s language is registered. Olivia Smith’s notion of the ‘intellectual 
vernacular’, although formed largely from an uncritical reading of Paine’s 	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‘plainness’, remains indispensible regarding the historical, political, and, in 
particular, confrontational aspects. 43  This aspect of Paine’s rhetoric is 
demonstrated in the unabashed market populism of the preface to Part II of 
Rights of Man: ‘If Mr. Burke, or any person on his side [of] the question, will 
produce an answer to the Rights of Man that shall extend to a half, or even to a 
fourth part of the number of copies to which the Rights of Man extended, I will 
reply to his work. But until this be done, I shall so far take the sense of the public 
for my guide (and the world knows I am not a flatterer) that what they do not 
think worthwhile to read, is not worth mine to answer’ (1: 350). By expressing 
confidence in the political understanding of his mass readership, Paine is able to 
excite a collective sentiment against a common enemy. Paine’s usage of simile 
and metaphor, for instance, is usually pointedly bathetic and aims for a specific 
target. Most of the similes and metaphors are used to represent Burke’s language 
and the authority and establishment he defends, in order to deflate their sublime 
appearances and derisively reveal the realities under the veil. The famous 
‘plumage and dying bird’ metaphor, for instance, represents Burke as a quixotic 
aesthete without regard for social reality. These figurative expressions are aimed 
derisively at the political realities he despises or disapproves of, by deeming 
them ludicrous and insignificant.44 Paine’s bathetic language serves as a contrast 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See Smith, The Politics of Language 1791-1819 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), ch. 2. Paine’s 
‘intellectual vernacular’, according to Smith, is a language confident in commonsense expression 
of intellectual ideas and the popularisation of the otherwise elitist concepts among common 
readers.  
44 To name only a handful of examples: ‘War is the Faro table of Governments, and nations the 
dupes of the games’ (1: 362); ‘A vast mass of mankind are degradedly thrown into . . . the 
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to Burkean pathos. When it comes to explaining his own ideology and proposals 
for social reform, he often becomes more factual, assertive, compositional, 
argumentative, and ‘vulgar.’45  
Remarking on the difference between a modern republican and an ancient 
courtier with respect to monarchy, Paine writes that the one affirms its value by 
belief, while the other ‘laughs at it, knowing it to be nothing’ (1: 296-297). This 
sentence not only suggests that laughter and knowledge go spontaneously hand 
in hand, but also highlights the combination of the performance of feeling and 
rational understanding. We may therefore reconsider James Epstein’s judgment 
that ‘Paine has a puritan contempt for public show. . . . Reason is not counter- 
but anti-theatrical’. For Epstein, as for many of Paine’s commentators, the 
Enlightenment reason in Paine must do away with any mediating feature that 
represents the spells and phantasms of obscurantism.46 The idea of Paine’s 
alleged anti-theatricality, moreover, depends perhaps on preconceptions about 
the Enlightenment and/or theatre: of Enlightenment as shorthand for the 
absolutism of reason while alternative forms of communication are illegitimate, 
or of the theatre conceived in terms of a cluster of generic conventions. As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
puppet-show of State and Aristocracy’ (1: 259); ‘in the rhapsody of [Burke’s] imagination he has 
discovered a world of windmill, and his sorrows are that there are no Quixotes to attack them’ (1: 
267); ‘[Burke] mounted in the air like a balloon, to draw the eyes of the multitude from the 
ground they stand upon’ (1: 282). Let alone his witticism in ‘no-ability’ (1: 310). Some of these 
witty quips will be discussed later in this chapter.  
45 James Boulton uses ‘vulgar’, an etymologically neutral word meaning ‘of the people’, to 
describe Paine’s style as consistent with his populism and plebeian politics. Boulton, The 
Language of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and Burke (London: Routledge, 1963), 134-50.  
46 Epstein, Radical Expression, 111, 112.  
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Gillian Russell argues, Rights of Man is far from anti-theatrical as commentators 
have asserted, but should be regarded as an alternative theatrical vision of a more 
mobile form of communication in contrast to Burke’s reasserted theatrical 
orthodoxy.47 The figure of ‘open theatre’ appears as a rejection of the Burkean 
emphasis on pathos. I will argue that Paine’s allegory of the theatre of bathos as 
a mode of confrontation with political institution provides an alternative affective 
communication among the popular subjects.   
So far I have presented Paine as the Enlightenment writer who laughs as he 
reasons. I have also stressed the ethical significance of his rhetorics of humour in 
highlighting the confrontational aspect of the polemics and in appealing to the 
wider reading public. Paine’s caricature of his political opponents is a way to 
democratise reason and make his otherwise ‘rational’ polemics more 
accessible.48 Yet laughter in Paine’s popular radicalism involves more than 
rational bathos against ruling-class obscurantism. The word ‘laugh’ and its 
derivatives appear frequently in his major works from American Crisis to Rights 
of Man and Age of Reason. Laughter is used predominantly in the sense of 
ridicule, which expresses the triumph of ‘reason’ and ‘common sense’ over 
certain sets of value that Paine is dedicated to eliminating: the wishful militarism 
of the English Tories in American Crisis, the apology for the ancien regime in 
Rights of Man, and religious obscurantism in Age of Reason. For Paine, laughter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Gillian Russell, ‘Revolutionary Drama’, in Pamela Clemit (ed.), The Cambridge Companion 
to British Literature of the French Revolution in the 1790s (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 175-89.   
48 For explorations of Paine’s literary style dedicated to popularising reason, see Olivia Smith, 
Politics of Language, ch. 2, and Edward Larkin, Thomas Paine and the Literature of Revolution.  
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is a language of merciless iconoclasm. It serves a negative function for reason, 
which is to ‘dismiss . . . with disdain’ (1: 189). Rational dismissal, however, does 
not exhaust Paine’s ethics of bathos, as I have also drawn attention to the 
constructive aspect of laughter that informs the radical social vision in which 
pathos is not discredited but rewritten. I will address in the next section the 
eighteenth-century issue of laughter to contextualise the social aesthetics of 
laughter in Paine and other radicals.  
The difference in comic vision between Burke and Paine results from their 
contrary social ontologies. Among the familiar contrasts between Burke and 
Paine are their opposing views on the relationship between natural rights and 
civil rights. Burke insists that they are categorically incompatible (Reflections, 8: 
109-10), while Paine believes that natural rights are fully convertible into civil 
rights (1: 275). This difference in the theory of rights can be explained by their 
respective views on how social life is constructed. For Burke, civil society is a 
dense fabric of customs, manners, laws, moralities and traditions, so any facile 
claim to natural rights as the inviolable rights of the individual must be 
inapplicable to such complex structure heavily mediated by social and material 
relations. Paine’s ideal society as congregation of self-sufficient individuals 
engaging in the co-operative forms of commerce is difficult to come to terms 
with the incumbent mediation of political or religious institutions. Such thinking, 
which can be understood as the opposition between civil society and the 
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government, was foreshadowed in Common Sense.49 In the Paine of Rights of 
Man, this sociopolitical vision is fused with the radical ethics of laughter.  
It is useful here to take a look at the ‘cement’ as a political metaphor in 
Burke and Paine in relation to the function of comic ridicule in political 
reasoning. For both Paine and Burke, this ‘cement’ symbolises an unnatural 
binding in society. I mentioned earlier that Burke’s ‘cement’ is a homogenising 
force threatening to dissolve social and cultural complexities. Burke identifies 
two ‘cements’ in Reflections, one referring to the supremacy of the city of Paris 
over local republics in France, and the other referring to confiscation and paper 
currency. Both for Burke fail to attend to the complexity of local communal 
affairs, acting as an abstract universal principle. The facile measures of paper 
circulation in particular is enforced ‘without fixed habits or local predilections’ 
(8:239), crudely disregarding the concrete incongruities among local interests 
which requires certain degree of autonomy from the tyranny of abstract 
universality. Pages later Burke derides assignats in a Bergsonian caricature in 
precisely this thinking. Burke’s comic ridicule of the ‘cement’ is meant to 
discredit a totalising measure that may obliterate the diversity of common life; in 
other words, to do away with the unnatural ‘cement’ is to restore concrete social 
relation upon which community and ‘common life’ must be built.   
Paine, on the other hand, uses the ‘cement’ to reject unceremoniously the 
British mixed government, which was, as I note earlier, part of the ideological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See a useful discussion in John Keane, Tom Paine: A Political Life (New York: Grove Press, 
[2003]), 116-19., 116-19.  
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foundation of eighteenth-century theory of humour. Paine calls it a ‘continual 
enigma’ in the state apparatus, ‘cementing and soldering the discordant parts 
together by corruption, to act as a whole’ (1: 339). The paragraphs that follow 
this are exactly the lampoon of monarchy and the ‘open theatre’, which is meant 
to break the sentimental cohesion between the civilians and the state. Paine’s 
comic ridicule identifies the incongruity in political realities and creates a 
bathetic distance, but in doing so he also seeks to induce superiority over its 
target. Laughter is a natural response to anything at odds with ‘common sense’. 
As a method of rational dismissal, laughter seeks to smooth things out into total 
transparency that cleanses away all incumbent mediation of superimposed 
institutions. In this sense, Paine’s comic language is very distant not only 
politically but also conceptually from the eighteenth-century comic theory in 
which the ludicrous incongruity is productive of pleasure and is the product of 
sophisticated complexity of institution. The incongruity theory, which treasures 
the discordant realities in social life, is in Paine’s comic performance completely 
abandoned. This comic language of boundary-dismantling transparency also 
contributes to reinvent the comic aesthetic of Hutcheson’s ‘contagious’ laughter, 
to which I now turn.  
 
2.5 The ‘Contagious’ Laughter: A Universal Sympathy ‘Passing from Heart to 
Heart’  
  
A main argument of Paine’s counterblast to Burke’s Reflections, surely, is 
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the priority of ‘common sense’ over piety, and of reason over sentimentality. Yet 
some of the most piercing remarks found in Rights of Man are put precisely in 
terms of sentiment. Echoing Wollstonecraft’s early rationalist rebuke to Burke 
and her mockery of his ‘inbred sentiments’, Paine nonetheless registers feeling as 
an indispensable category of democratic politics and implicitly assumes criteria 
for judging feeling’s authenticity. Paine complains of Burke’s melodramatic 
style and compares it to La Fayette’s: ‘how ineffectual, though gay with flowers, 
are all his declamation and his arguments compared with [La Fayette’s] clear, 
concise, and soul-animating sentiments!’ The counter-revolutionary rhapsody is 
‘music in the ear, and nothing in the heart’ (1: 255). One of Paine’s main claims 
is that he is incapable of authentic feeling, as his famous quip testifies: ‘[Burke] 
pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird’ (1: 260). Paine’s attack on Burke 
is therefore not a dismissal of sentimentality altogether, but a contention as to 
what legitimate feeling ought to be. This corresponds to the concerns of radical 
reformers in the 1790s about how to regulate feeling to bring about progressive 
reform or radical change. Yet ‘natural’ is also the very epithet Burke uses to 
congratulate his own sentiment. Loyalists respond to the radical accusation of 
their sentimentalism in the same vocabulary.50 This is one of the many examples 
in which political disagreement was often framed, not so much in theoretical 
contents, as in the definition of words in the 1790s. As a result, the war of letters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 For example, one loyalist pamphlet in response to Paine’s Rights of Man hurls back the epithet 
‘rhapsody’, with which Paine dismisses Burke’s polemics, to dub Paine’s own pamphlet. See A 
Defence of the Constitution of England (London, 1791), reprinted in Gregory Claeys, Political 
Writings of the 1790s, 5: 16.  
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between the two political persuasions often came down to teaching each other 
how to feel.  
For Burke, authentic feeling is grounded in local social ties via relations of 
production or familiar connection, which he defends in Reflections, and not by 
the abstract notion of ‘universal benevolence’, which he castigates in Letter to a 
Member of the National Assembly (1791).51 What, then, is the radical idea of 
common feeling inspired by bathos? One aspect of Paine’s dispute with Burke 
concerns a rather straightforward political content. For Paine, sympathy is 
authentic insofar as it is directed to the right object (i.e. ‘the dying bird’). In the 
passage in which Paine contests Burke’s defence of social privilege, he 
highlights the uneven distribution of wealth. Burke believes that ‘the people of 
England can see without pain or grudging . . . a Bishop of Durham, or a Bishop 
of Winchester in possession of £10,000 a-year; and cannot see why it is in worse 
hands than estates to a like amount, in the hands of this earl or that squire’ 
(Reflections, 8: 154). Paine, on the contrary, does not bother to decide if the 
Bishops deserved their income, for this would miss the point: ‘It ought to be put 
between the bishop and the curate, and then it will stand thus — “The people of 
England can see without pain or grudging, a Bishop of Durham, or a Bishop of 
Winchester, in possession of ten thousand pounds a-year, and a curate on thirty 
or forty pounds a-year, or less”’ (1: 290). Here, Paine’s parodic reproduction of 
the sentence structure in Burke’s original text to create a sense of ridiculous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See 8: 314-15, where he regards the notion as symptom of Rousseavian ‘vanity’ and negation 
of ‘natural’ feeling.  
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incongruity is not simply to dismiss Burke’s thesis in derision but to vacate the 
space for what Paine believes is the right object of sympathy (the curate) in order 
to rewrite Burke. By relocating Burke’s sympathy from the elite to the lower 
orders, Paine re-registers sympathy in the ethics of the popular radicalism of 
solidarity.  
Popular radical laughter contributes to a particular language of sympathetic 
tie. Laughter has customarily been understood as an expression of vitality. Vic 
Gatrell’s City of Laughter demonstrates the diversity and chaotic frenzy in the 
increasingly modernised London, which provides material for comic incongruity, 
and argues that such comicality celebrates pure vitality without definite tendency 
as in, for example, Thomas Rowlandson’s ‘non-judgmental’ caricature. Gatrell 
focuses on laughter as an expression of the pleasure-seeking eighteenth century, 
of its prevailing spirit of ribaldry and iconoclasm. Such vital and politically 
ambivalent culture, according to Gatrell’s narrative, gradually gave way to 
nineteenth-century respectability and became a history that requires scholarly 
excavation of the kind that he undertakes in his study. The general thesis of 
Gatrell, that the phenomenon of laughter bespeaks the conflict between manner 
and hedonism, or between politeness and vulgarity, though capturing an 
important aspect of the ethical antagonism of the eighteenth century, seems to me 
to involve some intellectual limitations when he suggests that free laughter is 
understood as pure pleasure. When it comes to radical humour, Gatrell’s general 
reading of laughter risks reproducing the conservative argument that radicalism 
is nothing more than anarchic egotism. Popular laughter is customarily conceived 
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as a resistance to restraint, or as an affirmation of ‘vulgar’ vitality against the 
stoic elitism of respectability. Gatrell’s discussion, on the whole, dwells on 
laughter as autotelic, non-tendentious freedom from moral and political 
pressure.52 However, does laughter entertain any constructive vision other than 
this obvious defiance of manner?  
In Chapter 1, I mentioned that the ‘disinterested’, ‘depoliticised’, or 
‘aesthetic’ character of the notion of humour in the eighteenth century 
reformulated rather than completely ruled out political conflict. I have shown 
that the tension between the transmissive universality and the plurality based on 
individual boundary resides within eighteenth-century discourse of sociability 
between Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. The notion of universal benevolence, 
central to radical ethics in the 1790s and reminiscent of Hutcheson’s invention of 
this notion in the early century, finds a link in this ethics of laughter.53 Paine’s 
aesthetics of bathos in the ‘open theatre’ interestingly resembles Hutcheson’s 
comic vision in its rhetorical pattern. Laughter for both does not stop at the 
derision of the ridiculous but inspires a particular ‘language’ as Paine claims, 
which can be illustrated in Hutcheson’s description of laughter as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Vic Gatrell, City of Laughter; for Rowlandson, see esp. his ch. 1.   
53  For an account of the controversy over universal benevolence, see Evan Radcliffe, 
‘Revolutionary Writing, Moral Philosophy, and Universal Benevolence in the Eighteenth 
Century’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 54 (1993), 221-240. Whereas, in Corbyn Morris’s 
reflection on humour, ‘universal benevolence’ is the virtue that adds amiability to a comic 
character: ‘Humour is the most exquisite and delightful, when the Oddities and Foibles 
introduc’d are not mischievous or sneaking, but free, jocund, and liberal; and such as result from 
a generous Flow of Spirits, and a warm universal Benevolence’. Sir Roger de Coverley is the 
representative example for Morris. See Morris, True Standards, 39, 40.  
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communicative energy that diffuses common sentiments. In Paine’s passage, it 
kindles transmissive democratic energies that ‘pass from heart to heart’.  
 Lord Chesterfield in 1775 formulates the distinction between politeness 
and vulgarity as that between smile and laughter. The mirth of the ill-bred is ‘a 
kind of storm’, characterised by ‘noisy mirth and loud peals of laughter. . . . A 
witty thing never excited laughter; it pleases only the mind, and never distorts the 
countenance: a glaring absurdity, a blunder, a silly accident, and those things that 
are generally called comical, may excite a laugh, though never a loud and a long 
one, among well-bred people.’ Chesterfield’s stoicism is based on the view of the 
laughter as a physical or material surplus hardly subsumable to the social 
organicism facilitated by cultivated ‘wit’ and ‘humour’. ‘True wit, or sense, 
never yet made any body laugh’, Chesterfield writes, ‘they are above it; they 
please the mind, and give chearfulness to countenance’.54 Indeed, laughter is a 
material sign in social intercourse that can fail to correspond to its meaning — 
‘chearfulness’, as Chesterfield puts it — and turns into a disturbing excess. In 
this sense, it can be a quantitative question, a matter of degree. In 1797, a 
jest-book still propagated the ‘Laws of Laughing’: ‘When a merry story is ended, 
you may be allowed to make a little noise in laughing, as it shows your 
approbation of what was meant for your entertainment; but never break into the 
middle of a story by loud laughter, such interruption being very disagreeable to 
the company, as well as to the speaker; and all the merry ammunition should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Chesterfield, Lord Chesterfield's Advice to His Son, on Men and Manners: or, a New System of 
Education, 2nd edn (London, 1775), 46-47. 
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preserved for the conclusion’.55 As audial medium to spread merriment, laughter 
can ironically turn into ‘disagreeable’ disruption of shared mirth when it 
becomes disproportionate to the actual amusement of the company. According to 
this view, laughter becomes excessive because, contrary to the belief in its 
contagiousness, its merry energy is unable to be passed on to others, but instead 
turns out to disturb the well-being of the company as a whole, which relies on 
individual boundaries maintained by self-regulation. I have accounted for the 
polite discourse of eighteenth-century humour that emphasises the cultivation of 
comic sensibility that can grasp the diversity of human experience and transform 
social and political contradictions into an aesthetic understanding of 
‘incongruity’. It means that the ludicrous in social realities is sublimated into 
disinterested knowledge and internalised as an acquired ‘taste’ or sensibility, 
rather than released into the raw energy of unregulated mirth that borders on 
social anarchy.56  
Popular radical laughter disregards this function of humour as social 
regulation, and resuscitates the Hutcheson’s aesthetic of contagion to construct a 
popular sympathetic continuum. The image of laughter as contagious, or 
diffusively symphonic, is a vital element in many radical literary imaginations, 
by radical authors as diverse as Paine, John Thelwall, and William Blake. They 
develop their social vision of laughter against the limitation of polite sociability. 
Blake, for example, unabashedly defended unconstrained laughter against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Comick Magazine; Or, Compleat Library of Mirth, Humour, Wit, Gaiety, and Entertainment 
(London, 1797), 6.  
56 See also Chapter 1, Sec. 3.  
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cultural refinement and moderation under the principle of politeness, in his 
annotation to Reverend Johann Caspar Lavater's Aphorisms on Man. Lavater 
writes: ‘Frequent laughing has been long called a sign of a little mind — whilst 
the scarcer smile of harmless quiet has been complimented as the mark of a 
noble heart — But to abstain from laughing, and exciting laughter, merely not to 
offend, or to risk giving offence, or not to debase the inward dignity of 
character — is a power unknown to many a vigorous mind.’57 Blake responds 
with his characteristically blunt defiance: ‘I hate scarce smiles I love laughing’.58 
Blake’s defiance is far from a passive resistance, if we consider a social vision of 
universal simplicity laid out in his ‘Laughing Song’ from Songs of Innocence 
(1788):  
When the green woods laugh, with the voice of joy   
And the dimpling stream runs laughing by,  
When the air does laugh with our merry wit, 
And the green hill laughs with the noise of it.   
When the meadows laugh with lively green  
And the grasshopper laughs in the merry scene,  
When Mary and Susan and Emily,  
With their sweet round mouths sing Ha, Ha, He.  
When the painted birds laugh in the shade  
Where our table with cherries and nuts is spread 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Lavater, Aphorisms on Man (London: J. Johnson, 1788), 23. 
58 William Blake, The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed. David Erdman 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 585.  
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Come live & be merry and join with me,  
To sing the sweet chorus of Ha, Ha, He.59  
Blake imagines the scene of innocence: ubiquitous resonance of laughter of 
natural objects and human beings in universal symphony (‘chorus’) that 
approximates a borderless communality. 60  John Thelwall writes a similar 
envisagement in celebration of ‘The Genius of France’ in The Peripatetic, in 
which the persona of France embodies the unfettered freedom from tyranny that 
gestures towards universal utopia: 
See Her swains render’d happy — her cities all shine, 
Her hills “laugh and sing” with the gen’rous vine; 
Fit emblem of ev’ry true patriot that lives, 
He draws his support, from the embrace that he gives. 
Then hail th’occasion, and boldly advance,  
The glass and the song, to the Genius of France. . . .61 
With implicit biblical allusions, Blake’s and Thelwall’s metaphors present 
symphonic mirth, rather than bathetic disdain, as the defining mood of laughter, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid, 11. 
60 As Heather Glen writes of Songs of Innocence in general: ‘In Songs of Innocence there is no 
isolated individual: no individual exists except in relationship.’ Glen, Vision and Disenchantment: 
Blake’s Songs and Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 137.  
61 John Thelwall, ‘The Genius of France’, Morning Chronicle (30 Nov. 1792), quoted in Michael 
Scrivener (ed.), Poetry and Reform: Periodical Verse from the English Democratic Press, 
1792-1824 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992), 43-44.  
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upon which a new radical rhetoric of emancipation is constructed.62 Thelwall 
also writes in The Peripatetic of ‘laughter loud, and thoughtless joy’ as a 
language of solidarity with the poor, ‘the base-born crowd’, ‘the peasant's low 
abode’, and the ‘widows, orphans, houseless rove’.63 Thelwall’s list of the 
mobile, solitary social subjects represents a ruin of the ‘common life’ of 
settlement and communal tie. The ‘loud, thoughtless’ laughter, the very kind of 
laughter that would scandalise Beattie and Burke, functions as a cohesion of 
outcasts in a fractured society rather than a secondary response stimulated by the 
perception of incongruity in a sophisticated civil system. 
This language of universal diffusion enables us to read some crucial social 
and political thoughts of Paine elaborated in the second part of Rights of Man as 
a comic imagination. In Rights of Man, we find a similar expression of this 
pastoral allegory when Paine describes the abolition of the aristocratic oligarchy 
of landed interest defended by Burke (1: 410-42). Paine rejects Burke’s defence 
of the House of Peers as pillars of society, and argues that the private interests of 
the oligarch do not represent collective ones. Paine envisages a community based 
on an equal share of the means of production by independent farmers as 
something of a universal communion between all men and nature: ‘When the 
valley laughs and sing it is not the farmer only but all the creation that rejoices’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Michael Scrivener identifies Psalm 126 as Thelwall’s allusion. See Scrivener, Seditious 
Allegories, 99. See also Mark Philp, ‘Explanatory Notes’, in Philp (ed.), Rights of Man, Common 
Sense and Other Political Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 478.  
63 See Thelwall, ‘Philautiaccha; or the Voluptuary: A Rhapsody’, in The Peripatetic; or, 
Sketches of the Heart, of Nature and Society (London, 1793), 2: 58-59. 
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(1: 412).64 Paine presents laughter as expression of vitality of the primitive or 
pre-civil, but laughter is also employed to define social relation as egalitarian and 
co-operative form, which Paine seems to take for self-sufficient human 
institution. 
In these radical allegories of laughter, its cognitive dimension (e.g. 
‘incongruity’) is temporarily bracketed. The laughter does not result from a 
perception of a ludicrous incongruity, but is a voluntary expression of mirth. 
Hutcheson’s mode of laughter finds a reinvented expression in these pastoral 
imageries. There are no targets and no identified objects in the act of laughter. In 
this grammar of the intransigent popular laughter, the stimuli are also absent. It 
also appears that this laughter for its own sake, valued in the eighteenth-century 
polite discourse, is appropriated in the demotic and collective language. In the 
absence of immediate political semantics, however, a different level of political 
significance is thereby registered. In contrast to the cultivation of the ‘taste’ for 
wit and humour that must be carried out in highly civilised conversation, these 
rhapsodies preserve and reinvent through the democratic vocabulary a more 
primitive vision of laughter as pure expression of innocence. If, so to speak, the 
anxiety about vulgarity often drives a polite cultural elite towards the aesthetics 
of comedy without laughter, the passages I discussed above show radicals boldly 
imagining an affective tie in laughter without comedy.  
The popular radical imagination of what in Hutcheson’s terms is called 	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   Mark Philp locates Paine’s biblical allusion in Isaiah 44:23 and 49: 13. Philp, ‘Explanatory 
Notes’, in Philp (ed.), Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Political Writings (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 478.	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‘contagious’ laughter provides another mode of expression of what Mary 
Fairclough demonstrates as the aesthetics of the ‘contagion’ of the crowd through 
sympathy.65 Radical humour imagines a ‘contagion’ conducted not by only 
‘sympathy’, but by pathos mediated by the language of bathos. As the polite 
discourse of humour defines laughter as noise in comic conversation, it would at 
the same time bestow its enemy (the ‘vulgar’ multitude) an opportunity to 
construct their political subjectivity by transforming laughter from noise to 
voice.66 On the other hand, if humour is to be confined in polite sociability it is 
because, in accordance with the theory emphasised throughout this thesis, 
comedy must be embedded in common life where sociability is practiced. A 
vision of expansive contagion will be beyond the ambit of ‘common life’ as it 
was currently structured in the 1790s.  
 The tension between comic paradigms implied in Burke is allegedly due to 
his perception of the precarious situation of the category of common life. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65  Mary Fairclough, The Romantic Crowd: Sympathy, Controversy and Print Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
66 For Saree Makdisi, Blake’s aesthetic laughter exemplifies his life ethics expressed through the 
aesthetic of noise in his poetry: ‘The noise level in Blake is something like an index, a 
barometer — perhaps a speedometer — of making, and especially of the making of life. . . . For 
the question that Blake pushes us to ask is not whether life is made, but how, and under what 
circumstances; whether that making, and life itself, are to be sorrowful — a matter of lamenting, 
shrieking, howling, gnashing — or rather a matter of joy, celebration, piping, and singing; 
whether life is to be dominated by “happy chear” which we “weep with joy to hear,” as in the 
introduction of Songs of Innocence, by the “bells chearful sound” of The Ecchoing Green, by the 
“tender voice” of the lamb, by The Laughing Song's “sweet chorus of Ha, Ha, He,” or instead by 
the howlings and shriekings of life perverted, abstracted, and stolen: the harlot's curse, the 
soldier's sigh, the chimney sweeper's “weep, weep, in notes of woe!”’ Saree Makdisi, William 
Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 
265.  
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Paine, on the other hand, comedy (or rather, laughter) as an expression of 
‘common sense’ can serve to clear away the corrupt fabric of common life and 
rebuild it on an alternative foundation. Burke’s understanding of human 
constitution is in stark contrast to Paine’s belief in the first part of Rights of Man 
in the existence of natural ‘Man’ as the builder rather than the beneficiaries of 
civil institutions. In the second part, Paine goes on to elaborate on his social 
programs that are based on this human metaphysics and the alternative civil 
society, although his proposal for government welfare programs may potentially 
contradict the principle of self-government of free individuals.67 It is in this part 
he proposes ‘open theatre’ of contagious laughter, and, pages later, the vision of 
individuals freely joining hands in laughing mirth. He then moves on from the 
abstract metaphysics to the elaborate and concrete proposals of social reform that, 
he believes, can radically rebuild society and government: progressive taxation, 
old-age pension, and so on, and concludes with an universal utopia based on the 
structure of commerce. In such progression of argument, Paine’s comedy serves 
as a foundation that creates the fabric of common life. This reasoning, 
understandably, is outrageously counter-productive for Burke.  
 
2.6 The Contagion of Laughter in Print 
 
 I have accounted for another strain in the comic theory that implies a more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 As John Keane points out, ‘Paine failed to consider whether a transnational welfare state 
would in practice contradict the ultimate aim of limiting the power of government in favor of a 
self-governing civil society.’ John Keane, Tom Paine, 303.   
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protean, transmissive and ‘contagious’ aesthetics. If Burke’s tragic theatre 
concentrates feeling on an individual as a synecdoche of the collective, Paine’s 
‘open theatre’ creates transmissive feeling, paradoxically delivered by bathos 
against that individual. Therefore, Paine displays apathy towards Burke’s subject 
who, Paine believes, is no true victim of political injustice: ‘[Burke’s] hero or his 
heroine’, Paine remarks, ‘must be a tragic-victim expiring in show, and not the 
real prisoner of misery, sliding into death in the silence of dungeon’ (1: 260).68 
Paine’s remark is an illustrative counterexample to the argument that Burke 
insists on restriction of theatrical space against the radical confusion of theatre 
and real life: here it is Paine who wants to return Burke’s theatrical performance 
back to where it belongs. For Paine, the bathos that turns a tragic subject into a 
comic one and dissevers the tie between the private individual and the crowd is 
the first step toward the universal social vision based on the contagion of 
laughter. As Paine criticises Burke’s tragic theatre that teaches submission of the 
multitude: ‘A vast mass of mankind are degradedly thrown into the background 
of the human picture, to bring forward, with greater glare the puppet-show of 
State and Aristocracy’ (1: 267). This rhetorical device of ‘open theatre’ 
transforms Burke’s silent audience into laughing political subject.69 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See also Tom Furniss, Edmund Burke’s Aesthetic Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), 162.  
69 Daniel Eaton’s Politics for the People records a letter from Edinburgh (March 1794) which 
depicts a struggle between loyalists and Jacobins at the theatre, which can be characterised as the 
struggle between Burkean pathos and Paineite bathos: ‘The Democratic parts of Cromwell’s 
speeches were received by thundering plaudits, while the pathetic and dignified speeches of 
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Burke’s primary target in Reflections may not have been the ‘swinish 
multitude’ itself, but its mobilisers. His histrionic of the violence of the Parisian 
mob in Reflections is largely a fiction, deriving from his memory of the Gordon 
riot. England’s popular radical movement had yet to develop by the time of the 
publication of Reflections. In comparison with his passing remark on the mob 
violence, Burke castigates more elaborately the ‘political men of letters’ such as 
Richard Price, whose pro-Revolution sermon for Burke could incense subversive 
sentiment and was the exact occasion of Burke’s furious rejoinder. Burke’s main 
fear was the spread of revolutionary ideas to England. Indeed, the anathema in 
Burke’s Reflections are more likely to be the ‘political men of letters’ who 
disseminate the ‘plague’ of radicalism through the medium of print to the 
popular readership. Burke turns to tragedy in 1790 when ‘common life’ in his 
judgment has become too alarmingly unstable for comedy to develop its humour 
and character sedately. In endeavouring to control the very source of disorder, 
Burke uses tragedy to rebuild a social consensus upon which alone ‘common life’ 
can be rescued. Although his ‘theatre’ aims to educate the audience to produce 
civil subjects, it remains uncertain how wide the spectatorship can be. Burke’s 
distance from the ‘multitude’ was manifested in his defence of parliamentary 
politics in the Wilkite controversy of the 1760s. John Brewer argues that the new 
‘political nation’ constituted by the press and its popular readerships, not only 
materialised the widened political participation but also the ‘alternative structure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Charles were either laughed or hissed.’ Politics for the People, 2 vols. (1793–95, rpt. New York: 
Greenwood, 1968), I: 377–79. See also Scrivener, Seditious Allegories, 97.  
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of politics’ in opposition to ‘the enclosed world of institutionalised politics’ like 
the parliament.70 Burke adheres to this meritocratic principle in the 1790s. His 
distrust of the popular readership is reflected in his mode of address in the form 
of private letter, creating a sense of the staging of an ‘enclosed world’. 
The radical ridicule finds its voice in the interstices of the polite and 
conservative discourse of comedy. The structure of the polite model of comedy, 
as I have constantly reiterated, usually finds its ‘humourist’ in the scenes of 
common life, his manner and character being at odds with the rest of the 
company or even the world. Radical humour, on the other hand, by obscuring 
‘character’ and highlighting the crowd, exploits and remakes the figure of the 
comic humourist in contrast with the collective social organization. The figure of 
‘open theatre’ is in a sense structured by this relationship between the ‘humourist’ 
and the world: the political show is presented as if it loses touch with the public, 
thereby affording amusement for the rest of the company. 
To achieve this radical theatrical aesthetic, however, the disseminative and 
diffusive nature of the form of print can be very effective. Eaton’s pamphlet The 
Pernicious Effects of the Art of Printing upon Society, Exposed (1793), which 
exploits the division between the higher and lower order, illustrates this point.71 
As one of the best wits in popular radicalism, Eaton’s comic satires and parodies 
vividly put much of the Paineite open theatre into practice. Earlier in the year, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 John Brewer, Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III (Cambridge, 
1976), pp. 15-17, 21, 158-60. 
71 It is presumably written by Eaton himself, though the fact that it is unsigned leaves the 
authorship open.  
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Eaton had been tried and acquitted twice for printing Rights of Man and for the 
‘gamecock’ joke. These events were good reasons for the complacency 
expressed in Pernicious Effects. In this short parody, Eaton impersonates an 
author addressing ‘the friends of social order’ on the alarming rise of mass print 
culture that endangers social hierarchy and enables the lower orders and women 
to take part in political process and assume equal rights to their social superiors. 
What unsettles him is the effacement of the boundary between public and private 
by print, most notably the exposure to the public of what should remain private 
among the ruling class. Failure to keep the multitude in ignorance shakes the 
social order. The desperation of the author eventually ends up with a 
self-cancelling proposal that climaxes the comic effect: ‘Let all Printing-presses 
be committed to the flames—all letter foundries be destroyed—schools and 
seminaries abolished—dissenters of every denominations double and treble 
taxed—all discourse upon government and religion prohibited . . . and lastly, 
issue a proclamation against reading and burn all private libraries.’72 These 
proposals are based on acknowledgement that printing is employed ‘as the 
medium of diffusing sentiment’.73 The anxiety shown by this parodic author is 
quickly turned into a Paineite comicality in which the ‘diffusion of sentiment’ is 
here simultaneously an unintentional diffusion of popular laughter. With 
dramatic irony, the author proposes several clandestine measures which are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 D. I. Eaton, The Pernicious Effects of the Art of Printing upon Society, Exposed, 15. For 
another useful discussion, see Paul Keen, The Crisis of Literature in the 1790s: Print Culture and 
Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 161-62. 
73 Eaton, Pernicious Effects, 8. 
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expected to work once they are disclosed in print:  
To carry some part of this plan into execution, it would be necessary to 
employ spies and informers, which by many (Jacobins and Republicans) are 
thought to be signs of a weak or wicked and corrupted government; they say, 
that governors, conscious of acting for the public good, of having it only in 
view in all their measures, would scorn using such unworthy and 
dishonourable means. I cannot be of this opinion, but am confident, that if 
the measures I have proposed be but speedily adopted . . . the lower orders 
would mind their work and [remain in] that desirable state of 
ignorance. . . .74  
Eaton’s ventriloquist voice constantly sabotages reactionary discourse, so that its 
agenda and argument seem to lose their credibility the moment they are uttered. 
The comic effect emerges in the contradiction that, while the target readers for 
the speaker appear to be the elite, the publication itself is clearly a mass-targeting 
pamphlet (sold at the price of two pence). This parody thus manoeuvres the 
speaker into a comical wrong footing, as if he is placed on the stage of an ‘open 
theatre’ where he thinks he addresses an oligarchic private world without being 
aware of his exposure to public spectatorship. Of course, judging from the nature 
of its publication, Eaton seems to ignore the possibility of a loyalist crowd in the 
readership, and subscribes to the typical radical dichotomy of the people versus 
the government. Nevertheless, Eaton exercises this radical rhetoric powerfully by 
burlesquing the Burkean literary form of the private letter, displacing the 	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Burkean persona from private social circle to open stage. The comic irony Eaton 
appears to aim for is one in which the parodic author is made to address a small 
circle of audience while the majority of the readers are allegedly the multitude 
unable to sympathise with him.  
The eruption of the comic technique that generally falls into the mode of 
Paine’s ‘open theatre’ reflects the growing perception that the ruling class is 
losing its grip on the populace, so that it can be mocked and dismissed in the 
belief, contrary to Burke’s, that the fall of the ruling class does not lead to 
negative collective consequences. Paine’s Rights of Man is imbued with this kind 
of optimistic triumphalism, which I have suggested above in the example of the 
trope of Quixotism. During late 1794 and 1795, in the wake of the acquittals of 
many leading radicals from high treason, which marks the temporary triumph of 
republican politics, a wealth of humorous print on the government and monarchy 
mushroomed in a variety of forms, including handbills, broadsides and 
advertisements, on the streets as well as on radical newspapers such as the 
Courier and the Telegraph. This literature of mock-advertisement, which has 
been rediscovered by John Barrell, elaborates upon ‘open theatre’ by 
representing the activities of the King and the government as spectacles and 
entertainments, including plays, pantomimes, ceremonial processions, 
magic-shows, and so on.75 The booming of mock-sermon also draws scholarly 
attention, as an elaboration of the Open Theatre in a broad sense, in which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See John Barrell, ‘“An Entire Change of Performance?” The Politicisation of Theatre and the 
Theatricalisation of Politics in the mid 1790s’, Lumen, 17 (1998): 11-50; and Barrell (ed.), 
‘Exhibition Extraordinary!!’: Radical Broadsides of the Mid-1790s (Nottingham: Trent, 2001). 
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pulpit is turned from an educative medium to a parodic object of the mass 
audience.76 There is little space to examine this body of texts in detail or address 
their difference and diversity in rhetoric and symbolism in this chapter; but I 
nonetheless want to point out briefly the shared trope in these texts in response to 
loyalism, the trope that in general agrees with Paine’s, with which he responds to 
Burke. A common technique in these texts is to represent state rituals as comic 
shows that compare politicians to magicians, and their activities to magic-shows. 
What these mock-advertisements show are that the public political rituals, 
contrary to Burke, do not bear on substantial public interest because they are 
simply tricks. A popular feature is the caricature of William Pitt’s dramatic 
persona as ‘Signor Gulielmo Pittachio’, after the renowned Italian illusionist of 
the time Giuseppe Pinetti, implying Pitt is a political mountebank. Later on, the 
targets extend to the King, Burke and Henry Dundas. 77  These 
mock-advertisements echo Paine’s derision concerning ‘the puppet-show of State 
and Aristocracy’ that the multitude is arbitrarily ‘thrown into’ (1: 267). In these 
parodies, the smooth affective continuum from the ruling class to its mass 
spectator is absent, or is replaced by the comic disconnection generated by the 
chasm between a theatrically isolated object and its laughing spectators. These 
mock-theatres in the open air deliberately misplace the Platonic cave of 	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phantasm. Barrell points out that the originality lies not in conceiving politics as 
theatre, but in finding a new way of representing political theatre in the medium 
of print so it can be more accessible to half-literate audience in their everyday 
life in the tavern and on the street.78 These parodic prints therefore exemplify a 
radical (in-)version of the polite model of comedy, generated by the incongruity 
of the ruling-class individuals not in the common life of the domestic middle 
class, but that of the lower orders in the tavern and on the street.  
An outstanding example of the radical disruption of communal affective tie 
is Admirable Satire on the Death, Dissection, Funeral procession, and Epitaph, 
of Mr. Pitt (1795).79 This anonymous satire on William Pitt, first published in 
the Telegraph, takes the reader behind the scene to see Pitt on the deathbed of his 
private home. It presents a parody that gives ‘details’ of Pitt’s final days 
surrounded by his friends in a tone of mock-pathos. The author constantly 
sabotages this pathetic scene with incongruous plot details to render sympathy 
from the readers impossible (or, sympathy is not expected at all because of the 
readership of this radical newspaper). Pitt asks George Rose, then Clerk of the 
Parliaments, to recall his good deeds, but Rose, ludicrously, can remember 
nothing but his ‘crimes’. After Pitt’s death, the author tells of a hilarious 
postmortem examination of Pitt’s body. Pitt’s cranium, tongue, neck, heart, lungs 
and liver are microscopically dissected in order to understand how the wicked 
character of Pitt is constituted. What the reader is presented with is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Barrell, ‘An Entire Change of Performance?’, 29.   
79 Admirable Satire on the Death, Dissection, Funeral procession, and Epitaph, of Mr. Pitt 
(London, 1795), reprinted from Telegraph (20, 21 and 24 Aug. 1795).  
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extraordinary and ‘singular’ constitution: the tongue’s smoothness and strange 
hollowness inside explains his deceptiveness and emptiness; the frozen lump of 
liquid in his heart shows his coldness; the superabundance of dark bile in his 
liver his explains his biliousness; and so on.80 This passage may benefit from the 
eighteenth-century medical discourse of the physiological determination of 
individual character, and can therefore be traced to the early discourse of the 
‘humourist’ made by his imbalance of bodily fluids — in this case, Pitt’s 
excessive bile. Indeed, this piece transforms Pitt from an object of pity into an 
amusing humourist. It may also allude to, ridicule and refute, Burke’s pathetic 
aesthetic of approaching the ‘wounds of a father’ with fear and pity. By 
presenting the body as an individual, singular case, the mock autopsy of Pitt not 
only expresses a gleeful irreverence towards his body but also appears to reject 
Burkean social organicism in which a person in power can be synecdochical to 
the body politic as a whole. The rejection of the link between a private elite and 
public interest is further expressed in one of the last developments of the story: 
‘A monument, we understand, is to be erected, at the public expense, to 
perpetuate this Great Man’s memory’.81 The monument does not symbolise a 
national tie but, ‘at the public expense’, represents the privatisation of public 
funds. At the end of this parody, the author laments the lack of respect and pity 
from the multitude:  
It is with grief that we advert to the behaviour of the mob on this occasion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid, 11-13.  
81 Ibid, 15 
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Neither respect for the memory of the deceased, nor hunger itself, (which 
appeared in most of their countenances) could restrain their levity from 
breaking out into shouts of laughter and indecent merriment’.82  
In this mass disrespect in laughter, Pitt is symbolically isolated, treated as a 
private figure who has lost his grip on the multitude. Laughter here is not only a 
declaration of popular independence and political subjectivity. It is also, in spite 
of (or because of) their ‘hunger’, their display of solidarity.  
 Burke and Paine’s far-reaching dispute beyond the confines of practical 
political matters such as the choice between monarchy and republicanism opens 
up questions concerning the very constitution of social life itself. Their comic 
ridicules of alternative sociopolitical systems bring the satiric function of humour 
back to the foreground. Popular radical humour in its attack on the political 
establishment embodies a peculiar combination of Hobbes and Hutcheson. Their 
political humour employs the aesthetics of ‘character’ in the ‘incongruity’ 
paradigm of the eighteenth century, but without the mores and ethos that 
sustained this paradigm. Its disagreement with Burke’s comic ethics reflects the 
content of ‘common life’ in contestation. Moreover, its expression of confidence 
and volition in ‘common sense’ in laughter differs markedly from the 
eighteenth-century comic tradition, founded on the theory of human imperfection 
and finitude, and expressed in the description of social ineptitude, fallibility, 
despair of transcendence, and Sterneian acceptance of mortality. At the end of 
the decade, these themes were to be reclaimed and defended by a literature of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Ibid.  
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‘Inoffensive Sport’ and Political Criticism in John Wolcot 
 
Richard Newton’s ‘Treason!!!’ appeared in 1798. Around that time he 
produced a number of caricatures on George III. It is certain that Newton’s royal 
satire benefited both substantially and stylistically from the most popular verse 
satirist of the King, John Wolcot, better known by his pseudonym ‘Peter Pindar’. 
He dedicated one print in 1798 to Wolcot, whom he lauded as ‘that Prince of 
Satirists’.1 Although it is likely that anyone wishing to lampoon the King would 
find Wolcot a natural inspiration, it is still remarkable that the popular radicals in 
particular was associated with such a satirist as Wolcot. It is not only because 
Wolcot did not engage very fervently with radical activities of the 1790s, but 
also because his approach to laughter and humour does not seem at the first 
glance conducive to radical causes. As I will discuss in this chapter, Wolcot 
frequently stresses the freedom of laughter as an end in itself, without any hint at 
subversion even if it is directed at the political establishment such as Monarchy. I 
have noted in the Introduction that this is exactly what Newton’s caricature 
claims. But I have also noted that the ‘disinterested’ amusement in the 1790s was 
part of political contestation. In this regard, there is hardly a better case in point 
than the controversy over the work of Wolcot, whose rhetoric notoriously plays 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘An Atlas, or the Strong Man!!!’ (1798), BM 1868,0808.6688. See also David Alexander, 
Richard Newton and English Caricature in the 1790s (Manchester: Whitworth Art Gallery in 
association with Manchester University Press, 1998), 51.  
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on the ambiguity between joke and propaganda. This chapter is concerned with 
how an ‘innocuous’ practice of humour without determined political leaning can 
lie at the heart of political controversy in the 1790s.  
Wolcot’s satire targets a range of political and cultural institutions, although 
it was the satire on the King that dragged him into political controversy and 
threats of government prosecution. When he finally renounced royal satire in 
1796 owing to heightened pressure on him by the government, Wolcot argued 
that the government overreacted to laughter, even though his satire was directed 
at the King: ‘behold, there is death in the joke/ That squinteth at Queen or at 
King’.2 He protests forcefully that his lampoon is innocuous:  
A harmless joke on King and Queen;  
A little joke on lofty Earls and Lords;  
Smiles at the splendid homage Court scenes;  
The modes, the manners, sentiments and words; 
A joke on Margaret Nicolson’s mad Knights;  
A joke upon the shave of cooks at Court;  
Charms the fair muse, and eke the world delights;  
A pretty piece of inoffensive sport. (3: 428)  
The ‘inoffensive sport’ is a familiar disclaimer that humour does not 
necessarily entail a subversive agenda. Wolcot’s satire is characterised by light 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 John Wolcot, Liberty’s Last Squeak, in The Works of Peter Pindar, Esq., 5 vols. (London, 
1812), 3: 417. Unless otherwise cited, all quotes from Wolcot are from this edition, and are given 
in the main text with the volume and page numbers. For Wolcot’s renunciation, see below, p. 171, 
and n. 47.  
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yet scurrilous mockery of his targets’ personal foibles. The Lousiad (1785-95), 
his magnum opus of royal satire, exposes the King to ridicule not by an account 
of his public deeds, but by a dramatisation of trivial domestic events conducted 
in a traditional mock-epic manner. It presents a farce of frenzy caused by the 
King’s melodramatic consternation at the discovery of a louse on his dinner plate. 
Blaming his cooks and ordering them to be shaved, he provokes the cooks to 
rebel in an equally mock-epic fashion. In this work, as well as his other verse 
satires on the King, the King is ridiculed for his coarse manner, his speech 
pattern (consisting mainly of inarticulate monosyllables), and such defects of 
personal character as a lack of taste, reasoning, sociability and amiability. In 
other words, Wolcot saturates his political satire with trivial human comedy. 
Isaac D’Israeli’s response to The Lousiad exemplifies a typical dismissal of 
Wolcot by his contemporary critics, when he asserts that Wolcot’s satire 
‘[s]wells a small foible to a monstrous crime’.3  
Notwithstanding Wolcot’s ‘inoffensive sport’, he could not escape political 
controversy in the 1790s and the government attempt to silence him. It may well 
be because of the contemporary construal of the King’s behaviours since late 
1788 as symptoms of madness, rather than porphyria as modern retrospective 
diagnosis has it. His ‘madness’ was the occasion for the Regency crisis that 
continued well into the 1790s, and satires on the King, however innocuous the 
authors may claim, became particularly political sensitive. Wolcot’s caricature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Isaac D’Israeli, ‘On the Abuse of Satire’, Gentleman's Magazine, 59 (Jul. 1789), 648. See 
below for more discussion of this text.  
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the King’s manners and tempers in his poem may well be read as mockery of the 
King’s madness, and is therefore subversive in the sense that the King’s mental 
condition displayed in everyday business disqualifies his reign. Also, Wolcot 
supported the Prince of Wales to replace George III (before the Prince actually 
did), and perhaps had a little political sympathy with the Foxites.4 That said, I 
will not reduce Wolcot’s satire to a specific textual production responding a 
specific political event. I have argued that political humour in the 1790s involves 
a complex ideological framework that goes beyond ad hoc political 
commentaries. Wolcot’s satire represents the King as a laughable character in the 
quotidian affair (in other words, ‘common life’), and is therefore germane to the 
terms of political controversy of the 1790s I have been focusing on. As we shall 
see, Wolcot’s work and the controversy it provoked at the end of the century 
resonate with this categorical tension between (human) comedy and (political) 
satire in the practice of humour. 
This indicates the difficulty of reading his politics. Wolcot’s targets of 
ridicule include the court, lords, Poet Laureates, the Royal Academy, the Royal 
Society, the government under Tory Prime Minister William Pitt, and, above all, 
King George III. He also wrote for the Morning Post. Such literary credentials 
may categorise Wolcot as a radical poet. He provoked loyalist attacks from the 
British Critic and the Anti-Jacobin Review and from conservative literati 
including and Isaac D’Israeli, Thomas Mathias, Richard Polwhele, and William 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 See his elegy to Charles Fox, Richard Sheridan and Sir Francis Burdett, Later in his Tristia 
(1806), in Works, 4: 337, however, Wolcot seems to think that these individuals have capitulated 
to the political establishment.   
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Gifford.5 Yet Wolcot also spent some of his early years in France, and returned 
to England with a resolute contempt for French culture in general. When the 
French Revolution started Wolcot voiced counter-revolutionary sentiments. 
Although he was associated with radicalism for his acquaintance with William 
Godwin and the Treason Trialists, he remained distant from radical activism and 
related societies.6 It is of little surprise, then, that modern scholarship has come 
to contradictory construals of his politics as radical as well as loyalist.7  
The objective of this chapter is not to provide another judgment on 
Wolcot’s politics, nor is it to reopen the case by a close and extensive reading of 
Wolcot’s work per se. Further, this chapter does not read Wolcot’s frivolous or 
‘comic’ style of satire as a self-conscious ‘strategy’ of political polemic, partly 
because it may risk committing intentional fallacy while downplaying the 
facetious playfulness of his language. It is more so because the complexity of the 
context in which he is writing does not always guarantee that his ‘strategy’ leads 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 D’Israeli, ‘On the Abuse of Satire’; Mathias, Pursuits of Literature; Polwhele, ‘A Sketch of the 
Private and Literary Character of John Walcot [sic], M. D., Commonly Called Peter Pindar’; 
Gifford, Epistle to Peter Pindar, all discussed below.   
6 For his lukewarm attitude to radical reform, his friend Cyrus Redding once reports that, in 
attending a meeting of the Friends of the People, ‘Wolcot, who was more of an aristocrat than a 
Jacobite [sic] of that day, was really not one of the disaffected, though he would not suffer his 
self-assumed betters to think for him. He attended the meeting out of curiosity’. See Redding, ‘Dr. 
Wolcot’, in Past Celebrities Whom I have Known, vol. 1 (London, 1866), 257-58. 
7 For ‘radical’, see e.g. Iain McCalman, ‘John Wolcot’, in McCalman (gen. ed.), Oxford 
Companion to the Romantic Age: British Culture, 1776-1832 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 766. For ‘loyalist’, see Tom Girtin, Doctor with Two Aunts: A Biography of Peter Pindar 
(London: Hutchinson, 1959), 108. Fenella Copplestone regards Wolcot a ‘self-avowed Tory’ in 
favour of constitutional monarchy: see her introduction to Peter Pindar, Laughing at the King: 
Selected Poems (Manchester: Fyfield, 2009), 12.   
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to the result he may have desired. Instead, this chapter pursues two questions: 
first, why Wolcot invites confusingly diverse ideological exegeses while his 
satire very often proves difficult to read in any determined political term; and 
second, why his ‘inoffensive sport’ is mired in political controversy and what his 
case can tell us about the political climate that affects the practice of otherwise 
‘innocuous’ humour. This chapter uses Wolcot’s satire on George III as an index 
to one of the central concerns in this study with regard to how humorous 
expression problematises political judgment and the terms of controversy. I 
emphasise that it is the interaction between his work and his context that registers 
the significance of his work as a symptomatic case in point of the ongoing 
controversy between satire and comedy in a politically-charged milieu of the 
1790s.  
In this chapter, I consider three aspects that can illustrate the polyvalence of 
political humour which Wolcot’s work and its receptions display. First, with 
regard to the political system, the changing style of monarchy in Britain under 
George III, who sought to fuse his two constitutional ‘bodies’: the political and 
the personal. This transition enables Wolcot’s royal satire to fuse human comedy 
with political satire. Second, Wolcot’s literary outputs renewed an 
eighteenth-century controversy between ‘Juvenalian’ pointed satire and 
‘Horatian’ general comedy. The ambiguity of situating Wolcot’s work between 
Horace and Juvenal can in a sense mirror the confused approaches to political 
questions of the time. Third, Wolcot’s attitude about humour itself reveals how 
his language of bathos seeks to maintain a critical distance from what Wolcot 
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perceives as stylistic extravagance in both the French Revolution and the British 
establishment. Unlike Chapter 2 and 4, this chapter does not attempt to provide 
explication for the political purpose in the use of humour but to raise questions 
about the ways in which the ambiguity of humour itself reflects the ambiguities 
in aspects of the political reality of the 1790s. I will also make some suggestions, 
through a reading of the controversy surrounding Wolcot, about the ways in 
which laughter for laughter’s sake can be as politically dangerous (for the 
loyalists at least) as laughter generated by a specific and politically subversive 
agenda. For example, as I will show, laughter for pure amusement is for the 
loyalists such as William Gifford and the Anti-Jacobin Review an encouragement 
of popular anarchy. 
 
3.1 Human Comedy and Royalty  
 
Recent studies by Linda Colley, Marilyn Morris and G.M. Ditchfield, 
among others, have persuasively rejected past impressions of the reign of George 
III as a continuation of the decreasing relevance of monarchy in the British state 
and politics. Despite the Hanoverian settlement that empowered Parliament over 
the monarchy, and with the loss of America that deteriorated monarchical 
credibility, these scholars argue that, by the end of the century, monarchy has 
renewed its political relevance by extending its influence into hitherto uncharted 
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cultural and religious spheres of common people’s life.8 The royal efforts to 
reinvent the monarchy’s political relevance include an attempt to close the gap 
between royalty and the whole nation outside royalty. Or, in other words, the 
task the monarchy took upon itself was to close the gap between the elite and 
demotic, ‘common life,’ according to Samuel Johnson’s definition I mentioned 
in Chapter 1. As a person, George III sought to close the gap between what 
constitutional theory has conceived of as the King’s two bodies, regal and mortal, 
the former being a political symbol for the state and the latter indicating a private 
individual.  
In the course of a gradual discrediting of the theory of divine right, which 
privileges the regal body, the King faced greater resistance to reigning with his 
regal body alone.9 It became vital that the monarchy construct an image of itself 
through which the mortal body clearly represented the regal body. Royalty 
sought to reinvent its majestic aura not only by splendour and pomposity but also 
by familiarity, as it tried to sell George III as a humanised, ordinary ‘Farmer 
George’ who could endear himself to the populace and turn himself into a 
cultural icon. To assist this project, George III exercised more frugality in the 
court. As John Barrell puts it, the King ‘needed to be both sublime and beautiful, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1992), ch. 5; Marilyn Morris, The British Monarchy and the French Revolution 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998); G.M. Ditchfield, George III: An Essay 
on Monarchy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).  
9 For a useful account of the history of divine right, see Morris, British Monarchy, 13-17, 
102-09.  
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to rule by fear and to rule by love’.10 
As Barrell understands it, this development in monarchical tactics is 
symptomatic of the broader change in the political milieu of the late century. The 
universal politicisation Barrell identifies concerns the government’s attempt to 
extend its reach into aspects of what in Johnson’s term can be identified as 
‘common life’. The domesticated image of the King is a significant part of this 
process, as the King endeavours to synchronise the rhythm of the life of royalty 
with that of the common people.11 In this sense, Johnson’s idea of common life, 
as the life of the common people rather than the (political) elite, experiences a 
major attempt by the royalty to change its political semantics from a demarcation 
between elite and low life to their convergence.  
Marilyn Morris observes that public scrutiny of the character of the King, in 
reaction to Burkean ‘decent drapery’ that sought to exempt the King from such 
scrutiny, did not serve to undermine British royalty: ‘tearing off the “decent 
drapery” actually served to humanize the British monarch and to pave the way 
for the social role it has come to play in modern culture’.12 This observation 
implies the tension generated by the very attempt at the fusion of the two bodies. 
Given Morris’s observation of the humanisation of the King, the omission of 
Wolcot in Morris’s book is curious. Wolcot writes that ‘Monarch now is proved 
a human thing, / Although it lifts its nose to such a height’ (3: 197). Wolcot’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 John Barrell, Spirit of Despotism: Invasions of Privacy in the 1790s (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 111.  
11 Ibid, ch.3.   
12 Marilyn Morris, British Monarchy, 12.  
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words reflect how the old constitutional theory, in which the King’s private, 
‘human’ persona is politically irrelevant and beyond reproach, was being rejected 
in George III’s reign.  
Wolcot concurs with the rejection of the theory of divine right: ‘I said, a Cat 
may look upon a King: / But foreign Potentates say: “No such thing” / Sicilia’s 
King, replete with right divine / Thinks he may hunt his Subjects like his Swine’ 
(3: 197). Vincent Carretta’s study of the satire on George III observes that the 
gradual and continual discrediting of the King’s divine right to reign made the 
principle appear increasingly lopsided on his human body. Following the 
discrediting of divine right (although it still existed), indeed, more attention to 
the mortal, fallible character of the King implies that the once separate symbolic 
realms of the two bodies became increasingly different to demarcate. For 
Carretta, satire on George III in the late century took on his private character, 
which was considered responsive to his political and personal virtue.13 In this 
sense, the conflation of the two bodies lends itself to political and interpretive 
ambivalence.  
Colley’s argument concerning George III’s ‘apotheosis’ in the 1780s and 
1790s precisely hinges on the King’s effort to popularise royalty by embracing 
his personal body. Commenting on George III and his satirists, Colley writes: 
[L]aughter takes the stings out of criticism. And laughing at royal 
individuals led in practice very easily to amused tolerance for royalty itself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Vincent Carretta, George III and the Satirists from Hogarth to Byron (Athens; London: 
University of Georgia Press, 1990).  
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Those who satirize the British Royal Family today, lampooning their corgis, 
their reputed philistinism, their funny clothes and their even funnier accents, 
may imagine they are being subversive, but, of course, they are not. The 
shift in criticism of the monarchy which first became apparent in the 1780s, 
a shift away from anger at the institution to mockery of individual royals 
and their foibles, helped — as it still helps — to preserve it.14  
Carretta concurs with this view, pointing out that the royal satirists, among 
whom Wolcot is a prominent example, focus on minor foibles, while they are 
unable to find faults of ‘real substances’ in the King.15 In my view, this 
historical judgement may not be easy to verify, since it is uncertain if the King’s 
subjects were sufficiently well-versed in constitutional matters to distinguish 
between his political and personal bodies. There was a risk that a lampooning of 
his personal body would be construed as an attack on the political system itself, 
especially when the King was generally considered mad.   
 My reconsideration does not seek to refute these judgements altogether, as it 
is inappropriate to overestimate the power of laughter in bringing about actual 
political change. Nevertheless, I want to note that such judgments may be based 
on an implicit critical assumption that the constitutional theory of the King’s two 
bodies corresponds to a rhetorical economy which neatly demarcates the register 
of ordinary life from that of the political. The co-presence of the King’s two 
bodies is ambiguous; either it suggests the fusion and imbrication of the two, or a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Colley, Britons, 210.  
15 Carretta, George III, 269-73, 180.  
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carefully demarcated balance between them which can be read without confusion. 
If the King should become too amiably domestic and humbly ordinary, for 
example, it may threaten the loss of meaning of the monarchy as such. For 
example, the loyalist newspaper The Sun is at times caught in such dilemma 
between its keenness to promote the King’s domestic affability, and its 
misgivings about the decline in reverence for the monarchy.16 The fusion 
between the ‘sublime’ and the ‘beautiful’ King could also entail the collapse of 
the two symbolic registers, and consequently the collapse of a political system. 
As Barrell argues, the lampoons directed at the King’s individual character were 
losing their political innocence in the crisis years of the mid-1790s. Barrell 
extends his long scholarly concern with the tricky relationship between the 
private and the public in the eighteenth century to his inquiry into the politics of 
the 1790s, determining that the line between the two continued to blur. He argues 
that, while in the beginning of the century it was only public and not private 
virtue that was under public scrutiny, private character in the 1790s became 
increasingly hard to distinguish from public character, as the former was 
emerging into the public limelight for public judgement.17 Arguably, Wolcot’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For The Sun’s coverage of the King’s mien as a caring paternal figure, see Sun, 12 Feb. 1796, 
quoted in Marilyn Morris, British Monarchy, 170. There was another article on The Sun which 
attributes the revolutionary turmoil to the crisis of the constitution, which results from continuing 
limitation of the power of the Crown. It seems to champion some kind of return to the pre-1688 
condition in which all sources of political power stably ‘emanate’ from the Crown. It argues that 
the confused use of ‘language’ is largely responsible for the crisis of political piety, as the 
language becomes somehow alarmingly close to the lack of rule in the language of ‘common life’. 
See The Sun, 25 Dec. 1795. 
17 Barrell, Spirit of Despotism, 91-96.  
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innocuous humour became politically sensitive in the 1790s because of these 
changes in the reigning style in response to the fear of republicanism.18  
For Barrell, Wolcot was not committed to republicanism, although his 
treacherously facetious monarchism still posed a greater threat to the court and 
the government than any republican proclamation (had there been any). This was 
because Wolcot’s irreverent ridicule of the king had the potential to encourage 
his readers to disrespect the court and the government in the crisis years, when 
‘disaffection from the war and sympathy for the poor were both running high’.19 
Barrell reports that Wolcot was threatened with government prosecution, and 
was involved in petitions against the government passing of the Treasonable 
Practice Bill, against which he wrote protest poems, not least Liberty’s Last 
Squeak. 20  With regard to the ideological dimension of Wolcot’s potential 
subversiveness, Barrell quotes Paine’s ‘open theatre’, which Wolcot can be said 
to have used often to expose the private faults of the King to public spectatorship. 
Paine’s passage of the ‘open theatre’ was specified as subversive at the treason 
trial of Daniel Eaton, who was tried for publishing Paine’s Rights of Man, which 
helps explain why Wolcot’s satire also proved alarming to the government.21  
What I take from Barrell’s analysis is his insight that the monarchy’s 
attempt to reach out into the private realm of national life could turn into 
confusion about whether this new style of governing aims at the fusion of or the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid, ch. 3. See also Marilyn Morris, British Monarchy, ch. 8.  
19 See Barrell, Spirit of Despotism, 137-38. 
20 Ibid, 138-43.  
21 Ibid, 143.  
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balance between the personal and the political. Barrell uses The Royal Tour, and 
Weymouth Amusements (1795), a mock-epic about the King’s public excursion in 
1789 to the Weymouth resort, to illustrate Wolcot’s criticism of monarchical 
tactics. The King’s Weymouth tour was meant to improve his recently 
recovering health from porphyria, or the alleged ‘madness’, and to 
simultaneously cultivate his accessible public image. In the poem, Wolcot cracks 
a series of jokes about the King’s botched attempt at humanisation and ironically 
reveals his selfish impertinence. Whereas Barrell’s focus is to question through 
Wolcot’s caricature the efficacy of George III’s effort to soften the monarchy by 
establishing his private virtue, I consider how this confusion of the private and 
public realm can be read in terms of the increasing relevance of human comedy 
to contemporary political culture. I seek to show that Wolcot’s comedy of chaos 
mirrors the very chaos of the political system evidenced by monarchy.   
Wolcot adds in Royal Tour a sarcastic dedication to the then Poet Laureate 
Henry James Pye, attacking what Wolcot perceived as a sycophantic bootlicking 
of royalist literary practices, by masquerading himself as a sycophant: ‘May 
Kings exist, and trifle Pigs with Kings! / The Muse desireth not more precious 
things! / Such sweet mock-grandeur! so sublimely garish!’ (3: 321). Wolcot 
argues that the mock-epical comedy/farce of the King is already a reality that 
does not require literary invention: ‘Such want no praise; in nature virtues strong: 
/ tis folly, folly, feeds the Poet’s Song’ (ibid.). My point is that the transformation 
of the character of the British state in general and the transformation of 
monarchy in particular suggest one significant way in which human comedy 
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becomes politically sensitive. Wolcot constantly reiterates claims of this kind: 
that the comic chaos of royalty derives not from his satirist’s literary 
interpretation but from royalty itself, which, instead of rendering itself more 
humbly accessible and loveable to its subjects, reveals the very ridiculousness 
and unworthiness of its current King.  
Wolcot opens The Royal Tour with a scene of local frenzy at the King’s 
arrival, as ordinary people and even wildlife leave their normal course of being 
to welcome and gain sight of the king. Wolcot uses mock-heroic technique of 
hyperbolic exaltation in order to suit the sublimity of royalty:  
Squat on his speckled haunches gapes the toad, 
And frogs affrighted hop along the road; 
The hares astonish’d to their terror yield,  
Cock their long ears, and scud from field to field; 
The owl, loud hooting, from his ivy rushes; 
And sparrows, chatt’ring, flutter from the bushes:  
Old women (call’d ‘a pack of blinking b—s’), 
Dash’d by the thundering light horse into ditches,  
Scrambling and howling, with post—rs pointed, 
(Sad picture!) plump against the Lord’s Anointed.  
Dogs bark, pigs grunt, the flying turkeys gobble; 
Fowls cackle; screaming Geese, with strech’d wing, hobble;  
Dire death his horses’ hoofs to ducklings deal, 
And Goslings gape beneath the burning wheel! (3: 325-26)  
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The same comic hyperbole is employed again in the other royal tour satire (1796), 
which describes the farcical mania of the crowd swarming into the city, pressing 
round like ‘pancakes’ simply to have a view of the King (3: 467-68). This 
representation of comic chaos has its specific political valence. Rather than 
expressing the vitality in the chaos constituted by the indistinguishable mass of 
the crowd in the caricature of Rowlandson, Wolcot depicts a chaos generated by 
one specific individual (the King) and continues to single out the King as the 
character incongruous to his surrounding.22 The King’s arrival ironically marks 
a suspension of ‘common life’ as rural people have to temporarily abandon their 
daily business.  
 Wolcot’s satire illustrates how the royal effort to bridge the gap between the 
King and his subjects does not work. The implication is either that it accuses the 
King of an unsuccessful execution of the attempt, or that it argues that this very 
policy of the humanisation of the monarch is not justified. In his satire, Wolcot 
seems more often to suggest the latter. The Royal Tour offers examples of this 
nature in comic episodes where a number of politicians approach the King to 
discuss state affairs, while the King is trying to enjoy his private tour. The King 
tries to dismiss Frost, the King’s bailiff at Windsor, when Frost approaches: 
 FROST, FROST, no politics — no, no, FROST, no:  
 You, you talk politics! oho! oho!  
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For Rowlandson’s graphic satire as expressing the vitality of the chaos of the urban crowd, see 
Vic Gatrell, City of Laughter, esp. ch. 2.  
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 Pull WINDSOR down? hae, what! — a pretty job! 
 WINDSOR be pull’d to pieces by the mob!  
  Talk, talk of farming — that’s your sort, d’ye see;  
 And mind, mind, politics belong to me. (3: 330)  
George III’s softened and domesticated public image is presented here not as his 
endearment with the commoners but as a negligence of his public office. The 
narrative plot continues to disturb the King’s effort to escape from public 
business. Politician after politician, including Frost, Pitt, George Rose, Joseph 
Banks, and a number of Lords, approach him with state affairs that require his 
attention, but are rebutted. At one point in his trip, the King attempts to join Lady 
Cathcart’s private reading in an affectedly affable manner, only to be frustrated 
by the revelation that she is reading of the war of America (1: 334).  
 Throughout the poem, Wolcot presents a King who constantly fails to 
distinguish between public and private, or political and personal affairs 
appropriately. The King’s private frugality, for Wolcot, involves 
misunderstanding of the nature of monarchy. Peter’s Pension (1788), for 
example, affixes a tale of the king’s attempt to sell carrion in place of mutton at 
Fleet Market, as an illustration of his miserliness.23 Wolcot’s scurrilous anecdote 
interestingly suggests that the King’s private virtue may result in public harm. 
Indeed, the evolution of private deeds is tricky in that it is often motivated by 
private interest, and the King’s frugality may be viewed as vice if it is meant to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Works, vol. 2. 
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protect his private interest at the expense of others.24  
Perhaps Wolcot wants to argue that the King’s effort to assimilate himself 
with ordinary people is in the wrong direction of governing. An oft-quoted 
proclamation suggests that Wolcot’s hostility towards the King owes more to the 
King’s failure to display monarchical qualities than to the unviability of the 
political system as such: ‘Far from despising kings, I like the breed, / Provided 
King-like they behave’.25 In addition to Barrell’s observation that Wolcot’s 
satire targets the King’s forays into ordinary life, or ‘invasion of privacy’, I 
would add that the satire may also urge the monarch not to demean himself with 
ill-conceived tactics, and to restore a Kingliness that does not require meddling 
with his subjects. In this sense, the ‘human comedy’ of the King and his people 
mirrors what for Wolcot is a political chaos: I suggest that one dimension in 
which human comedy gains a political and moral character lies in this mode of 
literary representation exemplified by Wolcot.   
Conspicuously, in order to represent the chaos the monarchy inflicts upon 
the political establishment and itself, Wolcot’s satire generally adopts mock-epic 
techniques that exploit a misalignment of the sublime and the trivial, either by 
hyperbolic portrayal of the King’s minor foibles or by transformation of comic 
incidents into wild farce. In this sense, Wolcot’s satiric technique sits well within 
the mock-epic tradition of Alexander Pope. The sarcasm he directs at Henry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Charles Pigott defines ‘Prudence and Oeconomy’ in his Political Dictionary as ‘an increase of 
taxes at the conclusion of an expensive war; and languishing that treasures upon profligate 
favorites which should be applied to discharge the public debts of the nation’. Charles Pigott, 
Political Dictionary: Explaining the True Meaning of Words (London: D. I. Eaton, 1795), 107.  
25 An Apologetic Postscript to Ode upon Ode, 18.  
160	  	  
James Pye’s empty panegyric to royalty may recall Peri Bathous, while allusions 
to The Rape of the Lock can be found in The Lousiad.26 For Howard Weinbrot, 
Wolcot writes in the shadow of Pope, but is more lopsided in style in comparison 
to Pope’s successful synthesis of satiric paradigms of Juvenal and Horace.27 
While such judgement is possibly true regarding the internal history of satire, the 
practice or application of such familiar technique to the political reality of the 
late century adds new dimensions of political meaning. Wolcot’s ‘comical’ satire 
reflects changes in political culture, as it evolved from partisan sectarianism to 
universal politicisation, through which the meaning of the private and the public 
is reconstituted. As a result, Wolcot becomes involved in the renewed 
controversy of two satiric traditions, those of Horace and Juvenal, a debate which 
became politically charged in the 1790s. 
 
3.2 The ‘Horatian’, the ‘Juvenalian’, and the Political Controversy between the 
‘Satiric’ and the ‘Comic’  
 
In 1789, the young Isaac D’Israeli attacked Wolcot in his early poem ‘On 
the Abuse of Satire’. It was addressed to the Poet Laureate Thomas Warton, who 
had appeared in Wolcot’s satire. The piece affirms Warton’s Laureateship as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 On Pye, see, for example, Instructions to a Celebrated Laureat (1790), in which Wolcot 
recommends Pye praise the Monarch about trivial subjects such as ‘Economy, Poultry, Cow-Pens, 
Pigs, Dunghills, &c.’, in Works, vol. 2; The Royal Tour, or Weymouth Amusement (1796), in 
Works, vol. 3. For allusion to Rape of the Lock, see Canto V, Lousiad, 2: 314-15, when Zephyr 
saves the louse from the King and stores it with Belinda’s lock of hair. 
27 See Howard Weinbrot, Alexander Pope, 357. 
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symbol of poetic orthodoxy and poetic standard, while castigating Wolcot’s 
vulgarisation of ‘Impartial’ satire by taking excessive pleasure at libeling his 
target:  
We love thy mirror; when bold truth exhorts 
But hate the witty malice that distorts. 
When the rank vices, and flagitious times 
Provoke the satirist, and inflames his rhimes 
A just applause should crown the deathless page 
Where wit Horatian tempers Juvenal’s rage.28  
The last line recalls the scholarly formulation of two eighteenth-century 
‘traditions’ of satire based on the receptions of Horace and Juvenal.29  
The syntax of D’Israeli’s line suggests that Wolcot fails to strike a decorous 
balance between the two modes as his work is perceived as disproportionally 
Juvenalian. I have recounted the traditional rules of satire in which rage is 
assigned to deal with vice and laughter with minor faults such as folly. In the 
eighteenth-century discourse, the Horatian and Juvenalian principles apply 
accordingly. James Beattie in his Ludicrous Composition suggests that the 
different tonalities of Horace and Juvenal correspond to moral principles 
regarding targets of different natures: ‘These poets had different views, and took 
different subjects; and therefore it was right that there should be a difference in 
their manner of writing. Had Juvenal made a jest of the crimes of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Isaac D’Israeli, ‘On the Abuse of Satire’, 648.  
29 See my brief account in Chapter 1 Sec.1, and references to Howard Weinbrot, Alexander Pope; 
W. B. Cronochan, ‘Satire, Sublimity, and Sentiment’.   
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contemporaries, all the world would have called him a bad writer and a bad man. 
And had Horace, with the severity of Juvenal, attacked the impertinence of 
coxcombs, the pedantry of the Stoics, the fastidiousness of luxury, and the folly 
of avarice, he would have proved himself ignorant of the nature of things, and 
even of the meaning of his own precept’.30 On this account D’Israeli’s problem 
with Wolcot’s style appears to lie in his confusion of decorums, with too much 
unprovoked Juvenalian castigation being laid on a ‘small foible’. Wolcot’s 
specific targeting is redolent of a Juvenalian bent. During the 1790s, however, 
reviews of Wolcot’s work, including his own self-judgement, were far more 
inclined to regard it as un-Juvenalian and sometimes even overly Horatian. His 
comic frivolity, fondness for trivial banter and concentration on minor human 
faults and foibles strike notes that may be closer to the Horatian paradigm. 
According to a biographical source, General Tadeusz Kościuszko of Poland, an 
admirer of Wolcot, described his work as ‘a couple of bottles of Italian wine … 
the wine of Horace’. 31  Wolcot’s verse works frequently quote Horace as 
inspiration for occasional points, and produce imitations of Horace. In 1792 he 
confidently claims literary alliance with the Roman author: ‘Horace . . . that Bard 
divine, / Whose wits so fortunately jump with mine.’32 At the turn of the century, 
however, a ‘revival’ of the satirical tradition of Juvenal led by conservative 
literati William Gifford, Thomas Mattias, and the Anti-Jacobin Review, attacks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 James Beattie, Ludicrous Composition, 395.  
31 See Cyrus Redding, ‘Dr. Wolcot’, in Past Celebrities Whom I Have Known (London, 1866), 1: 
253.  
32 The Remonstrance, in Works, 2: 460. See e.g. 2: 115-27. 
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satiric works such as Wolcot’s that they consider to indulge excessively in 
Horatian laughter while bracketing moral concerns.33  
In what follows I will not dwell on the detail of the Horace-Juvenal 
controversy per se, but on its political implications, which inform my reading of 
the controversy in which Wolcot was involved. In literary critical history, the 
eighteenth-century discourse on the two modes of satire has usually been cast in 
ethical terms, which might account for why its political character has received 
relatively little scholarly attention until recently. Yet it is not far-fetched to 
identify implicit political allegories in the figures of the two Roman satirists. As 
a court poet, Horace aligns himself closer to a private elite society, his tone of 
conciliation and amiability reflecting the ethics of private intimacy. Wolcot 
claims: ‘The World should say of Peter Pindar’s strain, / “In him the courtly 
Horace lives again / Circum praecordia Petrus ludit’ (2: 236). Juvenal, on the 
other hand, establishes himself as a voice of public-oriented opposition in an age 
of moral decline, and was banished for his conflict with the court. Wolcot’s own 
friction with courtly culture and the cultural establishment underlines D’Israeli’s 
implicit distinction between Wolcot and Juvenal. The figure of Juvenal may in 
this sense account for Wolcot’s subject position as an oppositional satirist. 
However, the ‘Horatian’ content, which consists of ridicule of ‘small foibles’ in 
the private life of the political elite, lies behind D’Israeli’s indictment that ‘small 
foibles’ of the King are swelled to the level of ‘monstrous crime’ as private fault 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For the ‘revival’, see Gary Dyer’s discussion of the satire of Gifford, in his British Satire and 
the Politics of Style, 1789-1832, ch. 1. See also below for further discussion of Dyer’s book and 
the controversy between Gifford and Wolcot. 
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is exposed to public spectatorship in print. It is possible, however, that D’Israeli 
was unaware that Wolcot perhaps simply described the present reality of the 
monarchy that blurred the boundary between public and private, so that a 
confused Juvenal-Horatian approach might be counterintuitively appropriate. As 
the monarchy continued to blur the boundary between the ‘human’ and public 
characteristics of the King, Wolcot’s satiric performance evidences how a 
Juvenalian intent of pointed political criticism could be more effective in mixing 
with the Horatian approach to ‘small foibles’.  
Wolcot’s case thus offers us a vantage point into the renewed controversy 
over the satiric ethics of the two traditions. Gary Dyer has traced the political 
resonance of the Horace-Juvenal controversy into the period of revolution, in his 
British Satire and the Politics of Style, 1789–1832. Dyer is unhappy with the 
stylistic dichotomy of Horace–Juvenal, which oversimplifies the practical 
diversity of satire in the period, and proposes a third category, ‘radical’ satire, 
which is partly derived from Wolcot’s legacy. Dyer’s use of the adjective 
‘radical’ denotes a pluralistic, Bakhtinian and critical subversion that is equally 
distant from the monological conservatism of the Juvenalian model and the 
conciliatory, and therefore non-polemical, Horatian model. Dyer is led to assert 
that Horatian satire ‘ultimately is anti-political’. On the other hand, ‘radical’ 
satire is as politically confrontational as the Juvenalian, but, unlike the latter, is 
critically subversive of the status quo. This formulation informs Dyer’s reading 
of Wolcot’s satire, and his conclusion that Wolcot’s legacy in the early 
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nineteenth century ‘split into two branches, Horatian and Radical’.34 Although 
Dyer’s alternative formulation does help reconsider the limitations of the binary 
formulation of Horace and Juvenal, it may also underestimate its inner ambiguity. 
The judgement that ‘light raillery’ is politically disengaging may be true, but 
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that it is apolitical. Dyer continues: 
‘Even if [Wolcot’s satire] does deal with parliamentary politics or class conflicts, 
it spreads blame so evenly as to weaken its call for reform, while its tone defuses 
tension, reducing injustice to only another manifestation of eternal human 
imperfection’.35 However, I have also argued that themes of human comedy 
reshape political rather than apolitical languages. In the case of Wolcot, as in the 
cases of all the works and writers I have discussed, the manifestation of human 
imperfection has a political resonance in its own right. As Wolcot writes in 
Liberty’s Last Squeak: 
But wherefore not laugh at a —— [Queen]? 
And wherefore not laugh at a —— [King]? 
A laugh is a laughable thing, 
When people are silly and mean.  
When we Paid civil List without strife,  
When we paid the old Quack for his cure, 
When we pray’d at Peg Nicholson’s knife, 
The K—— laugh’d at Us, to be sure.’ (3: 418) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Gary Dyer, British Satire, 41, 37.  
35 Ibid, 41.  
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In the former stanza, ‘laughter’ is understood as something of an end in itself (‘A 
laugh is a laughable thing’), justifiably indiscriminate to the ‘silly and mean’ in 
any individual regardless of their rank. The dashes in the first two lines and the 
impersonal ‘people’ seem deliberately to abandon political pointedness to the 
‘eternal’ human comedy, but the stanza that follows ironically assures its readers 
that such laughter is understood as a symbolic triumph of the powerless in 
retaliation for forms of political oppression in which ‘The K[ing] laugh’d at Us’. 
One could also read the two stanzas as mutually complementary ‘Horatian’ 
humour and ‘Radical’ subversion, but judging from the flow of the rationale it 
seems more difficult to separate the ‘radical’ implication from the Horatian 
statement itself.  
Wolcot had written earlier that ‘Rank is a farce—if people fools will be, / A 
scavenger and kings the same’ (2: 43). This statement vividly illustrates the 
connection of comedy to human follies and its implication for social hierarchy. 
Further, the statement contradicts the demarcation between human comedy and 
political satire. Loyalists could still accuse the ‘impersonal’ human comedy of 
impropriety and political danger when it came to a sensitive political subject. 
William Gifford contends in his translation of Juvenal in 1803 that even 
disinterestedness can be politically and morally subversive, because it holds 
moral questions and public duties in suspense: ‘To raise a laugh at vice . . . 
(supposing it feasible,) is not the legitimate office of Satire, which is to hold up 
the vicious, as objects of reprobation and scorn, for the example of others, who 
167	  	  
may be deterred by their sufferings.’36 Laughter for Wolcot, on the other hand, is 
only an expression of civil freedom, hurting none but entertaining many.  
This defensive argument, however, was in the eyes of some conservatives 
the very offence of political infidels. As Gifford continues: ‘To laugh even at 
fools is superfluous; — if they understand you, they will join in the merriment; 
but more commonly, they will sit with vacant unconcern, and gaze at their own 
pictures; to laugh at the vicious, is to encourage them; . . .’.37 For Gifford, to 
soften the severity of morality is itself a severe moral offence; to do it with 
laughter, is to put the whole social order in danger. Gifford took it upon himself 
to restore and reaffirm, as Dyer observes, the satirist’s ‘faceless public office’ of 
moral rectification. 38  Dyer properly reads this passage as Gifford’s 
Juvenalian-moralist disapproval of laughter’s alleged moral levity, but seems to 
gloss over it as an expression of a loyalist overreaction concerning the 
insufficiently political or subversive practice that (Horatian) laughter constitutes. 
Yet it is worth pointing out such unprovoked fear does indicate a real change of 
perception of political order: the phrase ‘they will join in the merriment’ conjures 
up a vision of collective disorder, while ‘they will sit with vacant unconcern, and 
gaze at their own pictures’ may imply the collapse of social order under the 
weight of moral nihilism. Another (anonymous) hostile response to Wolcot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 ‘An Essay on the Roman Satirists’, in William Gifford (trans.), The Satires of Decimus Junius 
Juvenalis (London, 1802), xlviii. See also Dyer, British Satire, 41.  
37 Gifford, ‘Roman Satirists’, ibid.  
38 Dyer, British Satire, 36.  
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asserts that his jokes ‘lay the Monarch level with the clown’.39  
The anxiety concerning ‘leveling’ in laughter can be contextualised in terms 
of the general fear of political chaos in radical expression in the 1790s. Radical 
literature of the Revolutionary period also employs the language of light, ‘trifling’ 
humour when addressing politically sensitive issues. This arbitrary association 
between a bathetic attitude to power and the determination to annihilate that 
power appears historically familiar when we recall the ‘figurative treason’, 
explored by John Barrell, that was transforming British political language.40 As 
we have seen, radical satires of the King such as ‘King Chanticleer’ and 
‘Treason!!!’ disclaim political pointedness by taking shelter in the supposed 
‘innocence’ of amusement.41 This example may serve to complicate Dyer’s 
formulation of the contrast between the conciliatory humour and radical satire, 
and encourages us to consider the paradox of being simultaneously jocosely 
good-natured and subversive.  
Although Wolcot’s humour is not particularly associated with the political 
programmes and democratic ideology of radicalism, his controversy does 
demonstrate anxiety regarding laughter for its own sake rather than laughter for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Anon., Peter Not Infallible! Or, a Poem, Addressed to Peter Pindar, Esq. on Reading His Nil 
Admirari, aLate Illiberal Attack on the Bishop of London; Together with Unmanly Abuse of Mrs. 
Hannah More. Also Line Occasioned by His Ode to Some Robin Red-Breasts in a Country 
Cathedral (Cambridge: printed by M. Watson, and sold by Chapple, Cadell and Davies, and 
Rivingtons, London, 1800), 10.   
40 Barrell, Imagining the King’s Death; see also Introduction, p. 4.  
41 Richard Newton, ‘An Atlas, or the Strong Man!!!’ (1798), British Museum manuscript 
1868,0808.6688. See David Alexander, Richard Newton and English Caricature in the 1790s 
(Manchester: Whitworth Art Gallery in association with Manchester University Press, 1998), 51.  
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moral or political purpose. Gifford’s contention lies precisely in the conviction 
that the act of taking shelter in the morally neutral comic frame of language is 
even more politically ominous than the use of laughter to articulate morally and 
politically subversive projects. What for loyalists and counter-revolutionaries is 
scandalous is the implication of anarchy in non-tendentious laughter; in other 
words, because free laughter seems to fall outside of the scope of politics itself in 
the age of crisis, it simultaneously implies that it falls outside of political control 
as well, at a time when control is desperately needed according to loyalist 
agendas. From the late 1780s onwards, there were efforts by Wolcot’s hostile 
readers to identify the purpose behind his seemingly autotelic facetiousness. 
D’Israeli in ‘On the Abuse of Satire’ understands Wolcot’s vulgarisation of 
literature as a writing for profit in the mass reading market: ‘The Bard a trader! 
his art a trade’.42 Later, he put it more bitterly by calling Wolcot ‘The dirty 
Prostitute of half-a-crown’.43 The implicit pun on ‘crown’ is also found in 
another commentary on Wolcot’s poems, which ‘sell . . . for a Crown’.44 In 
around 1787-89, when Wolcot was involved in rumours that he satirises the 
government to blackmail for state pension, local newspapers feature a number of 
attacks, which regard Wolcot as a mercantile opportunist. One poem reads:  
I think I know thee, Peter — Thou'rt a Thing,  
That for a Guinea could be wondrous civil;  
Would praise alike a Cobler or a King,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 D’Israeli, ‘On the Abuse’, 648.  
43 D’Israeli, ‘A Defence of Poetry’, Specimens of a New Version of Telemachus (London, 1790),   
44 Anon., ‘To Peter Pindar’, St. James's Chronicle (21 Aug. 1787), n. p.  
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Or damn, for Gold, a God, or bless a Devil.  
If thou art poor, there may be some Excuse.  
Here — take these Pence to help thee on thy Way;  
But let us have no more of thy Abuse:  
Poor little Doggy thou hast had thy Day.’45  
The obvious rationale here is that a pecuniary incentive sidelines the poet’s 
moral concerns. Indeed, such apprehensive vision as ‘God’ damned, ‘Devil’ 
blessed, and ‘a Cobler and a King’ praised alike, anticipate the misgivings of the 
conservative cultural elite in the 1790s concerning the social chaos caused by the 
republic of letters. The loyalist journalist John Taylor, friend of Wolcot, 
speculates on the motivation for Wolcot’s intrepid satire on the King: ‘I have 
often wondered at the boldness of his attacks on the royal character, and his 
general license of satire, as he was naturally, by his own acknowledgement, by 
no means of a heroic disposition; but he was seduced by popular favour and its 
consequent pecuniary profit’.46 Wolcot himself often playfully confirms his 
critics’ suspicion that he was writing for profit, exploiting popular appetite for 
gossips of the political elite. In response to a loyalist attack from Robert 
Jenkinson, Lord Liverpool, Wolcot quips: ‘You’ll say, “Let satires meaner 
subjects look.” / Well, Jenky, grant my satire flies at you, / Who’d buy my 
melancholy vulgar books? / Adieu fair fame, and fortune’s smiles adieu!’ (2: 
230). Financial metaphors such as the ‘fund’ in ‘Lo, with a fund of joke a court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Anon., ‘Brother Paul to Peter Pindar’, St. James’s Chronicle (10 May 1788), n. p.  
46 John Taylor, Records of My Life (New York, 1832), 1: 299.   
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abounds’ (1: 532) run through the self-defences in Wolcot’s work. Jokes on great 
personages sold well: ‘were I to write on common folks / No soul would buy my 
rhymes so strange, and jokes: / Then what becomes of mutton, beef and pork; / 
How would my masticating Muscles work?’ (1: 454). By claiming his intention 
to write simply for profit without subversive agenda, Wolcot apparent attempts 
to justify himself in depoliticising rhetoric. Of course, it is the very 
profit-oriented popular literary market that alarmed loyalists because of its 
potential ‘levelling tendency’ which put indiscriminate amusement ahead of 
respect for social hierarchy. What is interesting here is that in this very 
depoliticising rhetoric Wolcot may also secretly harbour his political indictment 
of the King’s unjust financial principle, which involves misdirected funding for 
‘sinecures’ and ‘sycophants’ rather than a free-speaking artist like Wolcot, which 
I shall discuss in the next section.  
Wolcot’s ‘Horatian’ aspects, however, did not cover up Wolcot’s otherwise 
Juvenalian bent. His pointed satire was directed bluntly at the King and other 
public figures, and could not convince the government and the loyalists that the 
work was merely driven by ‘inoffensive sport’. The government, along with 
loyalists acting on its behalf, negotiated with Wolcot during the time when 
Parliament was also pushing for the passing of the Treasonable Practices Act. In 
1796, they eventually succeeded in forcing Wolcot to reluctantly discontinue his 
royal satire and to renounce his pension.47 Despite his satiric voice being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For an account of Wolcot’s renunciation in which the loyalist paper True Briton and Wolcot’s 
friend John Taylor plays an important part, see Barrell, Spirit of Despotism, 138-42. 
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censored on the subject of the King, Wolcot refused to give up his satire 
altogether. He then applied the same comic techniques to his satire on the 
prominent Bluestocking, Hannah More, and her admirer, Bishop Beilby Porteus, 
in Nil Admirari, or Smile at a Bishop (1799). His critics became convinced that 
such comic license had been carried too far. Nil Admirari caused a more intense 
and acrimonious controversy in Wolcot’s career than his royal satires ever did. 
The title draws on the Horatian tradition (‘nil admirari’ literally means ‘to be 
surprised by nothing’), and the content includes a good deal of scurrilous and 
ribald jokes about More, as well as the bishop, jokes which her defenders 
considered outrageously libellous. Wolcot entertained the theory that More and 
her flatterers may have been involved in ‘Crim. Con.’.48 ‘Miss Hannah may be 
aptly term’d a hen,  
 Who sits on pheasants’ eggs, to kindness prone: 
 Hatches the bird, a pretty brood; but then, 
 Weak vanity! She calls the chicks her own’ 
 ..................................................................................... 
 And, what our good opinion must inspire, 
 With bishops she could talk from morn to night. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Nil Admirari, in Works, 4: 269. Gillian Russell has tackled the much politicised private issue 
of adultery (‘criminal conversation’; ‘crim. con.’) in the case of Thomas Erskine’s courtroom 
performance as ‘proscenium arch for the 1790s’ that ‘could destabilise boundaries between the 
private and public, masculine and feminine, the familial and the social, rulers and ruled’. Gillian 
Russell, ‘The Theatre of Crim. Con.: Thomas Erskine, Adultery and Radical Politics in the 
1790s’, in Michael T. Davis and Paul A. Pickering (ed.), Unrespectable Radicals?: Popular 
Politics in the Age of Reform (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 57-70 (66).   
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 Oh! Had good Hannah been not so severe 
 On each young Victim of her tempting bloom!49   
Wolcot’s ad hominen jokes at More’s expense unsurprisingly provoked moral 
outrage among loyalists and Wolcot’s former sympathisers. These diatribes 
assert that Wolcot had, in their view, taken the liberty of humour to excess, to the 
extent that even the regulatory moderation in the Horatian tradition, such as 
urbanity, modesty and amiability, is lost in those outrageous slanders on More. 
The Anti-Jacobin Review quickly published a scathing review. The reviewer, 
going by the pseudonym ‘Anti-Profanus’, was convinced that Wolcot’s literary 
entertainment would lead to catastrophic consequences, arguing that Pindar was 
not only forgetting, but also ‘absolutely perverting, the very object of satire — 
the correction of vice’. 50  Again singling out the moral irresponsibility of 
facetious (Horatian) humour, which enacted a dangerous form of levelling, the 
review imagined Wolcot ‘bribing the servants of his Sovereign to betray their 
trust, to reveal his family secret, and to expose all those little foibles from which 
no man upon earth is exempt, in order to render them objects of public derision 
and scorn; recollecting, no doubt, that the regicides of France attempted to render 
their Sovereign ridiculous before they ventured to murder him.’51 Richard 
Polwhele fully concurred.52 The position confirms Barrell’s conjecture that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid, 4: 269.  
50 The Anti-Jacobin Review (November 1799), also quoted in William Gifford, Epistle to Peter 
Pindar, 3rd ed. (London, 1800), 9.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Polwhele, Richard, ‘A Sketch of the Private and Literary Character of John Walcot [sic], M. 
D., Commonly Called Peter Pindar’, in The Unsex'd Females; a Poem, Addressed to the Author 
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laughing at the King encouraged dangerous irreverence — at least existed in the 
loyalist imagination.53 William Gifford continued this conservative censure with 
Epistle to Peter Pindar (1800) and approvingly reproduced most of the passages 
from the Anti-Jacobin Review, along with harsh ridicules of Wolcot’s works. In a 
later Anti-Jacobin Review of Nil Admirari, it is claimed that ‘Wit may, I admit, 
be so blended with profaneness, as to make it difficult not to be struck with the 
one, at the same time that we hold the other in abhorence’.54 An anonymous 
response printed in the journal claimed its author to have been Wolcot’s admirer, 
who found his works: ‘possessed an original, . . . inexhaustible vein of humour; 
the keenness of the satire was much softened by the playfulness of the manner, 
and the severest strokes appeared to be so void of malignity, that in many cases 
they ceased to offend, where they were known to be unmerited’. For this 
commentator, Wolcot had successfully tempered ‘keenness of the satire’ with 
‘playfulness of the manner’, but late works such as Nil Admirari manifested the 
degeneration of the humour of Peter Pindar who, ‘upon the indulgence of the 
public’, and like ‘a spoiled child . . . seems to think that every thing he says must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of The Pursuits of Literature. By the Rev. Richard Polewhele. To which is Added, a Sketch of the 
Private and Public Character of P. Pindar (New York: Reprinted by W. Cobbett, 1800), 64. A 
chunk of the passage in the Anti-Jacobin review reappears verbatim in Polwhele without citation; 
therefore it is reasonable to conjecture that the review was probably penned by Polwhele himself.  
53 See again Barrell’s Imagining the King’s Death, which argues the idea of treason extends 
beyond actual plotting into literary and figurative imagination.  
54 The Anti-Jacobin Review (Jan. 1800), 80-81.  
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be witty’.55 This judgement implies that Wolcot’s humour had lost control not 
only of its Juvenalian pungency but also its Horatian amiability. It is no surprise 
that some rejoinders and counterblasts to Wolcot’s Nil Admirari contain ridicules 
of, or scandals about, Wolcot’s private character.56 For Gifford, in Epistle to 
Peter Pindar (1800), Wolcot’s attack on More and himself affects his literary 
expression so deeply that it lapses into the tiresome venting of unrestrained 
spleen. He deems Wolcot’s satire ‘ebullition of frenzy’ by an ‘unhappy dotard’ 
who ‘[l]ashes his wither’d nerves to tasteless sin’.57 These statements provoked 
Wolcot to assault Gifford with a baton outside a bookshop in London’s 
Piccadilly later in the year, only to be overpowered by his younger adversary. 
The event sparked derisive and triumphalist accounts of Wolcot’s humiliation in 
loyalist periodicals such as the Anti-Jacobin Review, which reports Wolcot’s 
humiliation before a crowd of ‘lovers of fun to whom [Wolcot’s] melancholy 
story [and] his lamentations excites nothing but the mirth of his audience.’58 
Wolcot was, in its eye, a ‘profligate poetaster’, a ‘literary monster’, ‘all filth and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Pindarics; or an Ode of Lamentation, Addressed to Peter Pindar, Esq. On his Nil Admirari, or 
a Smile at a Bishop. And a disquisition concerning the Crasis of Peter Pindar's Blood, and Its 
Effect upon His Labours Exemplified (Bath: G. Robbins, 1800), [iii].  
56 The Pindarics, 13-39, features a bizarrely comic section of a hypothetical diagnosis of 
Wolcot’s physical disorder that is alleged to account for his reproachable assault on More. 
Richard Polwhele in his 1800 edition of Unsex’d Females (re-published by William Cobbett) 
added an attack on the ‘private and literary character’ of Peter Pindar. Richard Polwhele, ‘A 
Sketch of the Private and Literary Character of John Walcot [sic], M. D., Commonly Called Peter 
Pindar’, in The Unsex'd Females; a Poem, Addressed to the Author of The Pursuits of Literature. 
By the Rev. Richard Polewhele. To which is Added, a Sketch of the Private and Public Character 
of P. Pindar (New York: Re-printed by Wm. Cobbett, 1800), 51-68.  
57 Ibid, 75, 80, 82.  
58 See, for example, The Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine (Aug, 1800), 466-68 (67).  
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venom’, a ‘baleful pest’, whose scurrilous attack on the King and the 
establishment’s literati was driven by unprovoked malignity and spleen that few 
would care.59 Wolcot struck back in print quickly with Out at Last! (1801), 
which features another ad hominen derision of the low origin of Gifford and 
Thomas Matthias as cobblers (4: 331). Meanwhile, the incident of Wolcot and 
Gifford’s brawl became a news sensation and provided comic material for the 
mock-heroic satire The Battle of the Bards (1800), in which Wolcot the satirist 
ironically became a subject of public entertainment.60 Indeed, in this series of 
embittered exchanges, the Horatian-Juvenalian conflict between Wolcot and the 
conservative literati seems to be confused if not inverted. Wolcot’s self-avowed 
Horatian persona was compromised by his recourse to violence, which rendered 
him closer to ‘Juvenalian’ acrimony, whereas loyalists (though not including 
Gifford) achieved their retaliation by laughing back at Wolcot, thereby taking 
liberty to indulge in some sort of apolitical entertainment.  
This confusion between Horace and Juvenal in the controversy over 
Wolcot’s works at the end of the century, particularly in the controversy over Nil 
Admirari and its aftermath, shows that the moral and political terms of the 
dispute struggle to define itself when it comes to Wolcot’s role in political 
literature either as a political satirist or as a morally irresponsible jester. In the 
present frame of terminology, perhaps neither of the two political allegories — 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid.  
60 Anon. [‘Mauritius Moonshine’], The Battle of the Bards (London: Lackington, 1800). Kenneth 
Hopkins, Portraits in Satire (London: Barrie Books, [1958]), 257, attributes this poem to the 
Irish poet Thomas Dermody.  
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Juvenalian moral polemics and Horatian good-natured raillery — can be snugly 
applied to Wolcot’s case. My point, however, is not to dismiss this traditional 
binary formulation as useless for understanding Wolcot’s case, but to 
demonstrate how the confusion of the Horatian and Juvenalian characteristics in 
Wolcot’s satire points to the complexity of the personal and the political in the 
1790s. The Juvenalian mode is considered more political than the Horatian mode 
by critics such as Dyer because of its more specific moral commitment and 
specific political agenda. However, in the 1790s when political languages are 
increasingly complicated by universal terms which move beyond partisanship 
into ontological questions of order and anarchy, morality and pleasure that 
shaped the controversy between conservatism and radicalism, a Horatian 
‘general’ approach can prove more politically ominous, as shown in the 
abovementioned criticism of Gifford and the Anti-Jacobin Review.  
On the other hand, Wolcot’s scurrilous, personal, ‘Juvenalian’ jokes may 
recall the manner of the equally scurrilous satire on celebrities, The Jockey Club 
(1793) and The Female Jockey Club (1794), by the problematic radical 
pamphleteer Charles Pigott.61 For Jon Mee, Pigott’s case illustrates the point that 
the idea of ‘debate’ about revolution obscures the radical nature of writings not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For Pigott, see Nicholas Rogers, ‘Pigott’s Private Eye: Radicalism and Sexual Scandal in 
Eighteenth-Century England’, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 4 (1993), 247–63; 
Jonathan Mee, ‘Libertines and Radicals in the 1790s: The Strange Case of Charles Pigott I,’ in 
Peter Cryle and Lisa O’Connell (eds.), Libertine Enlightenment (Basingstoke, 2004), 183–203, 
and ‘“A Bold and Freespoken Man”: The Strange Career of Charles Pigott,’ in David Womersley 
(ed.), “Cultures of Whiggism”: New Essays on English Literature and Culture in the Long 
Eighteenth Century, (Newark, New Jersey, 2005), 330–50.  
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substantiated with elaborate polemics against political principles, but with 
performative rituals by opposition such as Pigott’s scandalmongering to discredit 
his political enemies.62 On the other hand, Pigott’s persistent exposure of the 
private faults of the aristocracy exemplifies again the changing terms and the 
criteria of political virtue, which provides radicals with alternative zones of 
engagement and problematises any easy delimitation of the ideological scope of 
radical argument. As radicals also utilised presumably innocuous gossip about 
the elite private life as byways for political struggle, Wolcot’s own fondness for 
directing this type of joke toward figures of the establishment can therefore 
hardly avoid a reading of his work as seditious or immoral libel, as the 
abovementioned conservative reviews testify. Furthermore, if Wolcot’s ‘humour’, 
which for some of his contemporary readers was already established as 
‘Horatian’, ironically turned more narrow-mindedly personal, more ‘Juvenalian’, 
then it should be because his ‘Horatian’ practice cannot be exercised in a 
sedately apolitical milieu which hardly existed in the 1790s. Given that Wolcot 
confronted threats of government prosecution and attacks from hostile critics, 
Wolcot was forced into a position where he compromised his Horatian amiability 
with vehement, more ‘Juvenalian’, defences of his belief in ‘inoffensive sport’.  
Satirising the private life of the ruling class was certainly a popular 
approach to political criticism at the end of the century, but the case of Wolcot, I 
want to argue here, is associated with another dimension of cultural politics. 
Although both Wolcot and Pigott register their political critique in ridicules on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Mee, ‘A Bold and Freespoken Man’, 339-40.  
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private characters, Pigott does not emphasise as constantly and superlatively as 
Wolcot does the significance of humour in addressing political questions. Taking 
this into consideration, I suggest this is another key aspect that makes Wolcot a 
special political case, which is difficult to be subsumed into either loyalist or 
radical discourse. I will discuss in the last section Wolcot’s emphasis on humour 
as essential to political criticism.  
In Wolcot’s case, moral controversy corresponds to stylistic controversy. In 
the Nil Admirari controversy, the exchange of assaults between Wolcot and his 
critics was often conducted in terms of the quality of writing as well as the 
scurrilous content. In the satire Wolcot bluntly explains what he targets in More: 
‘I own Miss Hannah’s Life is very good; / But then, her Verse and Prose are very 
bad’ (4: 261). Gifford’s Epistle to Peter Pindar is comprised mostly of 
assessments of Wolcot’s style: ‘He has the power of rhyming ludicrously, and is 
sometimes even gifted with poetry; and finally he is puffed up with a vanity and 
self-conceited importance, almost without a parallel’.63 In his Out at Last! 
(1801), Wolcot footnotes a lengthy appraisal of the quality of Gifford’s writing, 
lambasting his lack of ‘originality’, ‘luxuriance of imagery’, ‘awkward and 
obscure inversions, with a verbose pomposity, from the leading features of 
almost every couplet’ (3: 496). These literary quarrels illustrate a key 
development of the political controversy of the 1790s, which, as it is well known, 
was characterised by its extension into the cultural realm, and marked by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Epistle to Peter Pindar, in John Strachan (ed.), British Satire 1785-1840 (London: Pickering 
and Chatto, 2003), 72n.  
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increasing fusion of party politics and cultural politics.  
Paul Keen’s The Crisis of Literature in the 1790s offers important accounts 
of the process of establishment of a cultural institution known today as ‘literature’ 
as a result of contemporary political controversy. His new historicist approach 
sheds light on how the value and scope of ‘literature’ was contested in a time of 
proliferation of writing, when increasing promiscuity of readership sparked 
controversy over the political consequences of the changing republic of letters.64 
Keen’s literary-political landscape includes Gifford, Thomas Matthias, Polwhele, 
D’Israeli and Hannah More, all of whom, as we have seen, were involved in 
controversy with Wolcot on literary and political issues. Satirists and critics, such 
as Gifford, are no doubt a case in point; Gifford made his name in the early 
1790s with satires on the Della Cruscan poetry in the hope of a Tory 
re-establishment in literary orthodoxy, as well as his own literary authority, in 
order to rectify public taste.65 Wolcot, on the other hand, is perhaps a hitherto 
unrecognised case in point. This is perhaps due to, in addition to Wolcot’s 
ambiguous politics, the hitherto underexplored significance of humour as a 
literary critique of politics. While Keen explores the demographics of the 
republic of letters — on the questions of who writes, who should write, and who 
should be disenfranchised from the republic, my discussion of Wolcot considers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Paul Keen, The Crisis of Literature, esp. ch. 1 and 2.   
65 For Gifford’s (Tory) establishment of his own literary authority and an attempt to rectify 
public taste by thus lampooning the sentimental school of poetry represented by the Della 
Cruscans, see Michael Gamer, ‘“Bell’s Poetics”: The Baviad, the Della Cruscans, and the Book 
of The World’, in Steven E. Jones (ed.), The Satiric Eye: Forms of Satire in the Romantic Period 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 31-53.   
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the stylistics that provokes interpretation of the republic’s class meanings. 
Coming from a middle-class background, Wolcot’s coarse jokes on the political 
and literary elite struck his contemporary critics as pandering to be vulgar and 
disqualifying a respectable man of letters. The Anti-Jacobin Review characterises 
Nil Admirari as a ‘low . . . Grub-Street attempt’66; while Wolcot attempted to 
defend himself against implications that he wrote as a hack (2: 20; 2: 451). The 
reluctance to sell his work at low prices also reflects his reservation for 
popularising, at least on this count.67  
In order to distinguish himself from both the establishment writers and Grub 
Street, Wolcot made an idiosyncratic extension of the idea of ‘hack’ by 
entertaining the oxymoron of a court hack, whose fortune depends on 
low-quality sycophancy for his royal patron, as the hack writer depends his on 
his low-quality ephemera for his hirers.68 Wolcot can be said to attempt to 
exercise the role of a man of letters, albeit not of a kind of Gifford and Matthias. 
Yet Wolcot shares with Gifford and Matthias the notion that political order 
depends on literary morality: but whereas Gifford insists on solemnity, Wolcot 
privileges humour and laughter, which he believes to be corrective rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Anti-Jacobin Review (Jan. 1800), 80.  
67 Wolcot’s name was associated with the democracy of reading in the 1790s: one of Wolcot’s 
imitators, one ‘Peregrine Pindar’, produces a paean to popular publisher James Lackington: Ode 
to the Hero of Finsbury Square (London, 1795). Yet Wolcot spared few good words for 
Lackington, whose cheap-selling policy, for Wolcot, were demeaning to the elite writer: ‘I dare 
say the sad Bookseller, a Lane / Or Lackington, pour’d such unhallow’d sounds / On Milton’s 
shrinking ear, with Lips profane, / Who bought th’immortal works for fifteen pounds . . . The 
price actually given for the Paradise Lost!’ (4: 135, 135n). 
68 See, for example, 2: 20, 2: 451-452. 
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anarchic as Gifford perceives it. On this point, I shall turn in the final section to 
Wolcot’s justification of his humour as a literary ethics of critical distance from 
forms of political corruption. I shall demonstrate through Wolcot’s discourse the 
ways in which humour is regarded as an essential method of political criticism 
while being equally distant from loyalist and radical rhetorics.  
 
3.3 Comedy as Literary and Political Critique, and British ‘Liberty’  
 
I have suggested that Wolcot can be said to belong to the broader 
controversy of the juncture of literature and politics in the 1790s, and I have 
outlined the particular perspective through which I approach the decade’s 
conditions as they affected the reception of Wolcot’s satire, in relation to changes 
in monarchical image and the debate between Horatian and Juvenalian modes of 
satire. These developments indicate the ways in which ‘human comedy’ in 
private life finds its political relevance. Yet the accessible comic language, which 
consists of coarse and indecent caricature of the private character of the elite, 
strikes the loyalist critics as stylistic demagogy. That demagogic language may 
inspire the ‘unrespectable’ popular radicals (such as Newton). But I have also 
mentioned that Wolcot is distant from radicalism, and I want to point out that this 
reservation partly results from his view on humour. This section turns to 
Wolcot’s literary critique of the function of humour that touches on the broad 
themes of human comedy — human finitude and fallibility, reflected in foibles 
and faults in the worldly context. Wolcot’s satire includes critique of forms of 
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excess, facile transcendence, and false ‘sublimity’, which, according to Wolcot, 
plagues both French radicalism and British loyalism, and the comic attitude is the 
common antidote.  
Although trained as a physician, he showed interest in fine art, music, and 
literature. He achieved fame as a cultural critic, as his first satires were on the 
Royal Academicians whose artistic qualities were under Wolcot’s scathing 
mockery.69 It appears that Wolcot’s engagement with politics started with this 
cultural corruption as he perceived it. In the sarcastic Odes to Royal 
Academicians, he expresses strong distaste for the work of Benjamin West, who 
succeeded Joshua Reynolds, the artist Wolcot admired, as the new President of 
the Academy. Wolcot was convinced that the appointment of West by the King 
evidenced the King’s lack of artistic taste.70 He was also increasingly critical of 
the Academician’s sycophantic style which, Wolcot perceived, indicates the 
general sycophantic milieu among the cultural establishments of George III, 
including his court, the Poet Laureateship, and so on. One scholar proposes that 
Wolcot’s work can be associated with the transition from the personal panegyric, 
a main feature of the literature of patronage, to satirical ironies, when literary 
readership was changing throughout the eighteenth century.71 A derogatory 
keyword that articulates Wolcot’s opposition to the rhetorical performance of 
loyalty in the literature of patronage is ‘flattery’. Wolcot castigates the excess of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Odes to the Royal Academicians (1782-85), in Wolcot, Works, vol. 1.  
70 Ibid, passim; see also Robert Vales, Peter Pindar (John Wolcot) (New York: Twayne, 1973) 
26-29.  
71 See Jeanne Griggs, ‘Self-Praise and Ironic Personal Panegyric of Peter Pindar’, Age of 
Johnson, 8 (1997), 223-24. 
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flatteries in the court as well as among the social elite as a literary corruption that 
entails a political consequence, ‘an ivy wriggling round an oak— / This oak is 
often honest, blunt John Bull’. As a poison in disguise, ‘a pretty ornament’,   
Master Ivy creeps into John’s guts;  
And gives poor thoughtless John a set of gripes: 
Then, like an organ, opening all his pipes, 
John roars; and, when to a consumption drain’d 
Finds out the knave his folly entertain’d.’ (1: 390)72  
Wolcot’s employment of a metaphorics of the body is linked to his profession. 
He has specifically attributed flattery to court ‘sycophants’, which represent 
corruption at the centre of power. Such detestation recalls the eighteenth-century 
satiric tradition from Pope to Charles Churchill, which often couches political 
degeneration in terms of literary sycophancy: Churchill had written of 
‘smooth-tongu’d flatt’ry, that curst court-disease’.73 The metaphor of John 
Bull’s sick body as synecdochically allegorical to the health of the public body, 
furthermore, recalls Bolingbroke’s metaphor for republican rule that ‘Liberty is 
to the collective body, as health is to individual body’.74 The causality also 
travels the other way: it is the political framework that provides a hotbed for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Cf. Expostulatory Odes (1789), 2: 213: ‘The love of flatt’ry is the soul’s rank mange, / Which, 
though it gives such tickling joys, / Instead of doing service, it destroys: / Just as the mange to 
lapdog’s skins apply’d / Though pleasing, spoil the beauty of the hide.’ See Expostulatory Odes, 
new ed. (London: G. Kearsley, 1789), 34. 
73 Charles Churchill, The Night (1760), in Douglas Grant (ed.), The Poetical Works of Charles 
Churchill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 55.  
74 Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Idea of a Patriot King, in David Armitage (ed.), Political 
Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 244.  
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flattery and results in a vicious reciprocity, as Wolcot’s ridicule of the Poet 
Laureateship attests. Wolcot’s Lyric Odes to the Royal Academicians (1782-86) 
argues that, in addition to the King’s tasteless decision to appoint Benjamin West, 
the Academy’s cultural mission to promote arts and sciences is corrupted by 
political sinecures, bad taste and royal intervention.75 Wolcot argues that the 
King should fund free-spoken artists like Wolcot, rather than courtiers and 
sycophantic artists, if the present political system wants to do well: ‘Friend to the 
Arts, were George’s millions mine, / What heavenly maid in poverty should pine? 
/ For labouring Genius, palaces should rise;/ Not for Court-sycophants, the 
Carrion-flies’ (3: 395). The King is portrayed not only as a foolish but also as 
miserly character, failing to fulfil his duty to fund the liberal arts and sciences, 
and surrounded by mediocre sinecures.  
In this regard, we may understand Wolcot’s comic ridicule better as a 
corrective than as subversion. The Remonstrance (1791), a poem written in the 
midst of controversy over Wolcot’s alleged sympathy with the French 
Revolution, contains a manifesto that is at once literary and political. Wolcot 
insists that his principles are radically opposed to those of the French and that his 
national loyalty cannot be doubted. He reiterates the rationale that his rhetorical 
disloyalty is in line with the constitutional spirit of liberty, while condemning the 
French version as pathological. Thus he describes the enthusiasm for the 
Revolution as ‘An ugly Inflammation of the Brain’, and diagnoses the French 
problem in the capacity of a physician, who offers a cultural antidote ‘to calm the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Works, vol. 1. 
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hurry of the mind, / And bring you back to common sense again.’76 The 
Remonstrance demonstrates Wolcot’s arguing an unusual position in the 
literature of the 1790s, one which places the British establishment and French 
radicalism on the same side. Both, for Wolcot, are versions of what can be 
understood as a false ‘sublime’, or what he perceives as the ‘bombast’ of style. 
Wolcot uses comic deflation to expose the empty extravagance of courtly 
language: ‘Court Poet must create, on trifles rant, / Make something out of 
nothing: Lord, I can’t!’ (Remonstrance, 2: 451-52). He argues that the 
association of sublimity with extravagance and an empty elevation of language is 
false: ‘I fear that too many a poet of the present day is affected (if I may coin an 
expression) with a physi-phobia, or a dread of nature and simplicity, and, if I 
may judge from the difficulty of comprehension of their meaning, they fancy 
Obscurity to be the genuine parent of the Sublime’.77  
It is in these terms of cultural propriety and rhetorical decorum that Wolcot 
associates the French disease with that of the elite at home (‘flattery’). This 
defence of literary decorum through the ridicule of false sublimity can be traced 
back to the tradition of Pope’s Peri Bathous, and also found in Gifford’s The 
Maviad in an attack on the Della Cruscan sublime. 78  However, whereas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 The Remonstrance, 2: 454.   
77 Pindariana, 4: 24-25. Wolcot’s friend Cyrus Redding reports that Wolcot once ridiculed the 
radical painter Henry Fuseli: ‘He had an idea,’ said Wolcot, ‘that eccentricity and sublimity were 
synonymous’. ‘Fuseli had a notion that sublimity consisted in strangeness’. Later, Wolcot said to 
Redding that ‘[Fuseli] never forgave me my attacks upon his monsters’. Redding, Past 
Celebrities Whom I Have Known, (London, 1866), 1: 262.  
78 Gifford, The Maviad (London, 1795), 17.  
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Gifford’s hostility to literary extravagance is exclusively reserved for the radical 
version that suggests potential subversion of hierarchy and transmission of 
cultural anarchy, Wolcot’s is more indiscriminate, equally distant from the 
radical and loyalist counterparts. Gifford, according to Wolcot, is also guilty of 
rhetorical indecorum:  
As for Mr. Gifford’s rhimes, they will appear extraordinary to such readers 
(and they are not a few) as prefer bombast to sublimity. Bombast is the idol 
of the vulgar — To such, the Attic simplicity appears arrant insipidity — 
the vulgar eye is sooner fascinated by the stiff, staring cabbage-rose brocade 
of the Harlot, than the modest and snowy Robe of Innocence (3: 495). 
This same rhetoric of female impropriety as well as vulgar sublimity is employed 
to assimilate the language of loyalism to that of Revolution. A further example is 
Wolcot’s ‘instructions’ to the then-Poet Laureate Thomas Warton in 1787:  
stick to Earth, and leave the lofty Sky;  
No more of ti-tum-tum, and ti-tum-ti. 
Thus should an honest Laureat write of Kings  
No praise than for imaginary things: 
I own I cannot make my stubborn Rhyme  
Call every King a Character sublime.79  
Wolcot constantly justifies his comic ridicule with this reasoning. In this sense, 
his comic ridicule appears to be in line with conservative criticism of the 1790s, 
not least the work of the counter-revolutionary satirists I will consider in Chapter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Instructions to a Celebrated Laureat (1787), in Works, 1: 497.  
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4, who employ comedy as empiricist critique of the ‘imaginary’.  
This attitude had been formed in early outputs of The Lousiad. The 
beginning of the second Canto (1787), for example, contains a literary manifesto: 
that the sublime does not dwell [[in abstract imagination ‘on Pegasus’s back’ but 
in ‘lunar trifles’ of ‘Flies, Grasshoppers, Grubs, Cobwebs, Cuckoo-spittle’, the 
‘world of little’ in which ‘art’ dwells (1: 219-20). In a sarcastic ‘Ode on French 
Taste’ written in the mid 1790s, Wolcot compares ‘laughable’ French sublimity 
to a ‘meretricious, noisy Lass’, a ‘bouncing Giantess, with eyes of flame’, who, 
‘Trick’d out in flaunting lace, and stiff brocade, / With cabbage-roses loaded, 
glaring, vast! / Such is the Frenchman's song-inspiring Maid; / The name of this 
bold Brobdignag, Bombast’ (4: 184). Wolcot concludes that ‘Sublimity's a sweet, 
majestic Fair; / So Ample in her form, and speech, and paces; / So elegant her 
manners and her air — A Juno dress’d by all the easy Graces’ (ibid). He has 
remarked earlier that ‘Flattery is a pert French Milliner’, ‘a jade / Cover’d with 
rogue, and flauntingly array’d: / Makes saucy loves to every Man she meets / and 
offers even her favours in the street’.80 Mary Robinson, Wolcot’s close friend 
and admirer, wrote Modern Manners (1793), a verse satire that criticises 
contemporary vogue for empty fashion.81  The poem is punctuated with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ode upon Ode (1787), 2: 390. These metaphors of female manners with which Wolcot’s 
critique of the sublime is laden invite readings from the perspective of gender questions, though 
the ambiguities may not be easily resolved, as this allegedly misogynistic language can be read as 
a conservative stricture similar to those of More and Polwhele.  
81 For an exploration of Wolcot’s influence on Robinson that contributes to the Romantic 
reaction by Coleridge in particular, see Benjamin Colbert, ‘Petrio-Pindarics: John Wolcot and the 
Romantics’, European Romantic Review, 16 (2005), 311-328.  
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panegyric to Wolcot: ‘Facetious Pindar! son of whim and wit, / The Pride of 
Poetry, the scourge of Pitt!’.82 Suggestively styling herself ‘Horace Juvenal’, 
Robinson echoes Wolcot in her cultural critique of the cult of fashion that can 
corrupt female education.  
Wolcot pits comic bathos against what he perceives as cultural excess or 
corruption of the false sublimity that plagues the culture of British establishment 
and French radicalism alike. In this sense, Wolcot performs the task of cultural 
critic through his understanding of humour. Wolcot’s proposal of humour can be 
understood as a method for establishing a critical, or at least bathetic, distance, 
from both French radicalism and British loyalism. The language of bathos serves 
to clear a space for literary independence from the established political regime, 
and by this distance humour prevents political corruptions. Wolcot claims that 
publicising the King’s private faults and follies is something that King George’s 
sinecure courtiers fail to do. In his anecdote of another private foible of the King, 
when the King marvels at the apple-dumplings, Wolcot justifies the publication 
of this comic anecdote thus: ‘What modern Courtier, pray, hath got the face / To 
say to majesty, “O King! / At such a time, in such a place, / You did a very 
foolish thing?”/ What courtier, not a foe to his own glory, / Would publish of his 
King this simple story [of apple-dumplings]?’ (1: 458). He argues that ridicule 
against a private society like the court is an act of benevolence, seeking to bring 
it into public view. He perceived the aggravation of courtly sycophancy in the 
1790s in the Poet Laureate, Pye, and produced many satires on him throughout 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Mary Robinson, Modern Manner (London, 1793), 12.  
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the 1790s. As Mary Robinson puts it in her own satire on Pye, the true Poet 
‘disdain[s] . . . flatt’ring strain’:  
Why does the Laureat pen forbear to shew  
Your well-plac’d features—simpering in a row?  
Waiting the nod familiar, or the joke  
Which, to be laugh’d at—only needs be spoke?83   
Wolcot consistently argues that ridicule of a private society, such as the court, is 
the exercise of true poetry and well-meaning criticism, which sought to expose 
private failings to public scrutiny. One of his contemporary critics compares 
Wolcot to a court jester, in that the ‘whimsical strain of Pindar’s best poetry’ lies 
in Wolcot’s conviction that ‘the muses were accustomed to keep a jester in their 
court’. 84  Such understanding, though not particularly popular in Wolcot’s 
contemporary reception, offers us another perspective of viewing him as 
maintaining a subtler kind of good relationship with the monarch, one defined 
precisely by his free severity and candid ridicule.  
Wolcot makes a number of bold claims in the 1790s, without detailed 
elaboration, that wit and humour are germane to the national wellbeing. In his 
attack on Burke’s loyalism in the 1790s, he advances a gleeful vision of an 
‘advancing Golden Age’ characterised by the triad of ‘Truth, Wit and Humour’ 
(3: 37). Wolcot writes later in 1804 that ‘Had Britain an atom of wit, / And 
wish’d her lost health to regain; / She would kick out the mountebank P[itt], / 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Morning Post (1 Jan. 1798), 3. See also Judith Pascoe, Romantic Theatricality: Gender, 
Poetry and Spectatorship (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 174-75.  
84 Pindarics, 17.  
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And consult her old doctor again’ (5: 159).	    The depiction of Pitt as a 
mountebank may suggests a rhetorical, if not ideological, solidarity with the 
popular radicals who, as we have seen in Chapter 2, represented the government 
elite as illusionists or conjurers. Yet a more historically plausible conjecture may 
be that 1804 is the year Pitt returned to Premiership, which may strike a 
frustrated Wolcot as political treachery. Wolcot earlier celebrated Pitt’s departure 
from his first Premiership in Out at Last! (1801), which confidently asserts that 
his poetry ‘prophes[ies] a Minister to tumble’ (3: 487). Yet even a bold claim 
such as this would appear relatively modest in comparison to the ‘atom of wit’ 
that is believed to be able to ‘kick out mountebank P[itt]’ and ‘regain the lost 
health of Britain’. Like Robinson’s statement that ‘facetious’ Wolcot’s ‘wit and 
whim’ is the ‘scourge of Pitt’, Wolcot’s claims elevate humour to a central 
significance in politics. The juxtaposition of ‘Truth, Wit and Humour’ that 
defines a British ‘Golden Age’ goes further than the authors I consider in this 
study, who generally employ humour as an element that expresses their value 
systems. In Wolcot’s poetics, ‘wit’ and ‘humour’ appear to be the element that 
conditions political outlook rather than something harnessed to another, 
predetermined ideological commitment.  
Wolcot insists on the idea that humour is not at odds with patriotism when 
the King turns out to be indispensable material for his comedy, which in turn 
contributes to the practice of humour essential to maintaining the ‘liberty’ of the 
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nation.85 The ‘liberty’ in question, as he reiterates in Liberty’s Last Squeak 
following his renunciation of royal satire, with its defence of the freedom of 
innocuous jokes, refers to freedom of speech.86 Such rhetoric may recall the 
discourse of British exceptionalism founded on British diversity and tolerance of 
humour. Yet even if Wolcot implicitly alludes to this discourse (which is hardly 
verifiable given the characteristic lack of elaboration and detailed explanation of 
his assertions and statements), his emphasis seems to lie in the judgment that the 
theoretical marriage between British humour and British liberty was being 
divorced in reality. On the other hand, freedom of expression became a favourite 
line of argument for Pigott, who drew on the Whig constitutional discourse of 
‘freedom of speech’ as the rights guaranteed by the Magna Carta and the Bill of 
Rights to justify his otherwise scurrilous writings.87 For Mee, Pigott’s case 
points to an ambiguous conflation of Whig discourse of liberty and radical theory 
of natural rights, and therefore problematises the radicalism of the 1790s itself.88 
In a similar light, Wolcot’s justification of his humour draws on the ambiguous 
discourse of ‘liberty’ (without explaining it in detail), which problematises 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85  A record of Wolcot’s private conversation with a loyalist vividly illustrates the 
self-interpretation of his patriotism: ‘An advocate for Pitt remarked, that though not married to 
one of the female sex, he was wedded to his country. “Yes,” said Wolcot, “there is not doubt of 
that, and a cursed bad match it was for his country.” “You are too bad,” was the reply, “you are a 
bad subject for so good a sovereign as George III.” The Doctor rejoined, “that may or may not be, 
but I can assure you George III has been an excellent subject for me!”’ See Cyrus Redding, Past 
Celebrities, 1: 252. 
86 See Liberty’s Last Squeak (1796), in Works, vol. 3. See also above for the discussion of this 
text in the context of Horatian satire.  
87 Charles Pigott, Persecution: The Case of Charles Pigott (London, 1793), 37-38.  
88 Mee, ‘‘A Bold and Freespoken Man’, 342-46.  
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constitutional language when the freedom of ‘humour’ is taken into account. 
John Taylor reports that Wolcot ‘reverenced the British constitution, and held its 
political head in due veneration; but that he felt justified sporting with the 
peculiarities of the private character of the monarch’.89 Taylor is unclear on 
whether Wolcot’s understanding of ‘British constitution’ serves to justify his 
sport of amusement at the expense of the King, as the ‘but’ in the middle of the 
sentence seems to discourage the connection between the two. Yet it is clear that 
Wolcot is dedicated to a comedy substantiated by the ‘peculiarities of the private 
character’, and that Wolcot does not consider his ‘sport’ a contradiction to the 
‘British constitution’. This question is indeterminable in Wolcot given the 
confident yet vague terseness of his claims, but Wolcot’s claim of the 
synonymity between liberty and humour sheds light on a way in which comic 
expression, construed as part of ‘freedom of speech’, is claimed to be protected 
by the British political system and simultaneously critical and potentially 
subversive of the very system that is believed to foster it.90  
Wolcot’s tendency to place humour ahead of any specific political agenda 
offers a different vantage point from other politically committed practices, and 
this ambiguity is precisely why it provokes indeterminable controversy in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 John Taylor, Records of My Life, 1: 364.  
90 Rhetoric of absolving otherwise critical words on political institutions of sedition by casting 
them under the scope of the British constitution is, of course, a strategy of Thomas Erskine’s 
courtroom defence. Erskine’s gained ground in his eloquent defence at the trial of Paine in 1792 
by arguing for Paine’s adherence (true or not) to the ‘doctrine of Englishmen’. The freedom of 
speech is this glorious spirit of the ‘Constitution’, on which the prosperity of the nation depends; 
by granting this right to English subjects, the nation benefits from and improves on it rather than 
is subverted by it. See, for example, Erskine, The Trial of Thomas Paine (London, 1792), 24.  
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years of political crisis. In his Miscellany (1796), D’Israeli reevaluates Wolcot’s 
work more affirmatively than his castigation in ‘On the Abuse of Satire’: ‘Far 
from applauding the subjects of Peter Pindar, we must admire a copiousness of 
imagery, and a facility of wit, which variegate his early productions with a 
constant variety. At their ﬁrst appearance the critics received them with a stoical 
apathy. The personality of satire alone enabled them to escape the menaced 
oblivion’.91 Saliently, D’Israeli seeks to single out Wolcot’s aesthetic value from 
the moral deplorability of the content. It points to another ambiguity: either 
D’Israeli tries to depoliticise Wolcot, or to bring his satire under critical 
discipline as his method of political control. As D’Israeli’s argues, ‘a Poet alone 
should decide on a Poem . . . but this must not be accepted as an incontrovertible 
maxim’. For him, it falls to the lot of ‘Professors of Art’ to decide a poem’s 
meaning.92 If comic language for Wolcot is a method of political discipline over 
forms of excess, his satire’s own excesses (perceived by the conservatives), then, 
are themselves subject to another project of literary discipline. Later, Leigh Hunt 
remarks of Wolcot: ‘It is a pity that this pleasant reprobate had not a little more 
principle in his writings, for he has really a most original vein of humour, — 
such a mixture of simplicity, archness, and power of language . . . constitutes him 
a class by himself. He is the Fontaine of lampooners.’93  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Isaac D’Israeli, Miscellanies: or, Literary Recreations (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 
1796), 29-30.  
92 Ibid, 24.  
93 James Henry Leigh Hunt, Feast of the Poets (1812), in Michael Eberle-Sinatra and Robert 
Morrison (gen. ed.), The Selected Writings of Leigh Hunt, (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2003), 
2: 323-24.  
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The affirmation by the conservative D’Israeli and the reservation of the 
radical Hunt towards an anti-establishment satirist like Wolcot demonstrate once 
again the confusing character of political humour. This is probably due to 
Wolcot’s hyperbolic confidence in humour as a supreme virtue in itself that goes 
beyond any narrow political agenda. Nevertheless, Wolcot’s insistence in 
humour as an empiricist and pragmatist critique of sublimity, extravagance or 
transgression was continued in the counter-revolutionary novels in their ridicule 
of radical impracticality, to which I shall turn in the next chapter. Perhaps as an 
ironic twist, the language of Wolcot’s seemingly radical critique turned out to be 







Counter-Revolution and the Social Discipline of ‘Common life’ in the 
‘Anti-Jacobin’ Novels  
 
I have read Burke’s polemics n terms of the clash between ways of 
communal life in addition to that between political systems. Of course, fear about 
the regime change or the removal of constitutional monarchy still conditioned 
much of the political turbulence of the 1790s on the conservative or loyalist side. 
At the end of the 1790s, the immediate domestic threat of insurrection seems to 
have relatively subsided with the imposition of the Two Acts and the dissolution 
of some major reform societies, although foreign threats continued to mount with 
the rise of Napoleon and the renewed popular turbulence in the Rebellion of 
Ireland. Burke had identified the deeper threat of radicalism, which is to change 
the entire cultural character of the British nation, indeed the whole ideological 
structure of British way of being, by the ‘revolution in manner’ and the 
‘metaphysical’ approach to ‘common life’. The Anti-Jacobin magazine turned 
loyalist attention to the cultural and intellectual subversions (the ‘new morality’) 
to tackle threats in the cultural and literary forms in addition to that of the 
political insurrection.  
Burke’s ‘common life’ in Reflections is largely theoretical. If it takes 
concrete dramatisation in the comic form to construct the rhetoric of conservative 
dissuasion from the pursuit of ‘abstract’ theory, then a fictional narrative can be 
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an effective literary form. This chapter reads some key texts of the ‘Anti-Jacobin 
Novel’ to explore the ways in which humour was employed as an elaborate 
method of social discipline and of defining or constructing the ambit and remit of 
the political zone of engagement. Scholars have been well aware of the pervasive 
modes of humorous expression with which one is able to parody or ridicule, 
particularly to discredit the ‘new philosophy’ associated with the work of 
William Godwin and the ‘Jacobin’ novel, which is associated with various 
radicalisms and the ominous dissemination of the French Revolution and its 
principles across the Channel.1 
 This chapter cannot avoid being selective of its material, since it focuses on 
the comic works among the anti-Jacobin novels. Those identified by scholarship 
as  ‘anti-Jacobin’ novels vary in their literary expression to discredit radicalism, 
employing techniques including religious allegory, epistolary fiction, historical 
fiction, mock romance, and tragedy. I choose to focus on the comic works 
because the comic expression, which I will examine in the anti-Jacobin novels, 
offers us a perspective into the conception of social relation and ethical outlook, 
which informs the disciplining function germane to the broad conservative 
agenda. I argue that the comic expression is not simply employed to ridicule and 
write off radicalism, but to articulate ideological commitments at work in 
counter-revolution. In the counter-revolutionary novels that started in the late 
1790s, the comedy of manner was put into practice in the hope of reforming and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 See, for example, Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 
ch. 4.  
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reintroducing ludicrous individuals into the endangered enclave of ‘common life’. 
But while Burke confronts the urban crowd in defence of common life, the 
novels situate common life predominantly in rural England, which distances 
itself from urban turbulence. This indicates another significance of the form of 
literary fiction in counter-revolution. Comic fiction is consumed in domestic 
reading and not exposed to collective spectatorship of comedy in the form of 
theatre. I will discuss the conservative anxiety about the crowd revealed in the 
narrative form and content of the novels and their different ways to cope with it.  
 
4.1 Comedy, the Decorum of the Novel, and Social Discipline 
 
Isaac D’Israeli’s declaration in his anti-Jacobin novel Vaurien (1797), that ‘I 
have chosen the form rather than the matter of the novel’, is often read as his 
scepticism of the novel genre.2 Marvin Spevack calls Vaurien ‘the pamphlet as 
novel’, which seems to suggest that it sits ambiguously or even uncomfortably 
between ‘political’ and ‘literary’ writing, and argues that D’Israeli ‘is not so 
much concerned with novel writing as he is with fiction and truth.’3 Yet the 
interactions between ‘form’ and ‘matter’ in this novel merit further investigation. 
D’Israeli’s criticism of the genre, as he makes clear in his Preface, dwells not on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 Isaac D’Israeli, Vaurien, or Sketches of the Time (1797), ed. Nicola Trott (London: Pickering 
and Chatto, 2005), 8.  3 Marvin Spevack, Curiosities Revisited: The Works of Isaac D'Israeli (Hildesheim: Olms 2007), 
157, 160. Spevack asserts that ‘D’Israeli is not so much concerned with novel writing as he is 
with fiction and truth: ‘The eye may be deceived, truth may be delusion: this is the philosophical 
context into which Vaurien is introduced’ (160).  
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its innate flaws, but the present ‘dangerous class of men to unite politics with 
metaphysics’ in novel writing (presumably, therefore, a castigation directed at 
the ‘Jacobin novelists’), and the contemporary vogue for the ‘marvellous’ as the 
‘matter’ of the novel.4 For D’Israeli, the ‘marvelous’ in writing shows that it is 
‘much easier to excite our wonder, than to satisfy our judgment’.5 Vaurien tells 
a story of ‘constitutionally virtuous’ Charles Hamilton, son of a country 
clergyman, who travels to London and is fascinated by the urban clamour and 
chaos and seduced by its radicalism. The peaceful and ordered rural setting of 
Charles’s origin featuring characters of ‘hobbyhorsical’ dispositions in the 
opening chapter quickly gives way to the tumult of London from chapter two on 
and is never recuperated. D’Israeli offers a further reflection in a chapter entitled 
‘A Dissertation on the Marvellous in Novel Writing’, which introduces the 
eponymous villain Vaurien, the French Revolutionary, Charles’s main 
philosophical seducer, and the incarnation of the ‘marvellous’. Vaurien, who 
leads Charles almost to personal ruin, is eventually deported from England, in a 
reference to the Alien Act of 1795.6 Vaurien as an incarnation of the ‘marvelous’ 
seems to serve as an intruder into the well-being of English social life that must 
be expelled. Simultaneously, this character reflects all of the potential dangers 
found within London in particular and England in general: the novel features a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   D’Israeli, Vaurien, 77.	  
5 Ibid.  6 For this point of the banishment of foreign revolutionary threat from England as an allegory of 
the Alien Act, see Kevin Gilmartin, Writing against Revolution: Literary Conservatism in Britain, 
1790-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 163-67.  
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London that is already chaotic, as well as a radical society with members such as 
the Godwinian philosopher Mr. Subtile, the radical orator Mr. Rant, the radical 
publisher Mr. Libel, and Lord Belfield, Charles’s patron who capitulates to 
radicalism. All of these figures might evolve into monsters like Vaurien and 
subvert the fabric of British national life. The novel alternates comedy with 
pathos and satire: while the narrative admonishes the urban chaos evolving into 
total subversion catalysed by the Vaurien the French schemer, it is punctuated 
with comic parodies of the ineffective gang of these radical ‘philosophers’ who 
are preoccupied with empty talk without being able to carry out their subversive 
agendas. It seems that the comedy in Vaurien is involved in the conflict among 
ideological and formal forces, in which it battles for supremacy to control the 
alarming aspects of the novel. Although the novel’s matter is saturated with the 
‘marvellous’, the comic techniques employed to deflate the ‘marvellous’ can be 
viewed as an effort to clean up the mess of the generic corruption of the novel.  
D’Israeli’s claim of a merely strategic usage of the medium of the novel 
exemplified the anxiety shared by many counter-revolutionary authors about the 
subversive potential of romance and sentimentalism as the popular ‘matter’ of 
the novel, leading some scholars to understand the anti-Jacobin novel as 
anti-novel.7 Recently, Morgan Rooney has pointed out that in works such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 See for example M. O. Grenby, The Anti-Jacobin Novel: British Conservatism and the French 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 1; Kevin Gilmartin, Writing 
against Revolution 16, 158; W. M. Verhoeven, “General Introduction”, The Anti-Jacobin Novels, 
ed. W. M Verhoeven, vol.1 (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2005), li; and Lisa Wood, Modes of 
Discipline: Women, Conservatism, and the Novel after the French Revolution (Lewisburg, PA: 
Bucknell University Press, 2003), 14.  
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Robert Bisset’s Douglas (1800) and D’Israeli’s Vaurien the genre of the novel is 
not discredited. Rather, it is reappraised in the hope of reclaiming its authentic 
tradition; such works do not protest against the novel as such, but rather against 
its indecorous generic variations. The model for D’Israeli and Bisset, Rooney 
shows, was the novels of Cervantes, Le Sage, and especially Henry Fielding, 
who claimed to present the experience of ‘life’ and ‘human nature’ ‘as it is’, the 
category of the concrete, factual, present, and mundane. If so, the anti-Jacobin 
novel can be viewed as an effort to (re-)establish a paradigm of what Ian Watt’s 
classic, though disputed, thesis has conceived of the eighteenth-century novel as 
an empiricist valorisation of concrete worldly experience. 8  Rooney aptly 
suggests that this anti-Jacobin novelistic discourse anticipated the paradigm of 
the realist novel of the nineteenth century.9 This discourse, however, was not 
without precedent. In his review of Peregrine Pickle in the Monthly Review, John 
Cleland distinguishes Smollett’s comic novel from ‘that flood of novels, tales, 
romances, and other monsters of the imagination, which have been either 
wretchedly translated, or even more unhappily imitated, from the French, whose 
literary levity we have not been ashamed to adopt, and encourage the 
propagation of so depraved a taste.’10 For Cleland, the comic novels by Smollett 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (London: Chatto 
and Windus, 1957). 9 See Morgan Rooney, ‘Anti-Jacobin Fiction and the Eighteenth-Century Traditions of the Novel: 
Robert Bisset, Isaac D’Israeli, and the Novel’s Reclamation’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 48 
(2015), 221-238. 10 [John Cleland], The Monthly Review, 4 (Mar. 1751), 355; reprinted in Lionel Kelly (ed.), 
Tobias Smollett: The Critical Heritage (London and New York; Routledge, 1987), 44.  
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and Fielding provide an antidote to the ‘French’ fashion. The novel must base 
itself on the lived experience of ‘common life’:  
as the matter of [Smollett and Fielding’s novels] is chiefly taken from 
nature, from adventures, real or imaginary, but familiar, practical, and 
probable to be met with in the course of common life, they may serve as 
pilot’s charts, or maps of those parts of the world, which every one may 
chance to travel through; and in this light they are public benefits. Whereas 
romances and novels which turn upon characters out of nature, monsters of 
perfection, feats of chivalry, fairy-enchantments, and the whole train of the 
marvellous-absurd, transport the reader unprofitably into the clouds, where 
he is sure to find no solid footing, or into those wilds of fancy, which go for 
ever out of the way of all human paths.11  
Cleland’s view recalls the critical paradigm that opposes British empiricism to 
French fancy, in this case manifest in the novel. The contrast between the British 
emphasis on ‘common life’ and the French emphasis on the marvelous was 
continued in the conservative writings of the 1790s to register their critique of 
the Revolutionary ideology. Furthermore, while Cleland did not explicitly 
associate the comic novel with the literary ethics of empirical propriety, many 
counter-revolutionary novels use this literary medium to enforce disciplinary 
projects through the comic critiques of human nature. Certainly, not all 
conservative novels of this kind employ comic modes of expression to articulate 
their criticism, yet comedy’s theme of human fallibility is nonetheless commonly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 [Cleland], The Monthly Review, 4 (Mar. 1751), 356; reprinted in Kelly, 45.   
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employed to support their case against the radical, Godwinian argument of 
human perfectibility.12 D’Israeli and Bisset joined others such as Jane West who 
claimed to have purged ‘splendour of language . . . of the marvelous, or the 
enigmatical’, ‘sudden elevation, or astonishing depression. [The novel] merely 
spoke of human life as it is’.13 West’s claim not only attacks the vogues of the 
novel such as romance and the Gothic, but also contributes to the construction of 
decorum for the novel as a shift to ‘human life as it is’. These generic 
declarations may serve as a riposte to Godwin’s project. Of course, Godwin’s 
Caleb Williams claims to depict ‘things as they are’, as do other ‘Jacobins’, yet 
this subject matter in Godwin’s novel functions as an example of the status quo 
subject to reformist critique. Godwin stated in the preface to his St. Leon (1799) 
that, having seen novelists delineate the scenes of ‘real life’, he ‘endeavoured to 
gain footing in the neglected track of the … province’ of the ‘imagined new’.14 
Whereas ‘real life’ is a cause of discontent for some radicals, it is a solid ground 
of lived experience for the counter-revolutionaries. In Elizabeth Hamilton’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12  The insistence on human flaws certainly informs counter-revolutionary case against 
democracy as well. Bisset, for example, was a staunch Burkean, who made numerous fierce 
attacks on the Revolution, but his polemic is not restricted to revolutionary principle but targeted 
at ‘democracy’ as such. One pamphlet in particular surveys the long history of ‘democracy’ and 
argues that human nature always fails political projects of universal enfranchisement of the many, 
whose nature cannot be controlled. This is a possible explanation of Bisset’s recourse to Fielding 
as a model of human understanding in which weaknesses and comic foibles are to be 
acknowledged rather than transcended. Robert Bisset, Sketch of Democracy (London: J. Mathews 
[etc.], 1796). 13 Jane West, A Gossip’s Story, And a Legendary Tale (London: T.N. Longman, 1796), 1: vi.  14 William Godwin, St. Leon: A Tale of the Sixteenth Century, ed. Pamela Clemit, in Mark Philp 
(gen. ed.), Collected Novels and Memoirs of William Godwin (London: Pickering and Chatto, 
1992), 10.   
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Memoirs of Modern Philosophers (1800), the much caricatured ‘Bridgetina 
Botherim’ (a character allegedly modelled on the radical philosopher Mary Hays) 
confesses that her metaphysical mind has difficulty ‘descend[ing] to the vulgar 
concerns of common life’.15 In Hamilton’s novel, ‘common life’ is a realm not 
only of practical domestic concern but also of social duty and of the basis of 
community. The novel parallels the stories of three protagonists — the ‘modern 
philosopher’ Bridgetina Botherim, Julia Delmond, and Harriet Orwell — who 
take different approaches to the practical concerns of ‘common life’. In 
Hamilton’s didactic narrative, only Harriet Orwell, adhering consistently to 
practical wisdom and social duty even when it is necessary to resist her personal 
desire and passion and decline a marriage proposal before the time is ripe, has 
her virtue finally rewarded at the end of the novel with the marriage she longs for. 
Julia’s gullibility to the seduction of new philosophy and her abandonment of her 
father is eventually punished with death. The Godwinian Bridgetina, on the other 
hand, longs in vain to abandon civilisation and travel to join the Hottentots. Her 
wish to transcend mundane business is mocked throughout and finally chastised. 
‘Common life’ as the ambit of legitimate concern for the conservatives is here 
being established.  
These attempts at the establishment of the orthodoxy of the novel as a 
mimetic genre, in which ‘common life’ is approved as its legitimate matter, is 
mediated in the evocation of the comic tradition, from Cervantes to Fielding. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15  Elizabeth Hamilton, Memoirs of Modern Philosophers (1800), ed. Claire Grogan 
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000), 318.  
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a matter of fact, the ‘Jacobin’ novelists such as Robert Bage and Thomas 
Holcroft are also highly enthusiastic about the comic literature of Fielding and 
Smollett.16 In his private life, Godwin was far more liberal-minded than his 
reputation would suggest, as his circle of acquaintances and reading sweep 
across the political spectrum, including even his ideological opponents, and 
appears affirmative of the work of Sterne, Fielding, and other comic canons.17 
Nevertheless, the representative strategy in which Godwinians are portrayed as if 
they are humourless transcendentalists serves to legitimise certain ideological 
content that associates the ‘matter’ of the novel with comedy in the anti-Jacobin 
moral enterprise. In understanding D’Israeli’s claim that he chose ‘the form 
rather than the matter’ of the novel, therefore, it is important to take into account 
the rhetorical (the comic) as well as generic (the novel) form as the mediator of 
the ideological content (‘common life’, ‘human nature’, and so forth) that the 
anti-Jacobin moralists wish to inculcate.  
M. O. Grenby’s study understands the anti-Jacobin novel as a cultural and 
ideological ‘hegemony’, which creates certain discursive terrains in which 
related issues are put on the agenda and which enables the novelists to be 
generalised as ‘a single text’ by ‘an aggregate author’.18 My elaboration of a 
formal paradigm here can shed some light on the formation of such a 
‘hegemony’, and address the scholarly dispute over the ‘anti-Jacobin novel’ as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 See also The English Jacobin Novel, 1780-1805 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 7. 17 For his affirmation of Fielding and Sterne, see Godwin, Letters of William Godwin, ed. 
Pamela Clemit, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010-14), 1: 121-22, 123, 124.   18 M. O. Grenby, The Anti-Jacobin Novel, 170.  
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coherent enterprise. Though alternative terms such as the ‘anti-Jacobin’ novel are 
useful in describing a broader concern about the threat of revolution in its various 
forms, a commonly expressed scepticism about the binary categorization of 
‘anti-Jacobin’ against ‘Jacobin’ novels is that such arbitrary nomenclature 
appropriated from the French context barely covers the wide spectrum of 
opinions on the Revolution, even obscuring the differences within each 
category.19 This concern of historical rigour is understandable, and it is true that 
the name is generalised from a handful of self-styled ‘Anti-Jacobins’ and the 
namesake conservative magazine founded in 1798 by George Canning and his 
conservative coterie. Nevertheless, ‘Jacobinism’, for one thing, was increasingly 
used and abused to nominate a diversity of potentially subversive discourses, 
activities and tendencies, rather than those who directly expressed their sympathy 
with the French revolutionary incarnation. At any rate, the idea of ‘hegemony’ is 
useful in establishing the common ground shared by works of Isaac D’Israeli, 
Jane West, Elisabeth Hamilton, Robert Bisset, and George Walker. Despite the 
diversity of opinions on particular issues of these writers, they shared the view 
that political conversation can only be conducted in the categories already 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19 See for example Claudia Johnson, Jane Austen: Women, Politics, and the Novel (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. xxi–xxiii. Also, Miriam Wallace argues against this 
‘misnomer’, owing to what they consider as a misleading reduction to a monolithic school of the 
novel. Wallace in particular proposes instead a ‘continuum’ that includes both the ‘Jacobin’ and 
‘anti-Jacobin’ novels, whose contradictions and disagreements do not obscure their overlapped 
views and common grounds. Wallace, ‘Crossing from Jacobin to “Anti-Jacobin”: Rethinking the 
Terms of English Jacobinism’, in Jeffrey Cass and Larry Peer (eds.), Romantic Border Crossings 
(Aldershot, England; Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2008), 99-112, and Wallace, Revolutionary 
Subjects in the English “Jacobin” Novel, 1790-1805 (Cranbury, NJ: Bucknell University Press, 
2009).  
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available, not least ‘common life’.  
This commonality may go some way towards understanding the complexity 
of their relationship to Edmund Burke. Indeed, Burke’s subtlety, as well as his 
ambivalent utilitarianism, discourages commentators from too closely aligning 
him with contemporary loyalists, yet I want nevertheless to accentuate the 
common ground Burke and the novels in question share in putting forward their 
conservative cases.20 Consider this objective stated in George Walker’s often 
comic anti-Jacobin novel The Vagabond: ‘The following work is written with a 
desire of placing, in a practical light, some of the prominent absurdities of many 
self-important reformers of mankind, who, having heated their imaginations, sit 
down to write political romances, which never were, and never will be practical; 
but which, coming into the hands of persons as little acquainted with human 
nature, the history of mankind, and the proofs of religious authenticity, as 
themselves, hurry away the mind from common life into dreams of ideal 
felicity . . ’.21 The evocation of ‘common life’ recalls again Burke’s dictum in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20 Marilyn Butler argues that the anti-Jacobins are clearly un-Burkean, in that their criticism of 
sentimentalism is irreconcilably at odds with Burke’s sentimental style. But such judgement may 
have oversimplified ‘sentimentalism’ as unequivocally self-indulgent passion, when in Burke’s 
Reflections the function of ‘natural’, ‘untaught feeling’ or ‘inbred sentiment’ is to teach popular 
submission to political authority rather than to encourage egotism. Butler, Jane Austen and the 
War of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 94-95. For Burke’s isolated status in mainstream 
conservatisms at least in the early receptions of Reflections, see F. P. Lock, Burke’s Reflections 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 132-65. For a reserved attitude in associating Burke with 
other conservatives owing to the different attitudes towards popular propaganda through print, 
see Gilmartin, Writing against Revolution, 7-9. 21 Walker, ‘Preface’, The Vagabond: A Novel, ed. W. M. Verhoeven (Peterborough, Ont.; 
Plymouth: Broadview Press, 2004), 54. All quotes from the text are from this edition.  
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Reflections on the ‘metaphysical’ assault on common life by ‘self-important 
reformers of mankind’. In echoing D’Israeli, Bisset, and West, Walker succinctly 
casts the political infelicities in terms of the degeneration of generic decorum, in 
which ‘political romance’ eclipses realist depictions of ‘common life’.  
The presence of the comic form provides a key to understanding the 
anti-Jacobin novels as elaborate fictional footnotes to Burke’s metaphor of 
abstract theory facing refraction through the ‘dense medium’ of ‘common life’, 
despite the fact that Burke’s own style was far from comic. We have seen that an 
eighteenth-century critical consensus established ‘common life’ as the legitimate 
subject matter of comedy. To recapitulate: comedy’s exposure of human foibles, 
failures, and finitude and the irrelevance of transcendence finds its province in 
‘common life’, which materialises the ordinary and the mundane of ‘men’ and 
‘manners’ in scenes of everyday intercourse. This tradition was used to refute the 
transcendental hypothesis of ‘perfectibility’ of new philosophy and shift the 
terrain of communication into an empirically verifiable category as the proper 
‘matter’ of a literary form. The comic form in the anti-Jacobin novels therefore 
registers a significant aspect of what David Simpson identified as British ‘revolt 
against theory’ in its implacable privileging of praxis and experience over 
metaphysics.22 Marilyn Butler’s early study on the subject has pointed out in 
passing the prevalence of the Quixotic motif in which the anti-hero in the novels 
‘travels the country, meeting grotesque groups of troublemakers, and eventually 
learning to see society as it is’ and ‘learns to take his place in the world as it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22 David Simpson, Revolt against Theory. See also Chapter 2, p. 77, n.3.  
209	  	  
actually is’.23 Yet the last part of the quote suggests that the anti-hero in an 
anti-Jacobin novel can only be partially Quixotic; the unbending pride and 
persistent delusion of the Knight of La Mancha in Cervantes’s novel do not 
persist but are reformed in the anti-Jacobin settings. The tension between 
Quixotism and its practical context must to a certain extent be resolved in 
anti-Jacobin fiction.  
Because the ‘dense medium of common life’ was at stake in a revolutionary 
age that threatened to politicise everything, anti-Jacobin comedy played a vital 
role in counter-revolutionary literature in charting out a largely depoliticised 
enclave in the form of the novel. As Kevin Gilmartin understands the enterprise 
of the anti-Jacobin novel, an enclave was situated in the serener rural community, 
where ‘domestic interiors offered a refuge from corrupt public life, and an 
emblem of everything that revolutionary desire put at risk’. As Gilmartin puts it, 
‘The anti-Jacobin novel can seem by turns a curiously disengaged fictional 
enterprise or the most vexed and compelling of counter-revolutionary forms of 
expression. Disengaged, because by comparison with periodical and pamphlet 
literature the novel did not address popular radical protest in a sustained way, nor 
was it significantly integrated with counter-revolutionary organization’.24 The 
‘or’ can be changed to the more paradoxical ‘and’. The fictional enterprise can 
be viewed as an imaginative effort to resuscitate the conservative category of 
common life—the category that extends or displaces politics to individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23 Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 107. 24 Kevin Gilmartin, Writing against Revolution, 16, 150 (my italics).  
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manner, everyday social intercourse, domestic economy—the principal content 
to which anti-Jacobin novelists avow to attend. In this sense, the category of 
common life is restricted to a very particular community, such as the rural, 
domestic social circle away from the urban turbulence, rather than a general 
signifier for all quotidian lived experience. Domestic scenes, in which most 
anti-Jacobin narrative takes place, are in this regard a literary and cultural 
resistance to the alleged degeneration of the public sphere of print, tavern, theatre, 
debating society, government, and the outdoor crowd that suggests an 
insurrectionary threat. As Gilmartin puts it, ‘the novel is distinctive within the 
field of counter-revolutionary literature for its detailed rendering of domestic 
conversation as a way of securing commitment to government and social 
order . . . A conceptual split between public and private realms is 
symptomatically reinforced even as it is challenged. Yet despite these limits, 
fictional episodes of domestic conversation about the forces of revolution do 
represent a concerted effort to meet the force of subversion through the 
development of collective habits of criticism, reflection, and deliberation’.25 
Gilmartin observes that the new ‘politics of home’, predicated on the primacy of 
small community and common life, is a major contribution to the anti-Jacobin 
novel’s redeployments of politics, at once extensively politicking and 
symptomatically depoliticising. To illustrate his point, Gilmartin draws on 
Habermas’s observation of the private sphere of the conjugal family as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25 Ibid, 175.  
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‘training ground’ for the development of public political sphere.26 I would add 
that this ideological development manifest in the anti-Jacobin novels is also in a 
sense foreshadowed by the eighteenth-century reflection (although from an 
aristocratic and elite perspective rather than the popular or middle-class one from 
the anti-Jacobin novelists) by Shaftesbury and Corbyn Morris on country 
retirement as a cultivation of private virtue, from which public virtue or political 
wisdom benefits.27 
Gilmartin’s otherwise cogent judgement, however, should not downplay an 
another important mode of communication in addition to ‘conversation . . . of 
criticism, reflection, and deliberation’. An alternative appraisal to this implicit 
category mistake will be to look temporarily beyond the conspicuous artistic 
limitations of the anti-Jacobin novel and its frequent failure to recognise radical 
diversity, paying attention instead to the dramatisations of the revolution 
‘debate’, which, in my view, registers their principal argument. It is well known 
that much of the power of Reflections on the Revolution in France and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 Ibid. For Habermas, see The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1989), 29, 43–51.  27 See also Chapter 1. This paradox can also be explicated by John Barrell’s reflections on the 
representation of rural life and ‘cottage politics’ in the 1790s. By representing rural life as private, 
timeless and unchanging, in contrast to political turbulence and rapid social change in urban life, 
this depoliticising effort effectively contributes to the politicisation as an endeavour to 
circumscribe the private realm from the public one. John Barrell, ‘Cottage Politics’, in his The 
Spirit of Despotism: Invasion of Privacy in the 1790s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
210-246. For a further elaboration on this theme in the creation of rusticity in the urban context in 
the 1790s, see Barrell, ‘Rus in Urbe’, in Philip Connell and Nigel Leask (eds), Romanticism and 
Popular Culture in Britain and Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 109-27. 
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subsequent writings of the late Burke lie in their balance of rational analysis and 
affective appeal, in calm reflections punctuated by sentimental vignettes. Since it 
is important to read the novel as much as a literary form as a medium for the 
conveyance of ideas, style as well as substance should be assessed if these novels 
are to be awarded the epithet of ‘Burkean’. It must be acknowledged again, that 
Burke’s argument lies not only in what he says but in how he says it. The 
emphasis of lived experience, untaught feeling, and common life in Burke’s 
writing are expressed less in constative arguments than in performative allegories 
and symbolisms attempting to move the heart and sentiment. In my view, this is 
what the novels often dwell on—an attempt of dissuasion from the seduction, not 
by ‘conversation . . . of criticism, reflection, and deliberation’, but by the 
immediate and infallible impact of experience, action, feeling, and ‘common 
sense’ that do without speech and ideation.28 To give a very straightforward 
example, the new philosopher Bridgetina Botherim throughout Memoirs is never 
talked out of new philosophy, never successfully persuaded by exemplary figures 
such as Harriet Orwell, Dr. Orwell, or Mrs. Fielding, who offer rational 
argumentations against her sophism. She is only chastened and reformed after 
she experiences the impracticality of her philosophy, and in particular after she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28 On the anti-Jacobin novel as a world of ‘common sense’, see April London, ‘History, 
Romance and the Anti-Jacobins’ “Common Sense”’, in her Women and Property in the 
Eighteenth-century English Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). It is 
necessary to note that the idea of ‘common sense’ was by no means a counter-revolutionary 
monopoly, as radicals like Thomas Paine also privileged it as a companion category of reason 
and unabashedly used it to characterise their own writings. I then only become semantically 
specific when relating to the other conservative categories just mentioned in the main text.   
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sees the suffering of the repentant Julia at her deathbed. This moment is when 
her loquaciousness comes to an absolute end: she does not even (need to) express 
her repentance or recount her education in words but simply weeps ‘bitterly’ in 
response to Julia’s end. As one character realises, ‘an incident so striking was 
more likely to produce an effect on the mind of Bridgetina than any argument 
that could possibly be made use of’.29 Bridgetina never speaks up again in the 
novel. Hamilton’s ‘persuasion’ is thus silently achieved. The philosopher 
Fredrick Fenton in George Walker’s Vagabond, which I will discuss in more 
details later, also learns the infallibility of experience rather than ‘philosophy’ 
not by verbal debate but by suffering hunger and the cannibalism of the 
primitives in his quixotic adventure.  
It would seem counterintuitive, then, to emphasise feeling as a mediator of 
humour, since the former relies presumably on pathos and the latter is usually 
expressed through the language of bathos. This apparent contradiction can be 
resolved when both are understood as forms of passion, and both can be 
categorised as indispensable byways towards rational argument in anti-Jacobin 
satire. Although the decisive persuasion occurs in the emotive impact at the end 
of the novel, it is the recurrent comic deflations to Bridgetina’s quixotic quest 
that pave the way towards her education. One scene finds her lost in a narcissistic 
sentimentalism that leaves her companion, Julia, unable to refrain from laughing 
at a figure of whose every feature ‘screwed into formality, and every distorted 
limb sprawling in affected agitation . . . presented such an apparent antidote to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29 Hamilton, Memoirs, 364, 366.  
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the tender passion, that the mention of love from her lips had in it something 
irresistibly ridiculous’. Modifiers such as ‘irresistibly’ suggest the drive to 
laughter is also a type of powerful feeling that rational composure cannot 
command: ‘It was with some difficulty that Julia could sufficiently command her 
voice to desire her to proceed’. Bridgetina’s ludicrousness predetermines Julia’s 
judgement before she can recompose herself for further conversation. 30 
Hamilton outrageously characterises Bridgetina as egocentric, affectedly 
sentimental, and hardly conversable, whose solipsistic oratories are constantly 
interrupted rather than disputed. In an oft-quoted passage, Walker claims that 
‘perhaps the Novel may gain attention, when arguments of the soundest sense 
and most perfect eloquence shall fail to arrest the feet of the Trifler from the 
specious paths of the new Philosophy. It is also an attempt to parry the Enemy 
their own weapons; for no channel is deemed improper by them, which can 
introduce their sentiments’. 31  Subsequently, the rhetoric of caricature in 
Vagabond to replace ‘arguments of the soundest sense’ provokes Analytical 
Review to ‘protest against the idea of ridicule being a test of truth’.32 The 
Analytical Review holds that humorous language is not as well-disposed as 
reason or religion to the claim to ‘truth’, whereas the anti-Jacobin novelists 
affirmed its efficacy in advancing their counter-revolutionary cases in addition to 
rational argument. There is a comic episode in The Vagabond where Stupeo and 
his surgeon ‘debate’ the idea of the ‘incomprehensibility’ of motion. Stupeo 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30 Ibid, 174.   31 Walker, Vagabond, 53.  32 Analytical Review, New Series, 1 (February 1799), 212, quoted in Walker, Vagabond, 374.  
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explains why motion is ‘incomprehensible’ in an extravagantly jargon-laden 
language, only to be rebutted by the surgeon: ‘My dear Sir’, cried he, ‘I can form 
no clear idea of your incomprehensible discourse’.33 In avoiding losing himself 
within Stupeo’s philosophical maundering, the surgeon’s comic response 
activates an alternative faculty of intuition or common sense that can facilitate 
the communication between the author and his reader.34  
The comic mode of expression is therefore not a contingent rhetorical 
device but a specific form of (political) communication willfully chosen by the 
novelists to address the matters of common life. In her epigraph to Memoirs of 
Modern Philosophers, Hamilton quotes from Horace’s Satire that ‘Ridicule shall 
frequently prevail, / And cut the knot, when graver reasons fail’.35 Meanwhile, 
her preface quotes from Akenside’s Pleasures of the Imagination to justify the 
use of humour to ‘aid the tardy steps of Reason’.36 Hamilton proceeds to open 
the novel with a slightly abrupt ‘The pudding is very good’, as the strange in 
medias res of the sixth chapter. This cue-less opening sentence that cuts in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33 Walker, Vagabond, 175.  34	   This role of humorous expression was recognised in a review of Isaac D’Israeli’s anti-Jacobin 
novel Vaurien in the Analytical Review (1798): ‘The power of ridicule to shake the gravest 
system of philosophy, and derogate from it’s [sic] dignity and importance, has been very 
frequently acknowledged; an odd fantastic simile, or a ludicrous idea conveyed in some pithy 
pungent phraseology, is more often successful in discrediting an hypothesis, than the most 
laborious and argumentative disquisition’. Isaac D’Israeli, Vaurien, 8. This remark affirms the 
eighteenth-century idea of ridicule as a test of truth and as a byway of reason, but it dwells 
chiefly on the satiric function of political humour. 	  
35 Hamilton, Memoirs, 31.  36 Ibid, 36.  
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hiatus of five missing chapters abruptly positions the reader within the setting. 
Hamilton reports that the missing manuscripts were burnt by her maid, yet she 
seems to have little intention to recover or rewrite them: ‘The first fifty pages 
having been torn off to kindle the morning fires, made a mighty chasm in the 
work; but the remaining fragment appeared to me so worthy of being laid before 
the publick, that I quickly conceived the design of becoming its editor’.37 The 
literary effect, however, of this seeming accident is not insignificant. The reader 
would have no problem following the narrative, as a familiar scene of teatime 
domestic conversation, or a scene of rural common life, unfolds smoothly from 
this sentence onwards, as if the reader’s consciousness seamlessly connects to 
the familiar semantic environment. The good-natured compliment for the 
pudding comes from a house guest at the Botherims, who goes on to assume that 
it was the work of his ‘cousin Biddy’ (Bridgetina). ‘Cousin Biddy’ immediately 
insists in indignation and characteristic pretension in being called Bridgetina, and 
protests in reddening anger that pudding-making is below her philosophical 
dignity: ‘I do assure you, sir, you are very much mistaken, if you think that I 
employ my time in such a manner’. The caricaturist portrayal of the 
ill-conversable, smug, and sullen character of Bridgetina that plays the killjoy in 
social scenes draws conspicuously on the well-worn comic formula. 
Nevertheless, the point is the efficacy of such formula in quickly establishing the 
consensus of a shared (though middle-class) horizon of lived experience that 
affirms a community and simultaneously singles out the character as its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37 Ibid, 35.  
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unsympathisable nuisance. This formula in general fits into that of Bergson’s 
comic character whose persistent singularity fails to respond to the flux of social 
life. An episode in Memoirs sees Bridgetina Botherim take up a book presumably 
rich in humour and skim it in silence, while refusing, as a mark of her 
unsociability, to read aloud to her companion, Julia. She then surprises Julia by 
dismissing works of Cervantes, Moliere, and Fielding, and declares 
indiscriminately: ‘I do not care for wit and humour . . . they may serve to amuse 
the vulgar, but you know they are quite exploded by the new philosophy. . . . The 
investigators of mind never condescend to make their readers laugh’. Bridgetina 
loses an indispensable horizon of communication in her metaphysical stoicism: 
as Julia rejoins, ‘The authors most remarkable for wit and humour appear to have 
had no slight knowledge, of the human heart. Do you think that Cervantes, or 
Moliere, or Fielding, were strangers to the study of the mind; or that they could 
possibly have delineated the minute features of the soul in the manner they have 
done, without an intimate acquaintance with its nature?’	  Patently, in evoking the 
comic literary canon that brings Hamilton in line with D’Israeli and Bisset, the 
ways in which the ideas of wit and humour are pitted against new philosophy is 
by no means limited to bathetic rejection. Rather, they include a positive 
construct of a community based on shared cultural heritage. Julia and Bridgetina 
come to agree that the difference among readers in their relish for humour results 
from attachment to different societies that nourish ‘philosophy’ and affective ties 
respectively.38  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38 Ibid, 172, 173.  
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Hamilton’s dramatisation of Bridgetina’s pretensions against wit and 
humour at the expense of her sociability evokes the eighteenth-century discursive 
tradition. In this regard, the jocose language of the anti-Jacobin novels pursue 
more than the Hobbesian triumph achieved in ridiculing its political enemy; it 
was also disposed to valorise an essential method of sociability that hinges on the 
openness to raillery and ridicule. In other words, anti-Jacobin ridicule as a means 
of ascertaining satiric partisanship is at the same time supplemented if not 
tempered by its inherent ethics of comic sociability as a horizon of 
communication. While the humour in the novels does fulfil the satiric-political 
function of symbolically separating their ridiculous political opponents from the 
conservative community of common life, it simultaneously (and paradoxically) 
strives to reintroduce them into that community if they could accept the 
comicality of human nature and accordingly develop a sense of humour. In this 
regard, the use of human comedy in the anti-Jacobin novel is a vital method of 
moral education. Examples of the main faults of the ‘Jacobin’ character as 
lacking in wit and humour are ubiquitous. Much of Bridgetina’s character is 
shared by the sentimental heroine, Marianne Dudley, in A Gossip’s Story, whose 
faults includes an excess of passion. Her sister, Louisa, and her love interest, Mr. 
Pelham, both favour the remedy of laughter at her self-indulging ‘enthusiasm’, 
reminiscent of Shaftesbury’s proposal of wit and humour as an antidote to 
similar diseases.39 Both Fredrick Fenton in The Vagabond and the eponymous 
anti-hero in St. Godwin betray an inability to understand the comicality of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39 West, A Gossip’s Story (1796), 53. 54.  
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own philosophical cant. The new philosopher, Mr. Cloudley, in The Infernal 
Quixote (1801) adheres so implacably to his humourless rationalism that he 
becomes an object of pranks. When the facetious Mr. Rattle observes that 
Cloudley shows sign of jealousy at Rattle’s flirtation with Mrs. Cloudley, he ‘can 
hardly refrain his laughter when he perceived the husband affecting a 
philosophical indifference’.40  Likewise, Bridgetina Botherim’s philosophical 
mentor, Mr. Myope, struggles ludicrously to maintain his metaphysical aloofness 
by blurting out inarticulate swearwords when a monkey bites his finger, refusing 
to relieve the clumsiness with self-mocking laughter.41  By and large, the 
anti-Jacobin comicality evidences an eighteenth-century comic grammar, which 
can be cast in terms of what Henri Bergson calls as ‘a special lack of adaptability 
to society’. Through the revelation of the social ineptitude of the radical 
individuals, counter-revolutionary laughter functions like a corrective to the 
resistance to ‘life’ and a method to convert and reintroduce the radicals into the 
sociable world.42 
The possibility of comic conversation in addition to comic deflation and 
ridicule is evident in an episode in Memoirs. Late in the novel, Mrs. Botherim, 
Bridgetina’s doting and illiterate mother, having started by this moment to regret 
Bridgetina’s pampered affectation and unsociability, complains about her 
daughter bombarding her with the buzzword of the Godwinian notion of ‘general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40 Charles Lucas, Infernal Quixote, ed. M. O. Grenby (Peterborough, Ont.; Orchard Park, NY: 
Broadview Press, 2004), 218.  41 Hamilton, Memoirs, 48-49.  42 Bergson, ‘Laughter’, 146. See also Chapter 1, 48-49.  
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utility’: ‘who is this General Utility? . . . I never seed [sic] a General but General 
Villers, in all my life’. This risible blunder is not checked with ridicule by her 
interlocutor, Doctor Orwell, the paternalist mentor of the novel: ‘General Utility, 
my dear Madam’, he responds, carrying the topic on with comic wit, ‘is an ideal 
personage, a sort of Will o' the wisp, whom some people go a great way out of 
the road to find, but still see him mining in some distant and unbeaten track; 
while, if they would keep at home and look for him in the plain path of christian 
[sic] duty, they would never miss their aim’.43 The personification of Godwin’s 
abstract notion that offers a comprehensible metaphor for the illiterate Mrs. 
Botherim is an example in which Hamilton fulfils her promise to use wit to 
facilitate communication when rationality may not be quite up to the task. 
However, this method of allegorical reification seems not to reject Godwin’s 
notion but to reinterpret and transform it under a religious-conservative 
framework. This appropriation exemplifies the counter-revolutionary speech-act 
with which one relocates the quest for virtue from ‘some distant and unbeaten 
track’ to ‘home’ and ‘plain path of christain duty’. As I have tried to suggested, 
more than simply a rhetorical instrument for discrediting radical philosophy, the 
comic ridicule in the counter-revolutionary novel can be understood as a vital 
factor of the conservative imagination of social discipline. The anti-Jacobin 
novels of D’Israeli, Walker, Hamilton, Charles Lucas, among others, share the 
Burkean view that moral education is most effective in felt experience; the 
methods, however, register their significant difference. While Burke’s moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43 Hamilton, Memoirs, 345.  
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education hinges on the disciplining of the public sphere, that is, of the crowd 
through the form of tragic theatre, the novelists shift attention to the private 
home and community where lighter, comic scenes take place.44 I want to show 
in the next section that the comic form is where practicality in common life is 
brought to the forefront of the political question; it serves as a vital methodology 
of organising social relation in smaller communities and of scaling down the 
revolutionary threat to a manageable size.  
 
4.2 Community, the ‘Humourist’ and the Comic Dispersal of the Multitude 
 
Readers of the anti-Jacobin novels may notice the uneven targeting of the 
‘Jacobin’ radicals as well as the uneven representative strategies of different 
types. When it comes to parody, first of all, it was the radical culture of the 
intellectual elite — exemplified through the new philosophy of the Godwinians, 
along with Priestley’s natural philosophy and Mary Hay’s sentimentalism, on 
many occasions — that became the favourite straw man, more than the culture 
exemplified by Price, Paine, or Thelwall, who were associated more closely with 
the popular radical movement. A number of the most comically lampooned 
characters in the novels are philosophers allegedly modelled on Godwin: Subtile 
in D’Israeli’s Vaurien (1797), Coca-nous and ‘my Uncle’ in his Flim-Flams! 
(1805), Mr. Myope and Bridgetina in Memoirs, Mr. Vapour and Mrs. Ardent in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44 On theatre in Burke as a method of moral education and political discipline, see Paul Hindson 
and Tim Gray, Burke's Dramatic Theory of Politics, and my Chapter 2, Sec. 1-2.  
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Hamilton’s Translation of the Letters of a Hindoo Rajah (1796), Stupeo in 
Vagabond, Mr. Cloudeley in Charles Lucas’s The Infernal Quixote, and so forth. 
Many quixotic protagonists that embark on comical or farcical misadventures, 
such as Fredrick Fenton in Vagabond and Bridgetina in Memoirs, read and are 
seduced by Godwinian philosophy. A work such as The History of Sir George 
Warrington; or the Political Quixote (1797), however, does not particularly 
adopt a comic tone, as the title may suggest, in representing the eponymous 
quixotic hero who radicalised through readings of Paineite, not Godwinian, 
literature, while the literature of new philosophy is absent in the novel’s 
indictment of radicalism. The Analytical Review once complained of the 
Vagabond for concentrating its ridicule of radicalism on Political Justice alone.45 
On the other hand, as scholars recognise, mass civil unrest was not often 
represented in detail (let alone ridiculed or caricatured), while the usual setting of 
rural community in the novel was often a conscious attempt to put at a distance 
urban insurrections from below. 46  Indeed, ‘Jacobinism’ was a convenient 
blanket term for diverse positions of political reform that may obscure 
differences even within such organisation as the London Corresponding Society, 
which accommodated both the ‘polite’ and the popular grassroots approaches to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45 Analytical Review, New Series, 1 (February 1799), 210-15, quoted in Walker, Vagabond, 
373-78.  46 See Grenby, Anti-Jacobin Novels, ch. 2; Gilmartin, Writing against Revolution, ch. 4; April 




Although often characterised as ‘comic’, the novels in question strive to 
juggle with distinct tonalities in representing the revolution as a threat or as a 
joke. The forceful circumference of the ambit of common life against the 
metaphysical assault of new philosophy is, inter alia, embedded in the anxiety 
about the threat of the crowd. This anxiety may take many forms, from the vision 
of insurrectionary threat of the lower order to the fear of chaos and confusion 
brought about by the alleged homogeneity in the language of universalism or 
collectivism. James Beattie added to his incongruity theory of humour in 1790: 
‘For a mixture appears in the people, and in the houses, of every large town; yet 
a large town, or a great multitude, is rather a sublime than a ludicrous subject’48 
For Beattie, the sheer mass of the crowd exceeds comicality and approaches the 
‘sublime’. D’Israeli’s Vaurien describes the country protagonist’s first 
impression of London — ‘that universe of a city, containing all the of human 
mind, all the variation of human species’ — as nothing short of (Dickensian) 
dazzle and disorientation, concluding that ‘no object of London was more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47 Iain McCalman has pointed out in his Radical Underworld about the tension within popular 
reform societies between the ‘respectable’ and ‘unrespectable’ approaches to politics that 
eventually differentiated self-made working-class gentlemen such as Francis Place and the later 
Thelwall and the more insurrectionary and ‘unrespectable’ radicals like Thomas Evans and 
Thomas Spence. See Iain McCalman, Radical Underworld: Prophets, Revolutionaries, and 
Pornographers in London, 1795-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a 
recent elaboration on this theme see Michael T. Davis and Paul Pickering A. (eds.), 
Unrespectable Radicals?: Popular Politics in the Age of Reform (Aldershot, England; Burlington, 
Vermont: Ashgate, 2008).  48 James Beattie, Elements of Moral Science (Edinburgh, 1790), 1: 161. 
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interesting than London itself’.49 The syntax of this sentence suggests that an 
extremely rapid succession of varieties of impression ironically leaves no 
impression of any single object but the collectivised Object. Most of the comedy 
in Vaurien does not occur outdoors, probably because the social mixture at such 
a scale is so formidable that its potential comic incongruity is obscured. As the 
anxiety about popular politics mounted in the 1790s, the multitude was 
represented as the unrepresentable per se in loyalist literature, as is suggested by 
Burke’s calling the French Republic ‘a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre’.50 
Burke’s notorious porcine metaphor of ‘swinish multitude’ does not express as 
much of a Hobbesian triumph of caricaturist ridicule as a loyalist indignation and 
profound apprehension of total annihilation of civilisation. Hamilton also 
expressed her anxiety about the crowd.51 In a private letter, her ambivalence 
towards London reflected this anxiety: the dynamics of London life exposes one 
to ‘new views of life’; but the human varieties and diversities that afford 
amusements risk being eclipsed by living in crowds, ‘without ever having 
experienced a feeling beyond that of general good-will for any human being’.52 
This insight concurs with Burke’s polemic against the radical notion of universal 
benevolence and the insistence that authentic social affection based on family 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49 D’Israeli, Vaurien, 17.  50 Burke, First Letter of a Regicide Peace, in Writings, 9: 190. 51 See, for example, Hamilton’s letters in Benger, Memoirs of the Late Mrs. Elizabeth Hamilton: 
With a Selection from Her Correspondence, and Other Unpublished Writings (London: Longman, 
Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1818), 2: 157, 179. 52 Letter to ‘Dr. H— ’ (12th Dec. 1811), quoted in Benger, Elizabeth Hamilton, 140.  
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and local ties is how a viable community is maintained.53 For Hamilton, the 
collective uniformity of the crowd marks the impoverishment of social life, 
renders the ‘social virtues’ deficient, and is ‘for ever occurring to poison the 
sweets of social intercourse’.54 Forms of crowd mark the limits of common life 
that must be lived out in ‘sweets of social intercourse’, where comedy can only 
take place. Its antidote will appear to reside in smaller society, such as a familial 
society with choice acquaintances.  
Hamilton’s Memoirs concentrates her comic caricature on the philosophical 
circle of Bridgetina Botherim, whereas the other major Jacobin individual, the 
vagabond sham-philosopher Alphonse Vallaton, is given as a cautionary tale of a 
dangerous radical, despite a slightly mock-picaresque introduction of the 
character in the beginning. As we have seen Chapter 1, some critical literature on 
comedy goes so far as to separate vice from folly as its proper subject: while 
folly can be properly laughed at, vice is too grave and dangerous to be a comic 
subject and can only be tackled in satire.55 This reality informs Hamilton’s 
structure of narrative justice, in which the vicious Vallaton must be banished and 
extirpated (he is eventually ignominiously executed in France) and Bridgetina be 
reformed and reintroduced into society. Also significant is Hamilton’s 
astonishing assignment of Vallaton’s secret identity as a hairdresser, which 
clearly employs the late-eighteenth-century ideological association of barber and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53 The view is most articulated in Letter to a Member of the National Assembly (1791), in 
Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, vol. 8, ed. L.G. Mitchell and William B. Todd (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 314-15.  54 Letter to ‘Dr. H— ’, 140.  55 See Chapter 1, pp. 68-69.  
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low-class conspiracy.56 If Bridgetina’s folly lies principally in her inability to 
transmit subversive principles, the vice beyond comic or satiric redemption in 
Vallaton is the possibility of translating private intellectual folly into public 
sentiment. As Grenby remarks on the private philosophical pursuit of Mr. Mental 
in Thomas Skinner Surr’s George Barnwell (1798), the readers recognise that 
such practice is ‘innocuous if kept to himself, but highly reprehensible’ if spread 
to the unthinking.57  
In examples such as the co-presence of a ‘philosophical’ individualist like 
Bridgetina and the mass insurrectionist like Vallaton, two kinds of conservative 
apprehension can be thus identified. On the one hand, we have the emphasis on 
individual autonomy in Godwinian philosophy and, to some extent, Paine’s 
discourse of natural ‘man’ as freestanding individual, which discredit inherited 
institutions and atomise society, and on the other, partly as a consequence of this 
atomised society, we have the radical crowd that is freely and contingently 
amassed. Both were regarded as negation of community. Nevertheless, to defeat 
their dangerous alliance, the anti-Jacobin novelists managed to identify the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56 As Don Herzog documents, the increasingly demonised hairdresser in the wake of the French 
Revolution was often associated with images of treacherous masquerader and political 
opportunist from below, with mercantile, deceptive personality and fluid identity, capitalising on 
social mobility and the confusions of public spheres. Herzog, ‘The Trouble with Hairdressers’, in 
Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders, 455-504. Commenting on the class allegory 
epitomised in Vallaton, Gary Kelly writes that it advances the case for hierarchy of upper class 
over the lower in prevention of social mixing and dissemination of decadence from above, 
‘Otherwise the result, as in France, will be revolution replacing one corrupt despotism by another, 
both decadently courtly and vulgarly plebeian — a dangerous coalition of the professionals’ class 
rivals. Gary Kelly, Women, Writing, and Revolution, 1790-1827 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 148.  57 Grenby, Anti-Jacobin Novel, 108. 
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tension they could exploit in order to separate them. Unlike other prominent 
radicals like Paine and Thelwall, as scholars have pointed out, Godwin, the 
rational Dissenter, remained distant from the popular-radical crowd, though he 
continued to influence the public mind in the sphere of print.58 With a few 
exceptions, anti-Jacobin novelists chose ideological subversion over 
insurrectionary violence for comic ridicule, and therefore dramatise the rift 
between different forms of radicalism.  
What can the comic mode of expression do against the rhetoric of 
transmission? I will shortly refer to the common eighteenth-century comic motif 
that is also found in anti-Jacobin fiction, but before this I shall briefly address the 
literary paradigm of their political opponents that provoked this comic riposte.  
The ‘Jacobin’ satire in characteristically radical gestures tends to locate the 
sources of evil in the structure and the system, rather than in the self. Godwin’s 
and Holcroft’s novels, for example, often took the form of synecdoche. In these 
novels, personal history is an index to wider structural issues, so corrupt lords 
like Falkland in Caleb Williams and St. Leon in St. Leon are symptomatic of 
aristocracy as such. Drawing on Raymond William’s understanding of the 
individual as an indivisible member of society, Pamela Clemit observes that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58 For an useful discussion of the different approaches to radical politics in Godwin and Thelwall 
with regard to the crowd, see Jon Mee, ‘“The Press and Danger of the Crowd”: Godwin, Thelwall, 
and the Counter-Public Sphere’, in Robert M. Maniquis and Victoria Myers (eds.), Godwinian 
Moments: From the Enlightenment to Romanticism ([Toronto]: University of Toronto Press, 
2011), 83-102. In comparison to Godwin’s more polite model of the public sphere exclusive of 
the crowd, Mee argues, Thelwall’s was more willing to embrace the collective energy as raw 
material with the potential to be ‘alchemised’ into alternative public sphere.  
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‘Godwinian novel’ is the tragedy of the individual caught amid historical and 
social pressures, despite Godwin’s belief in autonomy of the self. The egalitarian 
servant Caleb, the boorish provincial squire Tyrrel, and the benevolent aristocrat 
Falkland are all sketched with typical qualities that underline ‘the breakdown of 
a progressive view of history’: though Tyrrel is superseded by Falkland, who is 
then challenged by Caleb, ‘all three phases collapse into violent conflict, as 
tyranny begets tyranny’. 59  It is in this manner, as Clemit identifies, that 
Godwin’s characterisation can be read as a revision of Richardson’s exemplary 
character. Godwin’s political allegory renders individualism subject to the social 
chain of being, as the intricate web of social and political determinants of 
civilisation ties individuals down to Theophrastan types. Personality in the 
‘Jacobin’ novel involves an index of a continuum between the personal and the 
political, in which personal tragedy serves as transparent allegory to the 
structural evils. As such, Gary Kelly has written of the ‘necessitarian’ aesthetic 
of the Jacobin novel: since ‘the characters of men originate in their external 
circumstances’, the individual psychological realism is directly symptomatic of 
broader institutional issues.60 The individuals are partly responsible but do not 
take the whole blame, and moral reprobation is metonymically deferred by 
general speculation.  
As a counter to this ‘necessitarian aesthetic’, ‘anti-Jacobin’ comedy sought 
to dissever such metonymical universality by insulating the individual ‘character’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59 Pamela Clemit, The Godwinian Novel: The Rational Forms of Godwin, Brockden Brown, 
Mary Shelley (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 48-49, 52.  60 Gary Kelly, The English Jacobin Novel, 1780-1805 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 16. 
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In so doing, moral criteria were applicable again to the individual.61 Although 
both Godwin and the anti-Jacobin novelists were influenced by the Fieldingesque 
theme of the Theophrastan character or human type as a social product, the 
anti-Jacobins also made use of the comic theme of the ‘character’ as a private 
‘humourist’, an individual singularity, which baulks at the sociability of his 
surrounding. In Chapter 1 I discussed this tradition, from Addison’s Sir Roger de 
Coverley to Sterne’s Shandys, who made so singular an existence that cannot be 
subsumed into any prescriptive ‘type’ except the Quixotic, the type of the 
un-typifiable. Such a comic model suggests the clash between the individual and 
social life rather than the contagion of collective laughter.62 As the ‘character’ 
stands out singularly at odds with the environment, the allegorical continuum is 
disrupted by the social drama. The jokes on the ‘new philosophers’ are designed 
to expose their intellectual monologue to social and practical scrutiny, in which 
the breakdown of conversation and sympathy between the philosopher and the 
crowd serves as a figurative rejection of the revolutionary vision of a universal 
continuum. If Godwin’s novels, as Clemit suggests, constitute a fictional 
self-critique of the theory of human ‘perfectibility’, his anti-Jacobin critics ignore 
such self-critical distance. While the contextual constraints on the character in 
Godwin’s novels render autonomy a utopian hypothesis that can only take shape 
after profound inquiries into the dense institutional mediations of social and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61 Lisa Wood summarises the antirevolutionary narrative in general as a ‘focus less on personal 
psychological and emotional development than on individual’s propriety of action within a social 
setting’ through which ‘responsibility for “character” is therefore transferred to the individual’. 
Lisa Wood, Modes of Discipline, 76. 62 See also Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.  
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historical realities, anti-Godwinian parodies assume that the Godwinians take 
perfectibility as an incontrovertible given, thereby proving themselves ignorant 
of human factual finitude and its social being. As the solipsistic unsociability in 
these characters embodies, Quixote-like, the rift between the individual and his 
surroundings, the anti-Jacobin novel insinuates its symbolic social discipline, 
where the Godwinian revolutionaries remain simply private humourists.  
Edward Dubois’s St. Godwin (1800), a burlesque of Godwin’s St. Leon 
(1799), is an illustrative case in point. The novel mimics Godwin’s satire and 
presents an autobiography of a French aristocrat, ‘St. Godwin’, who is unable to 
find his place in society. Educated in the precepts of chivalry and bankrupted 
through gambling, his life has traits of the old order Godwin discredits, until he 
accidentally gains eternal life through ‘the philosopher’s stone’, only to be 
frustrated and exiled again in his radicalised desire to benefit human kind. 
Dubois capitalises on the crippling alienation in Godwin’s pessimistic allegory in 
order to neutralise new philosophy with rhetorical gimmicks. He mischievously 
turns Godwin the satirical author into Godwin the autobiographical character 
who contradicts and censures himself:  
. . . thinking from my political writings, that I was a good hand at 
fiction, I turned my thoughts to novel writings. — These I wrote in 
the same pompous inflated style as I had used in my other 
publication, hoping that fine, high-sounding periods would assist to 
make the unsuspecting reader swallow all the insidious reasoning, 
absurdity, and nonsense, I could invent. The plan succeeded for some 
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time, but at last, they burlesqued my work, and made me look like a 
fool!63  
Seconding the anti-Jacobin consensus about the generic conflation of ‘political 
writings’ with ‘novel writings’, Dubois suggests that the ‘style’ that highlights 
the personality of the author is the glaring fault that causes this conflation. The 
distance between the satirist and his subject is obliterated. Through the shift of 
attention from the satire to the satirist, the satire is transformed into comedy. The 
Godwin persona is mediated here through a ventriloquised voice of Dubois, who 
distorts Godwin’s words in decontextualised verbatim quotes, thereby turning 
Godwin’s satiric allegory into a comic object in itself. The novel constantly 
throws ‘St. Godwin’ into deadened communication between himself and the 
individuals he wants to inculcate with his doctrines, thus rendering him a 
ludicrous soliloquist unable to spread radical ideas.  
As a result, Dubois seems to successfully neutralise the political satire of St. 
Leon, as sympathetic contemporary reviews suggested, into comic pastiche. This 
hollowing of the semantic dimension into empty signifiers agrees with the 
characteristic anti-Jacobin technique of displaced citation in fictional context. 
Along with St. Godwin, Hamilton’s Memoirs, Walker’s Vagabond, ‘Mrs. 
Bullock’s’ Dorothea, and D’Israeli’s Vaurien, among others, feature verbatim 
quotations from works of new philosophy by the Quixotic characters. Clearly, 
this rhetorical sleight-of-hand enhances the Quixotism of these characters by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63 Dubois, St. Godwin: A Tale of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Century (1800). ed. 
Robert Miles (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2006), 209.  
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rendering their words decontextualised and therefore resembling a monologue 
misplaced in practical context. But again, these examples should not be 
unequivocally taken as an attempt at nothing but the alienation of intellectual 
radicals.64 Herein is, of course, the implicit riposte to the radical confusion of 
genres of philosophy and fiction by subordinating fiction to a didactic medium of 
philosophy (which in fact was not entirely true of Godwinian radicals).65 As I 
have argued, political humour involves not only satiric partisanship but can also 
be conducive to comic rapport-building. This spirit informed contemporary 
reviews of St. Godwin. The Monthly Review wrote: ‘“Blessed (say we) be the 
man who invented laughing.” Sancho was never more relieved by sleep than we, 
who are obliged to wade through a mass of dullness, are by a hearty laugh; we 
hope, therefore, that Mr. Godwin will not be offended’.66 The London Review 
praised Dubois who, ‘with considerable ingenuity, employed the powers of 
ridicule, without any of the severity of indignant satire’.67 The Monthly Mirror 
granted the novel its poetic license, stating that the burlesque is simply an 
exercise of a ‘justifiable liberty’ that agrees with Godwin’s own principle.68 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64 See London, ‘Novel and History’, 74.  65  Scholars have pointed out that Godwin affirmed the distinctive function of fiction 
irreplaceable by and complementary to philosophical writings; as David McCracken puts it, ‘the 
two talents of “reason” and “imagination”, while separate, are finally complementary: Godwin 
the philosopher and Godwin the novelist are allies, not antagonists’. McCracken, ‘Godwin's 
Literary Theory: The Alliance between Fiction and Political Philosophy’, Philological Quarterly, 
49 (1970): 113-33. See also David Duff, Romanticism and the Uses of Genre (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 103, for Godwin’s criticism of Holcroft’s facile didacticism of the novel.  66 Monthly Review, n.s. 33 (1800), 224, quoted in Miles (ed.), 244.  67 London Review, 3 (1800), 43 quoted in Miles (ed.), 235. 68 Monthly Mirror, 9 (1800), 30-33, quoted in Miles (ed.), 240-44.   
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These invitations for Godwin to join congenial jocularity suggest the 
conservative view on comic function of political humour, which, paradoxically, 
suspends political difference by asserting the common language of laughter. We 
then arrive at another paradox: Godwin, the quixotic character and the natural 
object of ridicule, is not to be banished, but to be retained as the life of 
anti-Jacobin comedy. Gary Kelly has remarked that the one-dimensional 
characters in anti-Jacobin novels drew on the satirical Character-books of 
Samuel Butler and La Bruyère.69  Alternatively, however, another tradition 
possibly at work as well is the notion of the ‘humourist’, throughout eighteenth 
century, as the odd one out yet indispensable character in enlivening the 
company with amusement, such as a Roger de Coverley, a Parson Adams, or a 
Walter Shandy, all of whom live as if in another world but at the same time are 
an integral part of common life, which abounds with eccentric individuals.  
 This comic pattern to a certain extent corresponds to Bergson’s concept of 
comic character defined by ‘a growing callousness to social life’ or 
‘[inattentiveness] to his social surrounding’. 70  But while the 
counter-revolutionary use of this comic pattern may agree with Bergson’s 
objective to urge the comic individual to step out of his ‘ivory tower’, it has 
another dimension of political function.71 It serves to circumscribe what can be 
called the philosopher-humourist within the ambit of manageable scale of social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69 Gary Kelly, English Fiction of the Romantic Period, 1789-1830 (London and New York: 
Longman, 1989), 63.  70 Bergson, ‘Laughter’, 147. See also Chapter 1.  71 For ‘ivory tower’, see ibid, 148.   
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circle to ensure the dangerous transmission of his ideas will not be carried out. 
By representing the philosophical-humourist as an object of innocuous, neutral 
entertainment, this aesthetical neutrality of character serves to neutralise radical 
agendas. In other words, the de-political aesthetics of human comedy that 
circumscribes the philosophical radicals can function as an effective literary 
policing. Another function of counter-revolutionary humour lies in the 
(re-)invention and insinuation into the rift of two extremes — the individual 
humourist at odds with the world on the one hand, and the collective subject 
threatening to efface all institutional distinctions of lived experience on the 
other — an intermediate institution of social being in which the content of 
common life is once again recognizable. The anti-Jacobin novelists adopt 
different comic techniques in demarcating these modes of social organisation. I 
will use the remaining space of this section to demonstrate a number of strategies 
that register the function of humour in counter-revolutionary policing.  
A strategy found in such novels as Vaurien and Charles Lucas’s Infernal 
Quixote is to shut the philosopher-humourists within mock-conversation in a 
mock-society of radical reformers. In so doing, they are kept distant from 
popular activities, saving spaces for legitimate communal organisation to 
cultivate social virtue as a demonstrative contrast to the vulgarised radical 
society. Both novels feature parodies of ‘philosophical conversation’ in reform 
societies, where radical energy is often consumed in counterproductive 
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speculations.72 Infernal Quixote tells a parallel story of the hero Wilson Wilson, 
a humble carpenter who is later raised to become an exemplary Christian 
gentleman, and the villain, James Marauder, incarnation of the ‘Infernal Quixote’, 
corrupted and wicked son of a Lord who is disinherited and who later schemes 
with the 1790s Irish Rebels to regain his land. The tale roughly follows a typical 
moralist narrative structure that sees Wilson’s virtue rewarded with a marriage 
and Marauder’s vice damned with death and the failure of insurrection. But what 
is notable is that Infernal Quixote goes further than Vaurien in comic technique, 
employing motifs from Tristram Shandy to critique the principles of the 
Revolution. While Marauder’s vice is vividly portrayed, Lucas also seeks to 
attenuate the apprehensive atmosphere by constantly frustrating his scheme in a 
comic environment peopled with ineffective comic characters. The reform 
society (allegedly modelled on the London Corresponding Society) is 
represented as a Shandean communal chaos. A Mr. Rattle, friend of Wilson 
Wilson, and a participant in the society, constantly plays sabotage by mocking, 
misinterpreting, and parodying the language and the ideas of the society. Rattle 
dedicates to the meeting a comic ‘Double Oration’, a parallel text that juxtaposes 
rhetorical patterns of religious enthusiasm and insurrectionary Jacobinism by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72 Nicola Trott notes in her introduction to Vaurien that the threatened violence ends in farce as 
the very ‘Jacobin’ calculating method to which the Godwinian party adhered backfires and 
deflates the schemes of mass uprising. ‘The clear message’, Trott puts it, ‘is the lack of any real 
popular support in Britain for a revolution à la française. The literary effect is a rather English 
fiction, perhaps, in which violent history is absorbed in comic effect’. Nicola Trott, ‘Introduction’, 
in Trott (ed.), Vaurien, xiv-xv.  
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substituting certain words.73 The comic dysfunctioning of the society owing to 
the communicative sabotage is one reason James Marauder, the novel’s villain, 
turns to other sources of revolt such as the United Irishmen. Unsurprisingly, 
Marauder fails to organise an insurrection, which mirrors the failures of the 
radical society.74 Significantly, the character of Rattle embodies a Sternian 
critique of the ‘philosopher’, who is unable to accept his Shandean condition. For 
example, Rattle leaves his home door creaking, a symbolism apparently 
borrowed from Tristram Shandy that refers to mismanagement of domestic 
‘oeconomy’. It mirrors the domestic chaos of the estate of Mr. Cloudley, the 
novel’s principal Godwinian philosopher, who affords Rattle much amusement.75 
Rattle’s humour, furthermore, is an illustrative example of the comic moral 
teaching that accidental contingency and the farces and follies of common life 
are the human condition, a theme obviously borrowed from Tristram Shandy. As 
in the first chapters, the readers are given the story of the birth and the naming of 
the novel’s hero Wilson Wilson as an accident from a miscalculated astrological 
theory of a Dr. Line, Wilson’s man-midwife and a Dr. Slop-like character. The 
Wilsons accept this comic accident and raise Wilson to become a character of 
respectability.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73 Lucas, Infernal Quixote, 162-63.  74 As Grenby puts it, Lucas’s representation of the Irish Rebellion ‘must also be seen as an 
attempt to lay bare the danger of the Rebellion, but then to anatomise it, and thereby neutralise it, 
in just the same way that Lucas’s taxonomy of Jacobinism [in Chapter XV of Volume II] has 
been designed both to alarm and reassure readers’. Grenby, ‘Introduction’, in Grenby (ed.), 
Infernal Quixote, 25. 75 Lucas, Infernal Quixote, 214-20.  
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By confining the philosophers either in their mock-speculative circle or in 
the frustrating praxis of common life, this strategy is effective in representing an 
insurrectionary threat as remote a vision as possible. The society itself is 
represented as an assemblage of humourists whose philosophical whimsicality 
can have no impact on the public affairs but can only exist as a private 
hobbyhorse or a source of amusement for rational and religious individuals such 
as Wilson Wilson.76 Furthermore, Lucas preludes his novel with a visionary 
allegory in which Satan (a symbol for Lucas’s ‘infernal Quixote’) assembles the 
crowd of pandemonium and gives a high-flown yet slightly mock-epic oration. 
The Antichrist Devil claims inspiration from Voltaire, Robespierre, ‘the 
demagogues of France’, and calls for epic rebellion to topple ‘civil and religious 
liberty’ and put an alternative reign of ‘Albion’s favour’d Isle’ in its place. The 
speech is immediately followed by a droll authorial intervention: ‘The purport of 
this Satanic Speech the following history will unfold; it is unnecessary, therefore, 
to detail it any further: —but leaving this fragment as—a prologue—a 
prelude—a flight of fancy—an enigma—a romantic effusion—a poetical licence 
[sic]—a momordian scrap for critic, a Zoilean sop—or, in short, what the reader 
pleases to think it—the tale commences’.77 The intervention serves as a shield 
against the horrific vision, under which the scenes of common life can take place. 
The tale then commences with two simultaneous births (Wilson and Marauder) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76 Lucas, Infernal Quixote, vol. 2, ch. 12, in which Wilson attends their meeting and debates, but 
rather than persuading them with his principles, he is left ‘as much entertained with the violent 
inconsistencies they advance[s] for the doctrines of wisdom’ (136).  77 Ibid, 39-40.  
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in a provincial town that echoes the structure of Tom Jones. One modern edition 
of the novel remarks that the tonal shift from the prelude to the opening chapters 
may be compared to Coleridge’s remark on reading Fielding after Richardson, as 
‘emerging from a sickroom heated by stoves into an open lawn, on a breezy day 
in May’.78 Such impression is, surely, a textual experience, in which actual 
threat is transformed into amusing words on the page, lodged in the space of 
domestic novel-reading. The allegorical prelude, however, reads not unlike a 
picture of wartime Britain, where the French war was often experienced virtually 
as media reports from a distance.79 Along with a number of comic set pieces in 
the novel, this technique prevents the narrative momentum from building up until 
the second half of the novel, when the plot is to be carried out in vain — again — 
in the remoter region of Ireland. 
The revolutionary threat that was relatively abated at home but renewed in 
the Irish Rebellion of 1798 informs Lucas’s narrative strategy. Drawing up a 
contrast between common life being restored and preserved in the British rural 
environment and the subversive contrivers and multitude only recently 
suppressed in Ireland, Lucas’s strategy divides comic neturalisation and satiric 
admonition between two distinct settings. But a subtler allegorical episode found 
in Hamilton’s Memoirs exemplifies another strategy that presents a scenario of 
the philosopher’s encounter with the crowd figuratively as a method of observing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78 Mary Peace, ‘Introduction’ in Peace (ed.), Infernal Quixote, xiii-xiv.  79 For a study of British experience of what can be a remote French war, see Mary Favret, War 
at a Distance: Romanticism and the Making of Modern Wartime (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010).  
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the tension between them at a symbolic and comic distance. Hamilton prankishly 
designs a scene in which Bridgetina Botherim’s self-indulgent sentimental 
‘soliloquy’ is interrupted by ‘a more indignified source’, a drove of pigs, which 
mob her in a moment: ‘The obstreperous and unmanageable animals, not 
contented with terrifying her by their snorting and grunting, (a species of music 
very little in unison with the tender feelings) pushed her from side to side in a 
most ungentle manner’. The coarse, ‘unenlightened’ pig-drovers, instead of 
running to her aid, wickedly laughs at her clumsiness as she is finally driven to 
the ground, prostrate.80 It is intriguing that the apparent allegory of Burke’s 
‘swinish multitude’ is employed not as object of insult but as a weapon against 
Bridgetina’s solipsistic sentimentalism. Kevin Gilmartin identifies its semantic 
ambiguities as derived from different allegories of political conflict, or two 
radical ‘sociolects: on the one hand, the political jargon that dominates 
Bridgetina’s erotic soliloquy . . . and on the other hand, the vernacular in which 
the drovers defend their action’. Gilmartin also speculates on ambiguity and 
unresolved contradictions, as Hamilton seems to shift indeterminably between 
dramatising their clash and suggesting their confusion.81 Indeed, the comic 
episode of the pig-herd’s mobbing of Bridgetina in a sense serves to eradicate 
Bridgetina’s personality — her clumsy fall and her uncontrollable wailing 
assimilates her with the animality of the swine and dramatises the despair of 
transcendence. Bridgetina’s radical subjectivity based on abstract theory, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80 Hamilton, Memoirs, 157-58.  81 Kevin Gilmartin, Writing against Revolution, 155-57 (56).   
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aspires to pursue the primitivism of the Hottentots to liquidate ‘civilization’, is 
then ironically similar to the homogeneity of the faceless multitude, symbolised 
here by the swineherd. But the fictional symbolism is not to be equated with a 
realist representation of mob violence, and the pig-drover can represent the 
common labourer in the rural community from Bridgetina’s neighbourhood. The 
image of the swineherd can therefore play on two semantic levels: on the 
metaphorical level, as a symbolic parody of popular radicalism that mitigates the 
revolutionary threat, and on the metonymical one, as an indication of the 
ordinariness and coarseness of mundane affairs from which Bridgetina despair to 
escape. Bridgetina never manages to travel long distances, which not only 
illustrates her inability to carry out her ‘philosophical’ project but also serves to 
confine her within her immediate environment in which she plays the humourist.  
The last example I will use is Walker’s The Vagabond, which dramatises 
the most direct and closest encounter with the crowd in order to frighten the 
philosopher away to an unpeopled wilderness and then back into the community 
of common life. The novel begins largely in conformity with the familiar comic 
technique of the conflict between the philosopher-humourist and the business of 
common life. As the narrative develops, with the philosophers’ peripatetic 
adventures beyond the ambit of common life — including a visit to Newgate and 
attendance at popular-radical meetings, where the crowds turn violent — the 
novel’s tone develops an alarmist ring as this practical-communal framework 
gradually loses its grip. A comic scene finds the Priestleyan scientist, Dr. Alogos, 
giving a political lecture to his barn (which he calls ‘Hall of Science’) on the 
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virtues of republicanism in ‘rebellion, revolution . . . destruction, murder, and 
violation’ ‘like Milton’s devils’. By these provocative words, he inadvertently 
incenses a number of soldiers in the neighbourhood into mob violence against 
him. He expresses his shock at their behaviour by unwittingly adopting Burke’s 
notorious denunciation of the multitude: ‘they seem to have liberty enough; they 
are treading down my fine flower garden like a herd of swine: there go all my 
exotic shrubs! — I believe they are a troop of Goths and Vandals, who pay no 
regard to science’.82 The ‘mob’, one can say, is created by the subversion of 
Alogo’s own realm of everyday life. At this dangerous exposure to violence, the 
comic absurdity continues to dominate the narrative, as the philosophers start to 
debate on the distinction between the ‘enlightened’ mob of republican virtue and 
the ignorant mob of the ‘Church and State’. As a sanity check, Walker at this 
point is given voice through a gentleman at the scene stating ‘All mobs . . . are 
alike, whatever name you may give them’.83 The group then decides to abandon 
civilisation and go in search of the Rousseavean ‘noble savage’ in the American 
wilderness, where a series of grave dangers, including cannibalism and intense 
starvation, sours the comic tone. By the end of the novel, the comedy has given 
way to horror and then to catharsis. The novel ends with the Godwinian 
philosopher Stupeo perishing in the fire and its hero, Fredrick Fenton, being 
miraculously saved and reunited with his love interest Laura in the manner of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82 Walker, Vagabond, 182, 183. Alogos’s experiences of the mobs in the novel might involve 
implicit allusion to Priestley’s real-life experience in the Birmingham riot in 1791, when a 
loyalist mob stormed his house. See also W. M. Verhoeven, ‘Introduction’, Vagabond, 27.   83 Ibid, 183-84.  
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deus ex machina. Fenton closes the novel in making a Socratic remark that ‘All 
that I know is, that I know nothing’.84 After so long an anti-comic interval, this 
recognition declares the restoration of the supremacy of common life.  
 
4.3 Domesticity, the Novel, Humour and Political ‘Neutrality’  
 
This section continues to use Hamilton as a prominent example of these 
questions: if humour is politically ambivalent, can the counter-revolutionary use 
of it always maintain its depoliticising social discipline? Does the comedy of 
character always function to regulate social intercourse? Can there be any gap 
between the moral community of the home and that of the novel?  
I have argued that the humorous mode of expression in the anti-Jacobin 
novels not only as an alternative to debate but also as a constituent of a legitimate 
ambit of inquiry and social life. A significant function, as I have shown, is the 
shift of zone of engagement from (in Walker’s words) ‘political romance’ to 
‘common life’. In this sense, the counter-revolutionary novel constituted an 
integral part of the conservative cultural enterprise that depoliticises those realms 
of experience that were dangerously politicised in radical literature. As has been 
pointed out, Hamilton’s work privileges domestic virtue and morality as a means 
of resisting facile politicisation as well as reaffirming the sexual division of 
labour in which home management and public affairs are assigned respectively to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84 Ibid, 245.  
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women and men. 85  As Harriet Guest demonstrates, Hamilton emphasised 
domesticity as a ‘neutral’ space, an enclave from the pernicious ‘party spirit’ that 
informed contemporary political turmoil. It is in this domain managed by 
middle-class women, where business and labour are replaced by home comfort 
and leisured sociability and learning, that these women foster (perhaps as a 
female discursive counterpart to the male-constructed civic humanism) their 
cultivation of ‘disinterested’ and ‘comprehensive knowledge’ of the ‘wholeness’ 
of life. Guest explores the interesting double character of the home both as a 
depoliticised alternative of social system and, by virtue of its very ‘neutrality’, a 
microcosm that brings with it the possibility of comprehensively grasping the 
private and the political.86  
However, can the conservative writers fully command the comic language 
in perfect conformity to the political ‘neutrality’ of private domesticity and 
common life, or do they ironically reveal the wishful thinking of the ‘neutral’ 
institutions as depoliticised? Elizabeth Benger, Hamilton’s friend and biographer, 
believed that the virtue of neutrality had been achieved in Hamilton’s command 
of wit and humour in Memoirs: ‘Such success was the more remarkable, as the 
subject was not new, and the ground had been preoccupied by writers of inferior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85 See Adriana Craciun, British Women Writers and the French Revolution: Citizens of the World 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 42-46; Claire Grogan, Politics and Genre in the Works 
of Elizabeth Hamilton, 1756-1816 (Farnham, England; Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2012), ch. 
2; Gary Kelly, Women, Writing and Revolution, 149, ch. 8; Lisa Wood, Modes of Discipline, 
53-54.  86 Harriet Guest, Small Change: Women, Learning, Patriotism, 1750-1810 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2000), 318-39.   
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skill. But in them, the spirit of party had usurped the place of wit and humour: in 
The Modern Philosophers, on the contrary, the alliance of morals and politics 
was carefully disclaimed, and consequently Aristocrats and Democrats agreed to 
laugh at what was ridiculous’.87 By separating ‘morals’ from ‘politics’ and 
claiming that humour transcends ‘spirit of party’, Benger posits humour as a 
moral category. One can identify a typical conservative manoeuvre that 
privileges moral over political concerns and asserts that such concerns transcend 
politics (or party spirit in particular). Yet Benger’s verdict nevertheless appears 
wishfully ideal when compared with Hamilton’s who, in the episode in Memoirs 
I will now turn to, is aware of the fact that the ‘neutral’ space is being 
compromised and contaminated by politicised conversation.  
What kind of neutral space and what has comedy to do with it? Hamilton’s 
problem with her use of humour becomes eminent in an episode of Memoirs, 
where Mrs. Fielding, Hamilton’s exemplary lady in the novel, receives 
Bridgetina as her houseguest for the first time. Mrs. Fielding can hardly forbear 
to laugh when she hears ludicrous sentimental clichés brought by her servant 
before Bridgetina is admitted into the house. Upon seeing Bridgetina in person, 
however, Mrs. Fielding is struck by her appearance and manner, which for 
Fielding are signs of wretchedness rather than laughableness. Whereas Fielding 
ceases to laugh and start to pity Bridgetina, the houseguests continue to find 
Bridgetina simply a source of amusement. She is regarded as ‘a very 
extraordinary character’ by a guest at Fielding’s house named Mr. Sardon and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87 Elizabeth Benger, Memoirs of the Late Mrs. Elizabeth Hamilton, 1: 132.  
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possibly the rest of the company as well, who seems willing to allow Bridgetina 
to indulge in her hobbyhorse of philosophy through half-hearted flattery. Without 
the least awareness of sarcasm and self-knowledge, Bridgetina accepts the 
insincere praise with ludicrous complacency.88 Yet such comic dysfunction of 
conversation is not morally promising for Mrs. Fielding, who, despite the 
conviviality produced by the farcical exchange of words, hesitates over its 
propriety. Later, in another scene of domestic conversation, Mrs. Fielding’s 
reactions and interventions saliently mirror Hamilton’s own authorial 
intervention: ‘[Sardon] was going on, but was checked by a frown from Mrs. 
Fielding, who, observing the eyes of the whole room fixed on Bridgetina, desired 
her to sit down in a corner less exposed to observation’.89 Mr. Sardon continues 
to amuse himself with Bridgetina’s eccentricity, which ‘attracted around them a 
circle of ladies who were all eager to listen to their conversation’, many of whose 
manners were as coarse as Bridgetina’s.  
The narrator then shifts attention from their conversation to an account of 
Mrs. Fielding’s ideal sociability of ‘the conversation of people of talents’.90 
According to Hamilton, Fielding’s breeding enables her to select her company 
with ‘discernment and discrimination’, disposed to ‘pleasure or improvement’. 
Trivial conversation such as ‘a tedious argument concerning the etymology of a 
word, or some minute point in history or antiquity, for which not another soul but 
themselves could care a single straw; and sometimes a dispute in politicks would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88 Hamilton, Memoirs, 255, 257.  89 Ibid, 285.  90 Ibid, 286.  
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cast a temporary cloud over the good-humour of the disputants’, rarely occurred 
by Mrs. Fielding’s management. 91  Unfortunately, Mrs. Fielding has just 
witnessed a farce that rarely occurred by her management. The misconducted 
humour of the company vulgarises conversation that can become both overly 
political and overly personal (‘not another soul but themselves could care a 
single straw’). Fielding’s ideal model of conversation, it is clear, is in general in 
line with the polite tradition that is in a moderate position between the overly 
personal and the overly political, and is maintained by persons of taste. But the 
introduction of ‘politicks’ into domestic conversation taints the polite territory 
where ‘common life’ is lived and cultivated and thus can become alarmingly 
unrecognisable from the street crowd. For a proper lady such as Mrs. Fielding, 
even the domestic space has to function as something like a public forum, so one 
might consider her domestic management as an extension of the bourgeois 
project that Habermas identifies as the relocation of public sphere in relatively 
private arenas. Within this space ‘politicks’ has to be eliminated in the name of 
neutrality. Yet purposeless amusement deemed ‘trivial’ should also be eliminated. 
In doing so, Mrs. Fielding’s model for rational ‘neutrality’ at such private space 
as the home effectively suggests an inversion of the distinction between the 
public and the private.  
What is alarming for Mrs. Fielding in the indulgence of Bridgetina’s 
egotism is that comedy is no longer able to cure misguided zeal or frustrate 
quixotism but risks encouraging them. Mrs. Fielding’s desire for Bridgetina to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91 Ibid.   
247	  	  
‘sit down in a corner less exposed to observation’ when being taken by the 
company as a jocular clown shows that Bridgetina has become something of a 
public spectacle. Comic motifs such as Corbyn Morris’ having the Quixote at the 
dining table, or Addison’s having Sir Roger de Coverley as a regular member of 
Mr. Spectator’s club, is problematised in Hamilton’s fiction. A simple reason for 
that is that Bridgetina Botherim is not the anachronistic Quixote or the Tory 
gentleman after all. Her radicalism is by no means anachronistic but by all means 
a contemporary threat, and her radical politics is considered to corrupt communal 
life as such rather than simply meddle with party politics.  
The practice of treating Bridgetina as a comic character for the sake of the 
enlivening of conservation is, as we may conjecture from the viewpoint of Mrs. 
Fielding, a vulgarisation, if not a failure, of civil society. The 
counter-revolutionary establishment of domesticity as a miniature or displaced 
public sphere renders domesticity itself a site of political contradiction. Mrs. 
Fielding’s authoritative direction of the manner of domestic conversation not 
only expresses Hamilton’s position on women’s public role as private social 
agent but also reveals her conservative conviction that the home was not a ready 
arcadia and rather was in need of policing. Mrs. Fielding’s moral hesitation about 
wit and humour in domestic conversation evoke similar questions of female 
domestic propriety in the tradition of the female conduct book.92 In the novel, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92 Ideological feminine virtues expressed in humour such as modesty, delicacy, benevolence, and 
amiability were assimilated to the male paradigm of polite sociability. For Hester Chapone, in 
line with the paradigm of enlightenment politeness, wit and humour in conversation must be 
handmaidens to ‘improvement’ of ‘common sense and just reasoning’ rather than shallow dazzle 
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the political issue of Bridgetina’s character is cast in terms of her impropriety, 
particularly in her confusion of private and public spheres.  
 Humour as a solution to radical extravagances turns here into a problem, 
particularly when it comes to the distribution of comic expression in social and 
fictional spaces. There is an apparent discord of voices between Hamilton’s 
authorial portrayal of Bridgetina and Mrs. Fielding’s attitude towards this 
character. As a character in the novel, Mrs. Fielding refuses to indulge in amoral 
laughter at Bridgetina’s expense under the dictates of propriety. But the narrator 
in the novel makes an outrageous caricature of Bridgetina, who is given a squint, 
a short statue, and a coarse manner, which seems curiously to violate Hamilton’s 
(or Mrs. Fielding’s) ethical principle of benevolence and propriety. The literary 
reviews who praised Hamilton’s counter-revolutionary moral lessons in Memoirs 
frowned on Bridgetina’s characterisation: the Critical Review found it ‘grossly 
and farcically overcharged’; even for the loyalist British Critic, it ‘exceeds all 
probability, and almost all patience’.93 Hamilton herself was not fully at home 
with the power and stretch of wit and humour, nor was she certain of its social 
function. In an unpublished essay, she expresses misgivings about her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and ‘diver[sion] of an idle hour’. See Chapone, Letters on the Improvement of the Mind. 
Addressed to a Young Lady, 2 vols. (Dublin, 1773), 1: 156-158. Jane West in a letter of Letters to 
a Young Lady includes wit and humour in ‘the Virtues more especially feminine’. Yet the content 
of West’s argument follows the eighteenth-century principles that cheerfulness is an antidote of 
‘spleen’ and ‘gravity’; ‘hearty laugh’ is good for health; jest should amuse and soothe the 
distressed not mock their sufferings; the amusement must be discreet by ‘taste’, and so on. See 
West, ‘Letter IX: On the Virtues More Especially Feminine’, in Letters to a Young Lady, vol. 2, 
4th edn (London, 1811), 383, 382, 384, 387.  93 The British Critic, 16 (October, 1800): 439–40; The Critical Review, 29 (May, 1800): 311–13.  
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incompetence in the appropriate application of this double-edged faculty:  
Though I had a strong relish for wit and humour, I never could learn the 
happy art of bantering the opponent whose argument I could not answer: 
whether he happened to have a long nose or a short one, whether he 
delivered himself in a drawling or a rapid accent, I derived no advantage 
from the circumstance. And though I could not fail to observe how eagerly 
such opportunities were seized on by the wits around me, and that many 
owed their reputation solely to their dexterity in this respect, I never could 
bring myself to imitate their example. My aversion to personal sarcasm 
remained unconquerable.94  
It seems obvious Hamilton’s uncertainty about wit and humour here refers to the 
ethical problems in actual, face-to-face social intercourse and conversation rather 
than the comedy on the page. Her self-reflexive anxiety is reminiscent of the 
cautions of Shaftesbury and the puzzlements of Kames. Shaftesbury pointed out 
at the beginning of the century that laughter as a ridiculing weapon was always 
liable to bounce back from the object who undeservedly received the ridicule to 
the subject who unjustly laughed at him or her.95 As an avid reader of Kames, 
Hamilton probably alludes to Kames’ reflection on ridicule as a test of truth, 
which expresses a sense of despair in search for the definite rule of ridicule that 
can be followed and the conviction that only the faculty of ‘taste’ can be relied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94 Quoted in Benger, Elizabeth Hamilton, 1: 299-300.  95 See also Chapter 1.  
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on.96 Hamilton’s concern reflects many abiding issues of eighteenth-century 
ethics of wit and humour, particularly the issue of how wit and humour can 
maintain a balance between light, sociable entertainment and moral instruction.97  
Bridgetina is widely regarded as a pointed caricature of her friend Hays 
(and, to a certain extent, Wollstonecraft as well), not only for her ideology but 
also for her appearance, manner, and personality, to the extent of ad hominem 
derision. Hays’ and Hamilton’s private acquaintance came to a crisis after Hays 
published an anonymous, scathing review of Hamilton’s Translation of the 
Letters of a Hindoo Rajah (1796). Hamilton felt doubly offended at Hays’ denial 
of authorship as unprofessional backstabbing, and at Hays’ gross lack of humour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96 Kames, Elements of Criticism (Edinburgh, 1762), 2: 55-56. For Kames, see also Chapter 1. An 
admirer of Kames, Hamilton shares with her intellectual mentor the advocacy for female 
education in virtue, judgement, and politeness, as well as the problem, suggested above, of the 
adequacy of the use of wit and humour in promoting polite virtues. For a discussion of Kames’ 
support for women’s cultivation to rival men in ‘virtue’, see Harriet Guest, Small Change, 242-43. 
Hamilton remembers hiding a copy of Kames’ Elements of Criticism for fear of being ridiculed 
of reading what domestic women are not encouraged to read. See Benger, Elizabeth Hamilton, 2: 
31. Clearly, she foregrounds issue of women’s right to claim such faculty that has been alleged as 
a male monopoly. She showed this anxiety in publishing the first edition of Memoirs 
anonymously, when she ventriloquise the advertisement for the novel through the voice of a male 
pseudo-editor, ‘Geoffrey Jarvis’, in the preface.  97 Hamilton was thought to have achieved this in her later historical novel Cottagers of 
Glenburnie (1808), set in Scottish rural life and featuring comic characters. Contemporary critics 
praise Hamilton’s comic performance in this novel. Anna Barbauld writes that ‘perhaps few 
writers, without “overstepping the modesty of nature,” can produce scenes equally comic, or, 
without departing from the airiness of narration, administer counsel equally weighty’. See 
Monthly Review, New Series, 60 (October 1809), 217. For an account of the critical reception of 
the novel, see Gary Kelly, Women, Writing and Revolution, 289-90. 
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in her complaint about Hamilton’s ridicule of Godwinian philosophy.98 She 
retorted in a letter to Hays that Hays took her satire too personally to understand 
her attempt at lampooning general types.99 Hays’ belligerent irascibility might 
have irked Hamilton, and a few years later Hamilton published Memoir, a more 
relentlessly pointed satire on the Godwinian circle and even Hays herself. Critics 
such as Janice Thaddeus argue that Hamilton deftly maintains the balance of 
polyphony in this novel. The ridicule of Bridgetina, Thaddeus suggests, should 
not be taken as blunt comic cruelty. According to Thaddeus, Bridgetina ‘is 
calculated by ridicule both to scare young women who think they can pursue 
recalcitrant men, and to save them from treacherous seducers’.100 This claim as 
it stands is hardly verifiable, and does not fully explain why a caricature of 
Hays’s appearance and manner has to be carried out in such outrageous manner, 
or why that has to be the only way to ‘scare young women’ away from 
radicalism. Perhaps the Bridgetina caricature was Hamilton’s public expression 
of the private acrimony, yet even this is carefully handled in a disclaimer in her 
preface to Memoirs. Echoing her earlier, private letter to Hays, she claims again 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98 For these acrimonious episodes, see Gina Luria Walker, Mary Hays, (1759-1843): The 
Growth of a Woman's Mind (Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2006), 
173-76.  99 See Gary Kelly, Women, Writing, and Revolution, 143.  100 Janice Thaddeus, ‘Elizabeth Hamilton’s Modern Philosophers and the Uncertainties of 
Satire’, in James E. Gill (ed.), Cutting Edges: Postmodern Critical Essays on Eighteenth-Century 
Satire (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1995), 395-418 (409). See also her 
‘Elizabeth Hamilton's Domestic Politics’, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 23 (1994), 
265-284. 
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that her ridicule is targeted at ‘opinions, not persons’.101  
This claim resonates with the discourse of disinterestedness of ‘general’ 
comedy that disavows personal conflict. Elizabeth Benger reported once on the 
positive effect of Hamilton’s moral education by Memoirs: ‘the author received a 
most pleasing testimony in a letter from a young woman, evidently of superior 
talent, who confessed she had detected herself in Bridgetina, and instantly 
adjured the follies and absurdities which created the resemblance’.102 If Benger 
is to be believed, then it also infers that Hamilton’s moral community is that 
which is constructed through the virtual conference of print rather than 
face-to-face counsel. Hamilton was very unlikely to have cured the ‘Bridgetina’ 
in Hays. I do not suggest that this private feud explains the intention of 
Hamilton’s satire, but Hamilton’s comic performance on the page does serve to 
displace conflict in actual social intercourse, which is transformed through the 
literary mediation of humour into a cautionary tale that can instruct the absent 
audience, the reader of the novel.  
In the solitary reading of the novel at home, so to speak, the reader receives 
didactic messages from the author as a guide for the actual social intercourse in 
the same domestic space. The fact that comedy dwells between the author and 
the reader rather than within associative life can be telling. As I mentioned, the 
‘neutral’ home may be a paragon for Hamilton’s public sphere, but in her 
novelistic dramatisation it is contaminated with a variety of private interests. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101 Hamilton, Memoirs, 36.  102 Benger, Elizabeth Hamilton, 132-33.  
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may be that Mrs. Fielding’s attempt to hide Bridgetina from view even in such a 
small company of house gathering bespeaks her apprehension of the invasion of 
the house by the crowd. Bridgetina arouses a contagious sentiment of careless 
mirth around Fielding’s guests, who gather to indulge in meaningless laughter 
and disregard established rules of individual propriety. If comedy becomes a 
corrupting force in the social intercourse and a potential cross-individual disorder, 
then Hamilton’s displacement of comic language to the space of literary fiction 
with a satiric twist could be read as an aim to encourage a temporary retreat from 
domestic society and a sober reflection in private reading. If this is the case, does 
it not imply that the eighteenth-century idea of comedy as a language of 
sociability has gone into crisis?  
D’Israeli makes a similar claim of general comedy for Vaurien, that it 
‘contains not a single individuality; at the same time, that there is not one 
character, and scarcely one incident, which is not found on facts. In two or three 
places, where the attack was meant to be personal, I have named the persons, 
who are properly before the public’. He goes on to cite Fielding’s Joseph 
Andrews, whose characters are ‘copied from the book of nature . . . from 
[Fielding’s] own observation and experience’.103  Referring to the comedic 
paradigm of the factual representation of character types found in common life 
(and perhaps Fielding’s critique of ‘party spirit’ implied in his comedy), Vaurien 
offers itself as a prominent example of a counter-revolutionary depoliticisation 
that sought to recast political questions on literary, moral, and ‘common-life’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103 D’Israeli, Vaurien, 11.  
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terms. Likewise, Hamilton’s disclaimers involve an attempt to situate her satire 
in a politically neutral context. But the fact that such a context does not seem 
available in the 1790s suggests that the difficulty of balancing satire and comedy 
will continue to trouble its practitioners. Can the Godwinian philosophy be safely 
contained in the context that isolates a humourist where this humourist can 
remain an innocuous aesthetic object and can freely pursue his or her hobbyhorse 
without disturbing the wellbeing of rest of society? In the case of Hamilton, it is 
doubtful. Both D’Israeli and Hamilton recognise that a Fieldingesque taxonomy 
that was disposed to offering controlling social panorama cannot fully tackle the 
contemporary political problems of the new-fangled discourse of (Godwinian) 
individuality that threatened to rewrite the relationship between the personal and 
the political. D’Israeli’s addition that ‘where the attack was meant to be personal, 
[he has] named the persons’104 is of course a political act, but it is also, as it 
were, a satiric exorcism which hopes to purify the degenerated community that 
places its comedy at stake. It appears that common life as the (neutral) frame of 
reference is a goal rather than a given, while humour is troubled by its 
ambivalence towards carrying out that goal. Benger’s testimony in one sense 
seeks to confirm that Hamilton’s caricature was really of a ‘type’, which finds 
real-life counterpart in a self-critical reader. But the exorcism of the ‘follies and 
absurdities’ of revolutionary principles suggests that the reading community in 
domestic life is in fact not a retreat from political conflict; it is already a tainted 




4.4 D’Israeli’s Flim-Flams! and the Problem of Autotelic Humour  
 
 I have examined a number of aspects in the anti-Jacobin novel in which the 
comic form functions as literary and cultural discipline in a chiefly domestic 
reading context. I have also considered the conservative misgivings that comedy 
as a form of innocent or neutral amusement can also entail social corruptions 
within that context. But is it possible to imagine that the indulgence in comedy 
for its own sake is productive to the conservative case? I have suggested that the 
conservative reservation about comedy lies in that while it may keep the disorder 
of the crowd at bay to protect the realm of ‘common life’, it may also corrupt 
social relation of common life from within. But what if Hamilton’s (implicit) 
separation of the moral community of print and that of domestic company is 
carried to an extreme, where one confines autotelic humour to the insular world 
of print, and where private reading and writing enables one to indulge in the 
hobbyhorse of however wild and pointless amusement away from social activity? 
What if this kind of the anti-Jacobin novel disavows any topical moral agenda 
and still claims to be alternatively conservative? What would the conservative 
review, as a vital organ of the enterprise of literary policing, make of it? This 
closing section reads a later anti-Jacobin novel, which is in some regards 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105 It is probable therefore that her caricature of Hays expresses her defiance against what she 
perceived as gender bias and saliently illustrates what catastrophe of female education it can 
cause if a woman is taught to become what Richard Polwhele in 1798 called an ‘unsex’d female’. 
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untypical and raises questions concerning the coherence of the 
counter-revolutionary comedies post-1790s.  
D’Israeli’s wildly zany novel Flim-Flams! or, The Life and Errors of My 
Uncle, and the Amours of my Aunt! (1805; revised second edition, 1806) is 
perhaps the most thoroughly and unreservedly comic novel among the works that 
have been branded ‘anti-Jacobin’. However, it is in certain ways anomalous to 
the novels of the ‘anti-Jacobin’ theme. D’Israeli suggests that its wild comicality 
perhaps exceeds conservative tolerance. In the frontmatters of the novel, 
D’Israeli produces a self-critical comic twist by composing five fake ‘reviews’ 
that he and his readers may anticipate from five leading journals — the Monthly, 
Critical, Anti-Jacobin, British Critic and Imperial Review, the majority of which 
are conservative. The ‘Anti-Jacobin’ Review is made to complain: ‘Politics and 
religion are not even alluded to throughout the entire performance; yet so 
insidious and so wicked is this work, that it entirely concerns both politics and 
religion!!!’106 As Marvin Spevack puts it, ‘the keystone of the five prefaces is 
morality’.107 D’Israeli quite accurately predicted the overall negative critical 
reaction, which we will turn to shortly.  
Flims-Flams presents a fictional narrator who tells the life and errors of ‘my 
Uncle’ and his eccentric acquaintances that make up a group called the 
Constellation. The eponymous (anti-)hero ‘my Uncle’ is a bookish antiquarian, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106 Isaac D’Israeli, Flim-Flams! or, The Life and Errors of My Uncle, and the Amours of my 
Aunt! With Illustrations and Obscurities, by Messieurs Tag, Rag, and Bobtail. With an 
Illuminating Index, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1805), xiv.  107 Spevack, Curiosities Revisited, 221.  
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Walter Shandy/Dr. Slop character who is enthusiastic about system and 
metaphysics and morbidly keen on applying them to the business of common life. 
His friend Caco-Nous (‘bad-mind’) is, like the philosopher Subtile in Vaurien, 
another Godwinian incarnation who organises a dysfunctional republic in a small 
town where every citizen abandons their social duty and pasts times in favour of 
abstract debate. Like Tristram Shandy, the Constellation in Flim-Flams! is 
peopled with a variety of eccentric characters: a ‘picturesque’ architect, a 
naturalist scientist who wants to ‘restore’ dead animals to life by re-stuffing their 
emptied cavities, a sentimentalist who believes in telecommunication with plants, 
a female philosopher, and ‘my Uncle’ who quarrels with shades, plans to collect 
ancient Roman tears, designs ‘ventilating hat’ and ‘incombustible cap’ 
productive of ‘philosophical sympathy’, claims to invent ‘portable solitude’, and 
many other comic extravagances. The narrator considers his ‘Uncle’ a ‘peerless 
character’.108 Flim-Flams! presents a society of private humourists that seems to 
afford amusement more than provoke alarm. As the Shandys are confined within 
the parameter of ‘four English miles’ which comprises an archipelago of 
hobbyhorsical characters, the country-based Film-Flamers are also removed from 
the urban crowd and remain privately occupied in their whimsical pursuit 
without being able to communicate or build sympathy with each other. In 
Vaurien, D’Israeli had presented a number of ‘hobbyhorsical’ characters of the 
country in the neighbourhood of the protagonist Charles Hamilton before he left 
for London. These private ‘hobbyhorsical’ humourists differ from the humourist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108 D’Israeli, Flim-Flams! (1805), 2.  
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as ‘philosopher’ of the city, who dangerously meddle with the urban chaos. Yet 
the country humourists retreat into the background at the end of the first chapter, 
and D’Israeli had to cope for the rest of the novel with the dangerous urban 
radical ones through a number of mock-heroic techniques. Flim-Flams!, on the 
other hand, situates philosophical humourist in the private country setting where 
the comic farce is unscrupulously played out. Throughout the novel, mockery on 
Godwinian philosophy involves almost no allusion to the Revolution per se.  
This novel was controversial at the time of its publication, and was 
subsequently ignored. Benjamin D’Israeli made no mention of it in his memoir 
of his father.109 Samuel Smiles reports in the nineteenth century that this novel 
was forgotten.110 The first edition of Flim-Flams! was published anonymously. 
Marvin Spevack reports that D’Israeli denied authorship to the British Critic in 
1805, the year of the first edition, for uncertain reasons.111 The second edition, 
published in the next year, underwent a revamp in which the five reviews 
disappears, an ‘apology’ is added, the chapters are heavily reshuffled, some of 
which are rewritten or added. He also adds a brief episode where the Godwinian 
philosopher Caco-Nous supervises his fellow philosophers of the provincial town 
into a farcical dystopia of the revolutionary republic.112 Perhaps in doing so he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109 See, for example, Benjamin Disraeli, ‘Life and Writings of the Author’, in Isaac D’Israeli, 
Curiosities of Literature, 14th edn (New York, 1865), 3-46. 110 Samuel Smiles, A Publisher and His Friends: Memoir and Correspondence of the Late John 
Murray, with an Account of the Origin and Progress of the House, 1768-1843 (London: J. 
Murray, 1891), 43.  111 See Marvin Spevack, Curiosities Revisited, 229.  112 Flim-Flams!, 2nd edn (1806), 1: 82-83; See also Grenby, The Anti-Jacobin Novel, 101.   
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wanted to assure his critics that his laughter could indeed be harnessed to 
approvable political purposes such as the discrediting of new philosophy. 
D’Israeli’s biographer James Odgen reports the turbulence caused by this 
publishing event: D’Israeli was involved in talks of libel actions and was 
reluctant to publish the second edition until the controversy about the first settled, 
but remained confident about its moral integrity as well as its literary merits.113 
During these controversies in the wake of Flim-Flams, D’Israeli wavered 
between wild comicality and moral restraint. In his next novel, Despotism (1811), 
he returns to the counter-revolutionary themes of Vaurien that satirise the faults 
of new philosophy and threats of revolutionary insurrection, trims down the 
comic elements in Flim-Flams!, and presents a more solemn critique of 
revolutionary ‘fanaticism’ and the rise of Napoleon.114 In 1822, D’Israeli places 
a more critical remark that considers Sterne’s ‘humour and ribaldry’ to be ‘a 
perpetual violation of his natural bent’ of ‘pathetic cast’.115  
Flim-Flams! is a relatively rare example among the anti-Jacobin novels in 
that it engages not only in the ethics of humour but also the problem of laughter. 
Its narrator does not regard pedantry and philosophical whim as such as a moral 
defect, provided that it is balanced with the mirthful spirit for free laughter: ‘I 
believe no man of such profound erudition as my Uncle, ever so keenly enjoyed 
a good hearty crack; a loud burst of honest laughter; he and I would sit opposite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113 James Ogden, Isaac D’Israeli (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), 66. See also Samuel Smiles, A 
Publisher and His Friends, 45, for the talks of libel action.  114 D’Israeli, Despotism, or the Fall of the Jesuits (London: John Murray, 1811).  115 D’Israeli, The Literary Character, Illustrated by the History of Men of Genius, Drawn from 
Their Own Feelings and Confessions, 3rd. edn. (London: J. Murray, 1822), 2: 250. 
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to one another in the library, holding our sides with both hands, and laughing till 
the dome re-echoed with the heart-beating merriment’ (1805, 3: 54; 1806, 1: 
220). It seems that conviviality in the library is the same as that of any social 
scene. But Caco-Nus’s metaphysical defying of laws of physics turns his Uncle 
to hilariously laborious stoicism:  
[My Uncle] declared that “since he had known CACONOUS and 
KILL-JOY, he had frequently crammed his handkerchief into his mouth, or 
bit his nails to the quick, and even when threatened with an explosion of 
laughter, he has willingly stamped upon his own toes, but some of your 
arguments (said he) act on me like a feather in my throat!116  
D’Isreali’s narrator attributes the fanaticism for metaphysics to the lack of 
humour. Concurring with counter-revolutionary satirists, D’Israeli breaks the 
alliance of the philosophers and the multitude by portraying the former’s stoical 
pretensions: ‘Does not the very language of the vulgar, which sometimes 
happens to be accurately philosophical, (said CACONOUS, pursuing the 
argument,) describe the painful state of LAUGHTER? Sensible persons 
frequently declare that they are convulsed — ready to burst — splitting their 
sides — and, finally, dying with laughter?’.117 The dangerous potential of the 
pleasure of laughter — levity, licentiousness and vulgarity — which is subject to 
conservative censure, is to certain extent permitted.  
D’Israeli’s attitude towards laughter in Flim-Flams! is problematic, if one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116 Flim-Flams! (1805, 3: 58; 1806, 1: 224 [‘said he’ removed]).  117 Flim-Flams! (1805, 3: 56-57; 1806, 1: 222-23).  
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considers the general conservative view that humour must somehow be regulated 
under a moral framework. The case becomes more intriguing when the radical 
Holcroft gets involved in D’Israeli’s polemics. The young D’Israeli had 
contributed to Holcroft’s Wit’s Magazine with a humorous and playful piece on 
‘nonsense’. 118  Later, as their political sympathies went separate ways, 
D’Israeli’s took issue with the radical author’s views on the ethics of laughter. In 
a footnote to My Uncle’s asceticism from laughter, D’Israeli quotes parodically 
from Holcroft’s Travels . . . to Paris (1804). Holcroft is represented as a 
revolutionary stoic, lost in the theoretical calculation of the pros and cons of 
laughter in relation to progressive reform. Holcroft’s original text, in fact, 
addresses subtle ethical issues and expressed a more liberal take on laughter, but 
they are written off in D’Israeli’s parody as he urges Holcroft to enjoy laughing 
as Rabelais’s Gargantua did.119  D’Israeli seems to have brushed aside its 
complex ethics by reaffirming the Sternian ethics of laughter as simply against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118 D’Israeli, ‘Letters from Nonsense with Some Account of Himself and Family’, The Wit’s 
Magazine: or, Library of Momus Being a Compleat Repository of Mirth, Humour, and 
Entertainment, 1 (1784), 177-179; ‘Farther Account of the Family of Nonsense’, The Wit’s 
Magazine, 1 (1784), 145-47. See also Stuart Peterfreund, ‘Identity, Diaspora, and the Secular 
Voice in the Works of Isaac D’Israeli’, in Sheila A. Spector (ed.), The Jews and British 
Romanticism: Politics, Religion, Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 130-31. 119 D’Israeli, Flim-Flams!, 1805: 3: 56-57n; 1806, 1: 222-23n. The context of the quotes from 
Holcroft is in fact about the familiar question of the appropriateness of superiority laughter, when 
Holcroft’s travelling company was met with laughter by the locals presumably due to their exotic 
oddity, reminiscent of Shaftesbury’s reflection of the issue of cosmopolitanism in the scenario of 
the Ethiopians at the European carnival in Sensus Communis. Elsewhere in this book, Holcroft 
assures that ‘it is polite never to take offence at a joke’ on foible. Holcroft, Travels from 
Hamburg, through Westphalia, Holland, and the Netherlands, to Paris (London: Richard Phillips, 
1804), 42, 187.  
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the spleen. Holcroft, on the other hand, raises a familiar reservation that laughter 
may become an obstacle to ‘sound sense’ and ‘pure wisdom’ if it is performed 
without a view to improvement. In doing so, he employs the Godwinian 
progressive idea that the triumph of reason eventually overcomes the confines of 
passion and necessity on which the ethics of laughter is supposed to dwell.120  
Flim-Flams!, on the other hand, appears to maintain that laughter can pass 
as an innocuous private pleasure. However, it does not foreclose the question of 
milder ethical reform such as laughter’s improvement of communication and 
sociability. In the second edition, D’Israeli seems to have developed doubts 
about the communicability of laughter. D’Israeli adds an ‘apology’ by a ‘Bobtail’, 
Flim-Flams!’s fictional annotator, who breaks the news that its ‘illustrious 
author . . . died of vexation — and laughter!’.121 This Bobtail presents the 
‘author’ as just another hobbyhorsical character whose obsession is laughter 
itself. Bobtail recalls the scene at the deathbed of the ‘author’, who continues to 
enthuse over laughter and ‘flim-flaming’ and implicitly mocks the solipsistic 
vanity in My Uncle’s and Coca-Nus’s philosophical pretension, but whose 
persistence in laughter verges on the very solipsistic vanity he mocks. Bobtail 
poses as symbolic censorship on D’Israeli’s authorial persona, as he appears to 
be sceptical of the fictional author’s philosophy of laughter and ‘flim-flaming’. 
In their deathbed dialogue, the ‘author’ insists that ‘My Flim-Flams were 
designed as the child of Pleasantry and Banter.’ He claims that ‘The honey-moon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120 Ibid, 42.  121 D’Israeli, Flim-Flams!, (1806), 1: xv.  
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between Author and Bookseller was one of the sweetest we have had for many a 
year!’122 He enthuses about jest, raillery, and ‘flim-flam’ as a communicative 
action in the reading world, even a common language that connects all fields of 
knowledge: ‘Do we not every day observe the Antiquary bantering his brother 
Antiquary; the Picturesquists rallying their rivals; does not the Geologist smile at 
the results of his own calculations? Do not Metaphysicians hold terrible 
logomachies? Do not the Chemists laugh in one another's faces, scarred by their 
own discoveries? Do not the Mechanists confess, that nine-tenths of their 
inventions, are no inventions at all?’123 Yet this recognition and the implicit 
tolerance for the ubiquitous ludicrousness in all fields of knowledge and 
literature ends up implying that the richness of eccentric curiosities D’Israeli 
upholds amounts, through the ethics of laughter, to a universal and even timeless 
value. The author insists that ‘gravity’ should be driven away by laughter, and 
‘good-sense and good-nature never quarrel with a flim-flam, are never alarmed, 
and can laugh with the jester’.124 This rhetoric is clearly an echo to Sterne and 
evokes the eighteenth-century amiable humour that was thought to be conducive 
to sociability. Bobtail, however, comments that the author’s self-righteous 
vindication of ‘flim-flam’ verges on a solipsist monologue, ‘a delirium of vanity’. 
Shortly after, Bobtail reports, ‘he went off in one clap of laughter, and seems to 
die perfectly with himself!’125 Bobtail’s qualm appears to be that the autotelic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122 Ibid, 1: xxiii-xxiv.  123 Ibid, 1: xxvii.  124 Ibid, 1: xxxvi, xli.  125 Ibid, 1: xlii, xliii.  
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bent of ‘flim-flam’ or laughter will render itself too private to bear on any 
communicative, more public interests.  
In this regard, Flim-Flams! poses the difficulty of reading conservative 
humour, or even humour in general. It is not simply because of the possible 
tongue-in-cheek tonality (D’Israeli spuriously uses exclamation mark throughout 
the novel). The political and moral functions of humour depend on its reminding 
individuals of the human imperfection in faults and foibles — a favourite 
conservative theme — against the radical speculation of transcendence that is 
often read by the conservatives as deluded whims, such as those of ‘my Uncle’. 
Laughter is a corrective against the ultra-rationalism of ‘Holcroft’ and ‘Godwin’. 
But if this Bergsonian social function checks excess it also turns into an excess in 
its own right when its comicality eclipses its satiric function and becomes 
autotelic. The actual reviews by the Critical Review, the Anti-Jacobin, and 
British Critic were in general liberal enough to appreciate the values of wit and 
humour and D’Israeli’s approvable criticism of radical philosophy, but they were 
not very positive about D’Israeli execution.126 The reason for the scepticism of 
the author’s command of wit and humour was because of his indiscriminate and 
unregulated mockery. The Anti-Jacobin protests against ‘the want of distinction 
in the author’s censure’.127 The other two agree. In the verdict of the Critical 
Review:  
We are aware of the folly of racking butterflies upon the wheel: but this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126 Critical Review, 3rd Series, 4 (Feb. 1805), 155-57; Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine, 20 
(Apr. 1805), 371-76; British Critic, 26 (Oct. 1805), 399-405.   127 Anti-Jacobin Review, 375.  
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author is a hornet who has fallen into a nest of wasp; which wasps, if they 
do their duty, will sting him without compassion. We have at length 
examined a book which conveys neither instruction nor entertainment: 
both because it abuses, not only respectable characters, but also some of 
our noblest national institutions for the promotion of literature, art, and 
science; and because its pretension to instruct and entertain are confident, 
although they rest solely on three hot-pressed volumes of heavy trifles, 
and nine grotesque plates, — in the room of which we think this author 
might have substituted the black or marble pages of his model Sterne, 
with equal advantage of less expense.128  
According to the Critical Review’s criteria of ‘instruction’ and ‘entertainment’ 
seems to need to be given in mutual balance based on certain well-informed and 
morally sound position, absent in D’Israeli’s eccentric and unregulated 
performance. It seems to imply that D’Israeli fails to entertain because he means 
to entertain excessively, and is given to endless trifling of ‘his model Sterne’ 
without the restraint of moral taste. In fact, Sterne’s comedy remained a 
suspicious legacy in the politically charged context of the 1790s. Alarmed 
readers associated Sterne’s outrageously trifling and facetious style with French 
moral irresponsibility and revolutionary sentiment: laughter for its own sake was 
too morally suspicious. 129  Flim-Flams! may tonally resemble Dubois’s St. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128 Critical Review, 157.  129 At the height of anti-French sentiment, a pamphlet published in 1799 held Sterne’s amoral 
trifling responsible for encouraging French vices of irreligion and republicanism. According to 
the author, Sterne’s failure to instruct with laughter makes him complicit with the dangerous 
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Godwin, which exercised little more than a thoroughly facetious performance of 
parody without balancing it with the moral instruction or demonstration of virtue 
present in other anti-Jacobin novels. Yet St. Godwin managed to garner more 
positive reactions, presumably because of St. Godwin’s far more specific and, for 
conservative reviewers, just targeting of Godwin alone. But Flim-Flams!, as if to 
test the reviewers, fails to draw distinction between radicals and ‘men of letters’ 
in its universal raillery. 
D’Israeli’s comic performance is possibly associated with his idiosyncratic 
approach to conservatism. One aspect in which one can single out D’Israeli from 
many other loyalists is on the question of the individual: while others insisted on 
local social tie against the universalist dissemination of revolution, D’Israeli 
values ‘solitude’ in ways that suggest disturbing proximity to Godwin’s 
affirmation of individual autonomy. But the valorisation of individual solitude is 
predicated on a particular discourse that informs D’Israeli’s distinct version of 
conservatism. In his An Essay on the Manners and Genius of the Literary 
Character (1795), two years before Vaurien, D’Israeli affirms solitude as 
guarantor of the cultivation of ‘literary character’. This ‘Solitude’ is not one of 
seclusion and unsociability as such, but rather one that preconditions an 
alternative sociality to physical meetings. The ‘invisible brotherhood’, as he calls 
it in the second edition of Literary Character (1818), is found in the world of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘French freedom’ that shakes the foundations of social order. See D. Whyte, The Fallacy of 
French freedom and Dangerous Tendency of Sterne’s Writings (London: J. Hatchard, 1799).  
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bibliomania.130  Such virtual, non-physical communal bonding centres on a 
literary ‘genius’ or literary character, who is an ‘isolated wanderer’ or 
‘disobedient child’ of a parent but who comes to life in pages.131 
D’Israeli’s thesis of ‘literary character’ thus rests on an ethical premise that 
is conspicuously at odds with most conservative writers discussed in this study. 
‘Literary character’ in D’Israeli denotes literary uniqueness reflecting an 
extraordinary personality that is sometimes synonymous with his idea of ‘genius’. 
The ‘genius’, according to D’Israeli, is ‘in an eternal conflict with the usages of 
common life’, and distinguished by ‘an irritability of disposition’. 132  For 
D’Israeli, the ethics of ‘common life’ has to take a backseat when it comes to the 
cultivation of a literary genius. In his actual life, D’Israeli occupied himself in 
practices of antiquarianism (and befriended prominent antiquarian Francis 
Douce), and spent a long time in library immersing in texts. These bookish 
practices are liable to become objects of ridicule in the tradition as Shaftesbury’s 
virtuoso and pedant as well as that of the counter-revolutionary satirist’s 
soliloquist and narcissist.133 While authors I have discussed such as Walker and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130 D’Israeli, Literary Character (1818), 9.  131 D’Israeli, Literary Character (1795), 30-31, 41. As Sean Gaston puts it, the character of 
‘literary character’ for D’Israeli can be defined as ‘inherited disinheritance’: ‘In the formation of 
the literary character, it is neither family, nor friends, nor apparent mentors that matter—only 
books. One inherits the disinheritance of genius only through reading. It is in reading beyond and 
outside of the social environment that one is born into that makes a literary character and shapes 
character as a literary affect. One becomes a literary character through this perpetual dislocation.’ 
See Gaston, ‘Isaac D'Israeli and the Invention of the Literary Character’, Textual Practice, 27 
(2013), 793. 132 D’Israeli, Literary Character (1795), 103-04.  133 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, passim, but see esp. ‘A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm’. 
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Hamilton regard self-indulgent unsociability as detrimental to social virtue and 
community, D’Israeli identifies its positive (conservative) function in the private 
activity of preserving cultural heritage by annotating, anthologising and critically 
receiving existing literature. In this regard, his humorous portrayal of ‘my Uncle’ 
might entertain D’Israeli’s autobiographical self-compliment dressed as 
self-caricature. Like a ‘humourist’, ‘literary genius’ is equally inept in ‘common 
life’. This connection renders D’Israeli an odd case. While Hamilton, West, 
Lucas and Walker use the novel as fictional manual for manners in actual life 
and community, or as a cautionary tale, D’Israeli’s concern is the value of 
imaginative writing in its own right, which he sees as constitutive of a 
community — a print community as opposed to physical company in common 
life.  
Laughter and (parodic) humour as a means of reception, then, finds another 
conservative function. In the midst of charges of Sterne’s plagiarism in the 1790s, 
D’Israeli in his Miscellanies; or Literary Recreations (1796) turns Sterne’s 
alleged plagiarism it into compliment: Sterne are among the writers ‘who imitate, 
but are inimitable!’134 It is conspicuous that Flim-Flams! also imitates Tristram 
Shandy’s parodic allusions to knowledge. Flim-Flams! features a wealth of 
anecdotes and parody of the works of extremely diverse authors — including 
Philo, Cervantes, Richardson, Dr. Johnson, Kant, Lavater, Erasmus Darwin, 
Godwin, Capability Brown, and so on — all of whom are mocked for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134 D’Israeli, Miscellanies: or, Literary Recreations (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1796), 
318. 
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oddities and whimsicalities in their texts and the anecdotes of their personal lives. 
D’Israeli often parallels the whim of the flim-flammers in the novel with those of 
the canonical authors. He often depicts a scene showcasing the hilarious whim of 
a flim-flammer and then adds in a footnote that such a whim is found in the text a 
canonical author.135 As the ‘author’ remarks in the second edition:  
Revolve the works of the finest geniuses of this age — it is perpetual 
flim-flamming! SPALIANZANI flim-flams LINNAEUS . . . BONNET 
flim-flams LEIBNITZ . . . DARWIN flim-flammed BONNET . . . 
FALCONET flim-flams WINKELMAN . . . FUSELI flim-flams 
FALCONET REPTON flim-flams PRICE . . . KNIGHT flim-flams BURKE! 
Sir JOHN HILL  . . . flim-flammed the ROYAL SOCIETY, 
DRUMMOND . . . flim-flammed all our metaphysicians; but he himself 
must pay the public tax which Genius imposes on Genius, and be hereafter 
himself flim-flammed! . . . Men of genius are all cuppers and bleeders to one 
another’.136  
April London describes D’Israeli methods of miscellanist commentary of 
canonical texts as ‘conservative iconoclasm’, which resists ‘hierarchies of 
knowledge’, but the iconoclastic mode is also ‘a commitment to the preservation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135 For example, there is a scene in which a number of flim-flammers propose a ludicrous theory 
of the ‘sentimentality’ of plants. D’Israeli explains in the footnotes that such a whim can be 
identified in the texts of prominent botanists such as Linnaeus and Erasmus Darwin. See 
D’Israeli, Flim-Flams! (1806),  136 Ibid, xxviii-xxix.  
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of residual values’.137 In this light, the comic forms of Flim-Flams! establish an 
ambivalent relationship with the canon: on the one hand, the caricature of the 
canon serves as symbolic censorship to which men of letters are dedicated to the 
regulation of taste in the republic of letters; on the other, the iconoclast reading 
brings the deified status of literary genius down to earth to increase accessibility 
to the general reader, and to acquaint them with the unknown insider of 
neglected textual curiosities in order to facilitate a living, more intimate and 
more thorough relationship with the texts, which is jeopardized by the 
homogeneous universality of new philosophy.  
While D’Israeli’s laughter in Flim-Flams! is directed towards peculiarity 
and oddity, its universal application shows his view that peculiarity is universal 
and is worthy of conservation in his anecdotal representation. The idea of 
universal peculiarity inherits Sterne’s philosophy of the private hobbyhorse, 
which, as Wendy Motooka argues, opposes Enlightenment rational 
universality.138 In this sense, D’Israeli is in line with the counter-revolution 
against the radical Enlightenment of Godwin and Holcroft. But in D’Israeli about 
the relationship between the ‘literary character’ and laughter remains unclear, 
albeit that both involve a degree of private enjoyment. What is disturbing for 
many other conservatives is D’Israeli affirmation of a certain degree of the clash 
with ‘common life’, because it is productive of both comedy and ‘literary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137 April London, ‘Isaac D’Israeli and Literary History: Opinion, Anecdote, and Secret History 
in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Poetics Today, 26 (2005), 358. 138 Wendy Motooka, The Age of Reasons: Quixotism, Sentimentalism, and Political Economy in 
Eighteenth Century Britain (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), ch. 5. 
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character’. Perhaps it is the mundane practicality of ‘common life’, which might 
suggest proximity to demotic ordinariness and, to a lesser extent, to the radical 
universality of homogeneity, which makes D’Israeli anxious about the potential 
loss of the extraordinary individual as an essential ingredient for cultural 
meritocracy.  
 The mock-quarrel of the narrator of Flim-Flams! with his imaginary critics I 
have mentioned might well be a straw-man parody of the conservative review, 
but it does indicate the reality that the contemporary conservative criticism was 
not perfectly disposed to endorse comic techniques in the literary practice as an 
unequivocal antidote to radicalism. The Anti-Jacobin Review approves Edward 
Dubois’s politically charged ‘genuine humour, keen satire and sarcastic allusions’ 
in St. Godwin. It claims that, facing the ‘poisonous doctrine of the day’, ridicule 
such as this is necessary to nip the flowers of evil in the bud: ‘For although we 
do not allow ridicule to be the only test of truth, we still are of the opinion it may 
be applied with effect in the destruction of the false malignant and sophisticated 
reasoning of the disciples of Godwinian philosophy.’ By the end of the review, 
however, Anti-Jacobin raises concern over Dubois’s humorous performance, 
which features pointless entertainment and digressive episodes ‘unmeaning and 
unnecessary’ to the serious political task.139 In the anti-Jacobin novels discussed 
in this chapter, comic entertainment serves the double function of symbolically 
insulating radicalism and disengaging the readers from the heady politics of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139 Anti-Jacobin Review (Apr 1800), 426, 427, 428, reprinted in Dubois, St. Godwin, 233, 234, 
235. 
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day. Yet the effort of establishing the comic novels as a depoliticising enclave 
from political turmoil to prevent the epidemic of universal politicisation can also 
be considered self-crippling. As counter-revolutionaries were recruiting every 
available source to resist or overpower their political oppositions, the ‘comic’ 
strategies of diversion and disengagement to deflate radicalism’s momentum 
may run at odds with the direct engagement that the Anti-Jacobin appears to be 
demanding. As I mentioned earlier, D’Israeli also shows qualms about the 
balance between his affirmation of private pleasure and the social moral duty 
following these curious episodes of the publishing event of Flim-Flams!. I 
suggest that this problematic text indicates the potential fragmentation of 
D’Israeli’s conservative ideology, if not the very disintegration of conservative 
discourse as a whole.140
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140 For an observation on the fragmentation of the ideology of on the radical side of reform, see 
Mark Philp, ‘The Fragmented Ideology of Reform’, in which he points out that the fragmentation 
is most obvious in the shift between appeals to the idea of a ‘British’ constitutional politics and 




Humour and Common Life 
 
I have considered literatures of a range of political positions to demonstrate 
the ways in which political humour in the literature of the 1790s can be 
harnessed to the contestation about the scope of political life. I have argued that 
one way to approach this question is through a consideration of the shift of 
generic hegemony from ‘satire’ to ‘comedy’, in which politically committed 
authors find some useful vocabulary to describe the changing conditions of 
political life as they perceive in the 1790s. In eighteenth-century criticism, 
‘comedy’ was disposed to do away with these sectarian tendencies with 
depoliticising effects. However, as I have argued, it is through these allegedly 
depoliticising gestures that comedy reconfigures political matters. The implicit 
political character of ‘comedy’ provides useful grammars for the polemicists 
across the political spectrum to address the emergent political questions 
generated by the Revolution controversy.  
‘Humour’, certainly, is not to be regarded as an unequivocal disengagement 
from politics into a territory of amusement, nor as taking shelter in the interstices 
of the political fabric in social life. As a byway of rational ‘debate’ that turns out 
to take a central stage in the political conflict, it reflects the process of the wide 
politicisation of the 1790s that rendered rational debate insufficient in dealing 
with a diversity of political demands and issues. Yet I also emphasise that the 
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limitless politicisation of the 1790s is not to be understood as a process of 
subsuming all aspect of life into a monolithic political framework, but rather as 
two fundamentally contradictory processes that are nonetheless concomitant, if 
not mutually conditioned or determined. I argue throughout that the texts of the 
1790s not only engaged in the politics, but also the political: they wanted to 
understand and to contest the nature and the scope of politics itself. They tried to 
do this by drawing on a language that might help them gain a sense of the outside 
(illusory or not) of politics itself in order to negotiate and delimit its ambit. I 
argued that the language of humour provides this alternative zone of engagement 
in some respects. The contents of this zone include the categories of ‘common 
life’ and ‘human comedy’. These categories, as I have argued, gain increasing 
relevance for a number of political issues generated by the widened scope of 
political life.  
The political controversy over humour is summed up as follows. The claim 
to autotelic innocence of humour in the comic discourse of the eighteenth 
century was predicated on contradictory social tendencies: laughing either 
reinforces individual boundary or facilitates transmissive and collective 
conviviality. ‘Common life’, which denotes a social relation in settlement, is the 
existential horizon that enacts this contradiction. With ‘common life’ in crisis or 
contestation in the 1790s, and with social organisation under political 
controversy, humour as a political disclaimer is thereby reworked into a 
particular political language.  
 I have argued that the category of ‘common life’, whose depoliticising 
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discourse of social ethics no longer held in the politically charged 1790s, have a 
troublesome semantic range, which generates its own political problems even as 
they are employed to deal with existing political problems. I will conclude this 
study by considering further the problematic category of ‘common life’ in 
relation to the aftermath of the political controversy of the 1790s. ‘Common life’ 
is depoliticising partly because it implicitly assumes a degree of universality. It 
seems, intuitively, to be able to lose its meaning, including its political meaning, 
if its semantic range is so universal as to encompass all lived experience of 
individuals from all backgrounds. But as ‘common life’ also denotes concrete, 
practical business, it may simultaneously suggest contextual specificity. The 
‘common life’ in Burke’s Reflections, for example, is clearly conjured up to 
oppose the British political and social system to that of the French, which 
conditions lived experience in a different way. The ‘common life’ is believed to 
exist under an organic social structure of ‘British oak’, in contrast to what Burke 
later in the First Letter on the Regicide Peace calls the French ‘spectre’ under the 
Republican polity. The French polity is the very negation of ‘common life’ since 
its foundation, the civil society, is in Burke’s judgement absent.1 The radical use 
of humour, as I show in Chapter 2, therefore problematizes the discursive 
construct of comedy as a legitimate expression of ‘common life’ by affirming the 
more mobile and collective manner of living. Therefore, the specific contents of 
‘common life’ may be subject to conflict rather than serves as a universal plain 
of communication. As I argue in Chapter 3, Wolcot’s caricature of the King’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For ‘British oak’, see Writings and Speeches, 8: 136; see also p. 224 above for ‘spectre’.  
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effort to bring himself closer to common people’s everyday business may reveal 
that the content of ‘common life’ is class-specific, so that the attempt at political 
conciliation and political control through the communication of private, everyday 
matter may ironically turn into political conflict. For the anti-Jacobin novelists I 
have considered in Chapter 4, ‘common life’ refers to a moral category that must 
be embedded in a relatively stable and more manageable social structure. 
Comedy for them often becomes a tool of demarcation that circumscribes 
‘common life’ in the rural or domestic community away from the urban political 
turmoil. On the other hand, the ‘polite’ discourse of ‘common life’ often 
excludes a different way of life in the crowds of the tavern, the street, the theatre 
of the mobile urban world that contradicts the sense of settlement in conservative 
thinking.  
As I suggest in Chapter 1, ‘common life’ as an ideological category is 
employed in the construction of the genre of ‘comedy’, or more precisely the 
general, non-partisan, ‘human’ comedy that depicts human faults and foibles in 
quotidian affairs. In this regard, ‘common life’, in theory, should be a referent for 
the universal existential horizon. I have shown, on the other hand, that ‘common 
life’ in the 1790s is also made a vehicle for identity politics. If ‘common life’ in 
an abstract sense describes the universal human condition, in a concrete sense it 
cannot be homogenous because of its material content. This is the ideological 
wager with which Burke criticises British imperialism: as he puts it in Letter to 
the Sheriffs in Bristol, each community produces its particular ‘common life’, 
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‘according to the temper and circumstances of every community’.2 Burke’s 
understanding suggests that ‘common life’ is both universal and particular, since 
it denotes universal social being but simultaneously implies that the content of 
‘common life’ in each (organic) community might be incommensurable.  
The inner semantic tension of ‘common life’ between universal existential 
horizon and cultural specificity, in my view, bespeaks its ambivalence between 
conciliation and conflict. I will close this study with a discussion of Maria 
Edgeworth’s Essay on Irish Bulls (1802), co-authored with her father Richard 
Lovell.3 The book introduces to the English readers the Irish life and culture by 
focusing on the comic language in the Irish use of the English language. The 
republican project in Ireland was recently defeated in the failed Rebellion of 
1798 that involved the activists from the radical United Irishmen. Edgeworth and 
her father Richard Lovell, committed to progressive Enlightenment values and 
once connected with the United Irishmen, showed ambiguous attitudes to the 
Union.4 Irish Bulls, written in the wake of these events, sought to introduce an 
alternative mode of conversation to tackle the political controversy over these 
turbulent events.5  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Works, 3: 318. See also my Chapter 1, pp. 53-54.  
3 Irish Bulls has undergone significant changes through the editions, but I use the first edition in 
1802 to discuss the most immediate response to the recent events around 1800.  
4 Richard Edgeworth voted against the Union, but expressed attempt at cultural conciliation on 
many occasions as it became a fact.  
5 Claire Connolly proposes that Richard Lovell Edgeworth’s decision to vote against the Union 
and leave the parliament before the Bill was passed was due to ‘a loss of faith in the powers of 
persuasion and indeed public discussion altogether’. See Connolly, ‘Writing the Union’, in Dáire 
Keogh and Kevin Whelan (eds.), Acts of Union: The Causes, Contexts and Consequences of the 
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Edgeworth contends that blunders are universal and the English are by no 
means immune from making them, so they are in no position to use this biased 
image of the Irish as a proof of their lack of intelligence. If we are to believe the 
Edgeworths’ claim that Irish Bulls is written with their ‘sincere wish to conciliate 
both countries’, then the content of the book suggests that the conciliation 
requires far more than formal political arrangements. It takes the knowledge of 
the language, culture and the ways of life. Featuring humorous details of Irish 
common life, Irish Bulls contains themes that resonate with those of the British 
controversy over humour in politics. Irish Bulls sets out to explain that many 
apparent bulls are of the species of Irish wit. As for the comic incongruities of 
the Irish expression in Edgeworth’s previous publication Castle Rackrent (1800) 
that are received as ‘Irish bulls’, Edgeworth contends that most of the ‘bulls’ are 
in fact conducted with unacknowledged reasoning or witticism that reflected 
Irish manner, custom, approach to practical matters, and occasional political 
subtexts. As Henry McKenzie’s journal The Mirror once puts it, ‘humour’ is 
culturally specific because ‘common life’ is culturally specific.6 The Mirror 
explains why Scottish humour is less prolific than their English neighbour: 
because the Scots have to use a language that is not their native tongue, whose 
idioms is only comprehensible when the writers reach into ‘common and 
ludicrous pictures of life’ by using the language that is ‘as nearly as possible, that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Act of Union (Dublin: Four Courts, 2001), 171-86. Cliona Ó Gallchoir argues that this loss of 
public faith sheds light on the reading of Castle Rackrent and Irish Bulls as an alternative public 
sphere. See Ó Gallchoir, Maria Edgeworth: Women, Enlightenment and Nation (Dublin: 
University College Dublin Press, 2004), ch. 2.   
6 The Mirror, 83 (22 Feb. 1780), 73-81. 
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of the common life, that of the bulk of the people’.7 This is why, the article 
argues, their only works of humour are written in Scottish dialects, with which its 
Scottish users are more at ease to give the ‘ludicrous representations of low 
life’.8 This claim suggests that humour reveals the incommunicability between 
different systems of ‘common life’.  
Edgeworth uses similar reasoning, but with a protesting tone rather than The 
Mirror’s humility. She claims that native Irish people are prone to blunders 
simply because English is not their modern tongue.9 Unlike The Mirror, which 
argues that the Scots are less able to produce humour because of their 
unfamiliarity with English, Edgeworth argues that it is precisely the non-native 
and odd uses of English that produce comic incongruities. The cultural 
intersection — English as the common language — provides means of 
conversation between the otherwise untranslatable relativism of cultural 
particularities. Moreover, the Irish cultural particularity is a distinct totality, and 
a totality of common life that encompasses all classes. As Edgeworth claims: 
‘The Irish nation, from the highest to the lowest, in daily conservation about the 
ordinary affairs of life, employ a superfluity of wit and metaphor which would be 
astonishing and unintelligible to a majority of the respectable body of English 
yeomen’.10  
A reading of Irish humour as an introduction to Irish common life and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid, 79-80. 
8 Ibid, 80.  
9 Maria Edgeworth, Essay on Irish Bulls (London: J. Johnson, 1802), 7-8. 
10 Ibid, 160.  
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culture as a whole displays Edgeworth’s willingness to establish what one critic 
regards as ‘cultural partnership’ with England.11 But this gesture, reminiscent of 
the eighteenth-century comic sociability, involves a polemical twist. Edgeworth 
proposes cultural partnership with the proviso that the English learn about the 
Irish conditions expressed in Irish English. The ‘unintelligibility’ of Irish wit 
serves not as a brute fact but as a point of departure for a cross-cultural 
conversation on an equal footing. In order to open up that conversation, 
Edgeworth wants to jettison superiority theory. In the tale ‘Little Dominick’, 
Edgeworth tells the story of an Irish boy’s persecution by a pedantic Welsh 
schoolmaster for frequently committing errors of ‘standard’ English. Protesting 
against the arrogant ridicule on Little Dominick, Edgeworth reiterates 
eighteenth-century anti-Hobbesianism that this laughter of ‘real or imaginary 
superiority’ is fit for ‘the most ignorant’ and ‘the most vain’, who are 
‘unconscious of their own deficiencies, and consequently fearless of becoming in 
their turn the objects of in their turn the objects of ridicule.’12 She clearly 
identifies the demeaning stereotype of the Irish vernacular language as the 
impediment of progressive conversation between the two cultures. In fact, ‘Irish 
bulls’ was ubiquitously a main feature among eighteenth-century jest-book. 
Although Simon Dickie omits to mention, ‘Irish bulls’ were a permanent feature 
in the jest-book, a laughing-stock for the English readers, along with women, the 
handicapped and the poor. Edgeworth’s main contention is that this mode of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Rebecca Shapiro, ‘Educating the English: Maria Edgeworth’s Castle Rackrent and Essay on 
Irish Bulls’, Women’s Writing, 10 (2003), 73-92.  
12 Maria Edgeworth, Irish Bulls, 89.  
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facile triumph rules out productive mutual understanding of cultures.  
Evidently, Edgeworth’s critical inquiry benefits from the tradition of 
incongruity theory, often with explicit and implicit allusions to the Scottish 
criticisms by Beattie or Hutcheson. Marilyn Butler believes that the Scottish 
Enlightenment intelligentsia is Edgeworth’s role model. For Butler, it is the 
‘progressive cosmopolitan history of culture’ in Scottish philosophy that 
cross-fertilises mutually and fruitfully with Ireland’s popular culture. The Scots 
were to be the post-1800 ‘role-models’, who had ‘established the ground rules 
for diverse but equal membership’.13 Elsewhere, Butler takes issue with the 
reading of the Edgeworths’ politics as Protestant landlordism and supporter of 
the Union, and argues that Irish Bulls presents a ‘hybrid’ culture of the British 
nation. The Union was merely a ‘fact’, and its cultural identity consists of four 
regional particularities. She writes: ‘The high and low strands help weave 
together a new, enlarged civil society and British nation. This is both a manifesto 
and an extreme example of Edgeworth’s new method and new subject, modern 
culture itself.’ 14  This vision of ‘enlarged civil society and British nation’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Marilyn Butler, ‘General Introduction’, in Marilyn Butler and Mitzi Myers (gen. ed.), The 
Novels and Selected Works of Maria Edgeworth (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1999), XLV.  
14 Butler, ‘Irish Culture and Scottish Enlightenment: Maria Edgeworth’s History of the Future’, 
in Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, and Brian Young (eds.), Economy, Polity and Society: 
British Intellectual History, 1750-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 168-72 
(170). See also Butler, ‘Edgeworth, the United Irishmen, and “More Intelligent Treasons”’, in 
Heidi Kaufman and Chris Fauske (eds.), An Uncomfortable Authority: Maria Edgeworth and her 
Contexts (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 33-61. On cultural ‘hybridity’, see also 
Mary Jean Corbett, Allegories of Union in Irish and English Writing, 1790-1870: Politics, 
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resonates with the eighteenth-century discursive tradition about a liberal nation 
of humour I have accounted for.15 However, the theory about the universal 
expansiveness of civil society is often compromised by, I have noted, English 
chauvinism which would congratulate its self-image of diversity against the 
simplified others. Edgeworth’s polemics thus displays a tactful appropriation of 
the English rhetoric by suggesting that this rhetoric is not progressive enough 
with the Irish excluded.  
While Butler’s interpretation is valid on some counts, I want to consider 
how far the comic linguistic aspect is constructive to Edgeworth’s cross-cultural 
vision. Like other eighteenth-century comic theorists, Edgeworth sees humour as 
a distinct mode of communication from reason. She insists that comic blunders 
in social conversation be laughed at rather than be reasoned with. An Irish diner 
who wants his beef to be cut ‘horizontally downwards’ should be received as an 
accidental bull but should not be corrected by the censorship of rationality.16 As 
she puts it: ‘It would, indeed, be an intolerable restraint upon social intercourse, 
if every man were subject to be taxed for each inaccuracy of language — if he 
were compelled to talk, upon all occasions, as if he were amenable to a 
star-chamber of criticism, and surrounded by informers’.17 It is clear, then, that 
Edgeworth considers not the semantic or logical aspect of language but the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
History, and the Family from Edgeworth to Arnold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 50, 76. 
15 See Chapter 1.  
16 Maria Edgeworth, Irish Bulls, 59-60.  
17 Ibid, 58-59.  
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speech-act or language-game, which functions not simply to give information but 
to facilitate other aspects of social intercourse, which, for instance, can enliven 
the conservation with the Irish diner that the restaurant table.  
But even if the performative dimension of language exempts comic 
blunders from rational censorship, is it restricted to jocular conviviality? At times, 
Edgeworth suggests sympathy or compassion rather than laughter as the proper 
performative expression. In an example of a ‘bull’, two Irishmen on a fatiguing 
journey learn that they still have ten miles to go. One of them cries: ‘it is but five 
miles a[-]piece’. Edgeworth makes it clear that the point of the story is not its 
logical absurdity: ‘instead of a bull, they have only a piece of sentimental 
arithmetic, founded upon the elegant theorem, that friendship doubles all our 
pleasures, and divides all our pains’.18 At times in Irish Bulls, Edgeworth 
highlights pathos that tempers rational ridicule and prejudicial triumph to 
promote fellow-feeling.19 But in doing so laughter’s role is also limited, raising 
the question of how to laugh with ‘good nature’ or when to stop laughing.  
This leads to her implicit ambiguity, or indecision, about the epistemology 
of ‘Irish bulls’. Edgeworth is frequently vague about the distinction between a 
‘bull’ or a wit. Should one regard ‘five miles a[-]piece’ as unequivocally a bull 
rather than a witty way to cheer up the companion? An expressive pattern like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid, 91-92.  
19 For example, the Irish bulls made by the wretched ‘Little Dominick’ (‘I have no father — I am 
an orphan — I have only a mother’; ‘I have no brother but myself’) should be good-heartedly 
laughed at with caring benevolence and without an attempt to ridicule it to coerce the blunderer 
into corrected expression. Ibid, 71, 72.  
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‘silence that speaks’, as Edgeworth reports, is often identified as bulls, but she 
also assures that such expression is found trans-historically and internationally 
from the Homer and Horace to Milton, Pope, Voltaire and the contemporary Irish 
speeches.20 She suggests, correctly, that ‘eloquent muteness’ is a much-used 
figure of speech in the canonical literature. But if the pattern of that expression 
should be evaluated in the literary framework of poetic license, and if it is a piece 
of wit, why and when is it simultaneously a ‘bull’? In these problematic 
examples, Edgeworth does not elaborate on the criterion for the reader to identify 
a literary wit or a bull based in different contexts. She points out that unidentified 
satires cause the misidentification of witticisms as ‘bulls’, but does not consider 
why expressions like ‘Every man his own washerwoman!’ should be regarded as 
a bull rather than perhaps a satire on the sexual division of labour.21 In his 
review in 1803, Sydney Smith points out that Edgeworth is indecisive 
concerning the nature of ‘bulls’, and fails to grasp that the incongruity in a ‘bull’ 
is that a bull misrecognises false relation and ironically produces real incongruity, 
while ‘wit’ does the opposite in disclosing real relations through apparent 
incongruities.22  
Nevertheless, despite his analytical rigour, Sydney Smith fails to consider 
the multilayered concerns about the performativity of comic language and its 
entangled social ethics that lie at the heart of Edgeworth’s complex analytical 
confusions. Despite the lack of careful categorisation of the comic figurative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid, 218-220.  
21 Ibid, 43.  
22 [Sydney Smith], ‘ART. X. Essay on Irish Bulls’, Edinburgh Review (Jul 1803), 400. 
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language, Edgeworth’s critical inquiry opens up new thinking of humour as a 
mode of social intercourse or a method of political negotiation between cultures 
or between common lives. In my view, Edgeworth’s analytical confusions 
bespeak her wish to plead for perhaps too complex and too many kinds of 
English response to Irish culture. The responses she demands include sympathy 
(hence the plea for refrain from cold ridicules of Irish ‘bulls’), respect and 
appreciation (hence the plea for recognition of Irish intelligence in ‘wit’), 
benevolence, egalitarian attitude, tolerance, sociability, civility, convivial 
humour. Such wide range of communicative modes may not always comply with 
the jocular, mirthful, or facetious tone of humour.  
Irish Bulls clearly seeks to acquaint the English readers with the particulars 
of common life in Ireland, but in doing so the role of laughter is also rendered 
partial. If the eighteenth-century comic theory concentrates on characters and 
manners as materials of entertainment in social scenes or even as relaxing feasts 
of jest to ease everyday toil, then it certainly cannot cover the wide range of 
social issues Edgeworth effectively raises in this otherwise amusing book. 
Edgeworth in Irish Bulls appears to follow the eighteenth-century tradition of 
treating humour as an anodyne for the hardship of common life: ‘the poorest 
labourer [in Ireland] forgets his poverty and toil in the pleasure of enjoying a 
joke’.23 However, the amusement in the Irish Bulls often has to be juggled with 
other performative aspects in the joke such as the expression of pathos. In 
Edgeworth’s later writings, the reservation about the power of the laughing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid, 309.  
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humour increased. In her novel Ennui (1809), Edgeworth has her melancholic 
protagonist reflect on a ‘practical bull’ in his travel around Ireland. A number of 
Irish labourers at work in a bog on a hot day lights fire. This strikes him as a 
laughable foible, but he is informed later that the fire is meant to drive away tiny 
flies in order to continue working, and he feels embarrassed about his ignorance 
of a local custom.24 The judgement of a ‘practical bull’ is falsified because the 
apparent incongruity of practical reason (lighting fire on a hot working day) 
obscures another practical necessity (getting rid of the flies). This example 
demonstrates that the apparent incongruities in the lived experience are 
intertwined with the complexity of material conditions. Edgeworth here offers 
the reader a possibility to think beyond the eighteenth-century incongruity theory. 
That the discordances, oddities and practical contradictions in common life are 
considered infinitely productive of comicality is probably an idealist wishful 
thinking. ‘Common life’ is an entanglement of practical concerns. The ludicrous 
incongruity can be a polyvalent speech-act, breeding amusement as well as other 
concerns and responses.  
Yet Edgeworth leaves these questions underexplored in Irish Bulls and 
concentrates on the theme of universal tolerance of comic blunders, which was 
largely tackled on formal linguistic level in the polite language, while the ‘vulgar’ 
remains a source of anxiety.25 Later in life, Edgeworth increasingly perceived 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ennui (1809), reprinted in The Novels and Selected Works of Maria Edgeworth, 1: 252.   
25 The conversation about the toleration or appreciation of Irish expressions is between three 
gentlemen from Ireland, England, and Scotland. The Welsh are elsewhere demonised as 
backward-looking and narrow-minded bullies. Edgeworth makes the Englishman remark: ‘Yes, 
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humour reaching its limit in Irish realities, as she remarked privately on the 
progress of the novel Helen (1834): ‘[the novel contains] no humour, no Irish 
character . . . It is impossible to draw Ireland as she now is in a book of fiction — 
realities are too strong, party passions too violent to bear to see. . . . We are in too 
perilous a case to laugh, humour would be out of season, worse than bad taste.’26 
Edgeworth employed humour to introduce the Irish question, but it turns out to 
be only a point of departure rather than the comprehensive means of tackling the 
issues of Irish life.  
Irish Bulls is an illuminating example that it is precisely the conciliatory and 
depoliticising take on humour that produces rich political subtexts. Humour is 
effectively rendered a partial index to the extremely complex questions of 
‘common life’ as an entanglement of cultural, political and material conditions. It 
may encourage one to regard the theoretical marriage between comedy and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
among the vulgar and the ignorant, but not amongst the higher and better informed class of 
society’ (Edgeworth, Irish Bulls, 389). The Scotchman also appears to subscribe to this 
demarcation between the ‘well-educated’ and the vulgar (Ibid, 128). Alternative form of affective 
cohesion like solidarity to a positive and voluntarist form of association like ‘cultural partnership’, 
nevertheless, is suggested in the remark by the Irishman after he hears the Englishman 
acknowledge that the English blunder as much as the Irish: ‘I’m so glad to hear we have 
companions in disgrace’ (Ibid, 128).   
26 Maria Edgeworth, A Memoir of Maria Edgeworth, with a Selection from her Letters by the 
Late Mrs. Edgeworth. Edited by her Children. 3 vols. (Privately published, 1867), 3: 87. For 
discussions, see Michael Hurst, Maria Edgeworth and the Public Scene: Intellect, Fine Feeling 
and Landlordism in the Age of Reform (London: Macmillan, 1969), 33; Declan Kiberd, Irish 
Classics (London: Granta, 2000), 264; Michael Neill, ‘Mantles, Quirks, and Irish Bulls Ironic 
Guise and Colonial Subjectivity in Maria Edgeworth's “Castle Rackrent”’, The Review of English 
Studies, New Series, 52 (2001), 90; Claire Connolly, A Cultural History of the Irish Novel, 1790–
1829 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.  
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‘common life’ as arbitrary. The inconsistencies and tonal ambivalence may 
reveal her inability to deal with the massive range of issues, but it is to her credit 
to illuminate that the connotations of humour are far beyond humour itself. As 
Brian Hollingworth puts is: ‘Ambiguities and ambivalences abound in [Irish 
Bulls]. . . . This is not necessarily something to be deplored. Edgeworth’s 
uncertainties often add depth to her narrative structures, particularly in the 
context of the Irish political situation after 1801.’27 By playing (in Stuart Tave’s 
term) an ‘amiable humorist’ with an amusing representation of Irish common life, 
Irish Bulls tactfully avoids technical political terminology in the wake of the 
political events around 1800. Yet it is precisely in locating the Irish question in 
the mundane particulars of common life that the political questions are registered 
fundamentally. Its reflections on humour signal the disintegration of the 
incongruity theory after the political turbulence of the 1790s, and reveal that 
humour as a political solution — as emancipation (the radicals), discipline (the 
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